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THE NEW GERMAN ARMY

By Count Wolf Baudissin

GERMANY'S military defeat in 1945 destroyed a régime which had been a nightmare to many Germans, and, at times, to almost the entire world. Its disappearance nevertheless left the world, and of course Germany in particular, with a multitude of political, social, psychological and spiritual problems. The basic questions of German national life have all been newly posed. Among them now is how to construct a new army which will avoid the mistakes and dangers of the past and achieve the highest efficiency under the present changed circumstances. In this problem is revealed the whole complexity of the German situation.

The split in our country is part of the world-wide division between the free nations and Communism. This means that Germans cannot think about it merely in national terms.

The bitter lessons taught us under the Third Reich and the present fate of our compatriots between the Elbe and the Oder have made Germans genuinely desire a legal state and a free way of life. Even the sincerest pledge to democracy, however, cannot substitute entirely for what makes a parliamentary system healthy and viable in the long run: the slow growth of democratic traditions until the people are permeated with a sense of security down even to their subconsciousness. For the time being, our young republic can be only what the first German republic was in the twenties: an experiment in good intentions, a hope for the future. But in its rôle as a model and nucleus for a Germany united in freedom and peace the Federal Republic carries a special responsibility.

We pledge ourselves to democracy and to the free nations of the West partly because we remember our recent past, partly because we have the example of the Eastern Zone and partly because of

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the proximity of the Soviet Armies. At the same time we realize that there are intangible forces threatening to which not even veteran democracies are immune. The magnetic attractions of anonymity existing in the modern mass society make it difficult to describe democracy any longer in terms of the value of the individual and the dignity of man. The rapidity with which the conditions of modern life change makes it very hard for individuals to have the same sense of mutual interdependence that used to exist in a simpler society. This makes man lonely and increases his fear of life. The emphasis which both we and the totalitarians place on technical perfection blurs the borderline between us and them. The loneliness of the individual within the mass encourages escapism rather than devotion to principles. The desire for security is often stronger than the desire for freedom and a chance to develop according to individual aspiration. These dilemmas are intensified by the fear caused by nuclear weapons and the fact that Germany has only just recovered from a total defeat brought on by her own leaders. Together they may give an idea of the difficulties facing German political leaders and military planners today.

Nevertheless, one simplifying factor causes all these questions to fall into a clear pattern. We have become a border country of the free world. From a simply national point of view it is possible to think of defending Germany from the Elbe against the West. But the fact that any such idea would seem absurd to Germans shows how far they have come in realizing that any concept of German national defense must be identified with a democratic system of government. Today the spirit of German defense can be expressed only in the symbol of armed democracy. So much has the Hitler era sharpened our senses.

Experienced soldiers know how critical the spirit of an army is for its efficiency. In planning our armed forces, then, we would necessarily, from simple interest in their future efficiency, take account of the fact that among so many spiritual changes and faltering values the German soldier must be given the feeling that he is a member of a free nation standing on the side of freedom. In other words, the actual potential which the German armed forces will add to European and Atlantic defense is closely connected with the extent to which the free way of life has meaning for Germans and the extent to which the German soldier identifies himself with it.

Under the term *Inneres Gefuege*—"inner structure"—the plan-

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ning section of the German Ministry for Defense has tried to develop a program for a democratic army. Many people think of "democracy" and "army" as irreconcilables. They are confusing democracy as a form of life with parliamentary procedures. In my view, the idea of democratic armed forces consists of simply three things: organic integration of the army into the democratic state; devotion of its leaders to the state and its constitution; identity of values in the army and in the democratic state.

Concrete proposals for giving this program effect are now coming before the German Parliament. But before we concern ourselves with the draft of this "inner structure" it may be well to indicate what was the foundation on which we based our specific concepts about the nature of the future armed forces. This may be done by outlining three specific problems.

II. ARMED FORCES IN THE COLD WAR

We must draft and train our armed forces in the midst of a permanent civil war. Mankind is threatened by an ideological principle which denies all personal values and demands total submission of the individual. In this dispute, the old frontiers no longer exist; no limitations of place or time or ways and means hamper either side. Neutrality can only be had at the risk of choosing the opposite side. The enemy directs his attack at the individual. He plays all the keyboards of the propaganda organ, from blunt menace to nebulous reassurance, from threats of social disintegration to appeals to nationalist feeling. By reversing and confusing the meaning of everything he tries to make the individual capitulate without applying force. But he will be ready to use force the moment he is sure the opposite front has been sufficiently softened and undermined.

The formation of the German armed forces is thus seen to be simply an act in the general context of international civil war. But these armed forces are to do more than serve as a warning to an aggressor. They will form and hold an important sector of the inner front. Under their protection and with their help Germany will try to build up a form of life and government which every citizen will consider worth defending.

Before weapons speak, the soldier of today is already fighting in a jungle of ideas, slogans, sensational propaganda and disguised aggression. To fight it successfully he needs more insight, vision and confidence than were ever involved hitherto in the "art of

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soldiering." True, behind him there will stand a social order which should set an example for his conduct and make his decisions easier. But democracy is hard to comprehend under modern conditions and therefore is vulnerable to the down-draft of totalitarianism. Similarities between the forms which modern mass society assumes on the two sides of the Iron Curtain suggest that it may be possible to avoid choosing between them and simply adjust to circumstances. Whether or not to change sides thus becomes only a question of personal risk. As we know, the deserter who either by a moral decision or from weakness allows himself to be used against his own side is the classic symbol of a civil war. Here is a grave warning for those who consider the spiritual attitude of the future soldier unimportant.

Henceforward the German soldier must be conscious of the fact that he does not defend one sort of political system or another but a concept of life. Not national interests alone but decisive questions of human existence are at stake. If life is to consist of just production, enjoyment and consumption, of efforts to insure the material needs of existence and rise in the social scale, then the choice between a democratic and a totalitarian form of government will follow the line of greatest convenience. The chasm between the attempt to achieve democracy and the arbitrary planning of authoritarian systems is revealed by the judgment of our inborn conscience, using an entirely different set of values.

Those who are unable to recognize that the basis of democracy is respect for the human being will be particularly susceptible to arguments about democracy's technical shortcomings and particularly impressed by the degree of economic consolidation achieved in the Soviet Union and its capacity for decisive action. In a permanent civil war the "unpolitical" soldier, the "blind" citizen, will not in the long run prove able fighters. Units of the Foreign Legion type which are held together mainly by various fears or by *esprit de corps* are reliable only under special conditions not at all like those prevailing in Europe. Nor will loyalty to a government be sufficient by itself; it will not supply the soldier with the inner stability he needs in facing the intricate confusion of ideas, threats and temptations spread by the enemy. Only the man who knows that as a citizen he is at one here and now with the state and who sees its capacities for development as his own—only that man can survive in and win the cold war.

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III. THE SHAKEN STANDARDS OF THE "SOLDIER'S WORLD"

The German soldier entered the Second World War with more or less distinctly defined traditional values and military principles. Our experiences in the war deprived us of these supports. Think of only a few of the problems raised during the war—civilian bombing, partisan warfare, minors and women drafted into active service, questions as to the limits of shocking revenge. Traditional ethics knew no answer to them. A world of honorable principles failed when constituted authorities ordered the killing of hostages and political commissars. The pledge to the flag came into conflict with conscience.

From an objective point of view, this war was characterized by two striking phenomena. One was the gain in range and in concentration of firepower resulting from the universal adoption of the internal combustion motor. The second was the unrestricted use of "terror" as a psychological weapon and a method of authoritarian rule. Both opened up new possibilities of emotional conflict within the military sector.

The gain in operating power, which increased the number of civilian victims to a frightening extent, follows the course of technical progress. In the future it will still not be in the soldier's power to reduce that number, since he is restricted to purely military considerations and finds the limits of military necessity in his own conscience and the standards of international law. To say this is not to imply, of course, that it may not be possible to set new limits on warfare against civilians by international agreement.

Terror is a different matter. The fact that terror lies outside enlightened control and restriction has renewed the domination of the primitive in the history of war. What happened during the war in the German-occupied countries and in Germany herself was simply a chaotic chain reaction of hatred and revenge, the relapse of Western man into the primitive world of Genghis Khan. There is no military gain in provoking revenge. Yet the war proved that the supposedly firm standards summed up in the phrase "the world of the soldier" were unable to cope with such abominations. A secularized "soldier's honor" which describes obedience, duty, hardihood and readiness for action as unquestioned and absolute concepts abandons the soldier blind and helpless to the whim of criminals and charlatans.

Traditional ways also fail in the face of technical progress in

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so far as concepts of military authority and soldierly obedience derive from the world of patriarchal feudalism. The range, speed and complication of military operations in the age of motor and radio, and the variety and complexity of weapons and equipment have left their mark on the military social structure. The tactical and technical specialist has taken his place as an equal in importance alongside the tactical leader. Through the interlocking and far-reaching possibilities of air reconnaissance and radio the modern leader controls his unit as completely as the fencer his rapier. But he must realize that mere subordination can accomplish little. Success will depend upon mutual confidence, latitude in orders and delegation of initiative to the lower echelons. The "melting" of the superior into the group (or rather the raising of the subordinates) becomes particularly evident in the airplane, tank or submarine. The superior ranks above his subordinates for purposes of coördination, but since he usually is less well equipped in special knowledge he is restricted to that one special function. In other words, he has to rely on the coöperation of his subordinates in thinking and acting just as much as they rely on him for leadership. These new social conditions in motorized and armored units, in the air arm and in submarines produced attitudes and codes during the war which come far closer to the concept of a free community based on mutual partnership than to the traditional picture of patriarchal authority over "minors."

We are entitled to say, I believe, that the trials and experiences of the Second World War have shaken many traditional military concepts. Questions have been brought up which can be answered only from a new and more general point of view.

IV. POSTWAR GERMAN YOUTH

For an individual to understand democracy as a way of life rather than as just a more or less useful form of government requires him to take a stand outside the magic circle of modern mass society. With this in mind, I find most significant the picture of present-day German youth as I obtain it from careful studies and personal contacts. This is partly because they will provide the future soldiers and future leaders for our armed forces, but more because their intellectual and emotional attitudes give cause for both worry and hope. They are victims of the German past and of modern mass existence in general; yet they present a steady if silent protest against the mechanization of institutions.

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What is striking about these young people is that they fluctuate between sober self-assurance in coping with the surface demands of daily life and insecurity in facing the more profound areas of intellectual and spiritual life. As a result, their attitude toward the community is divided. Under no condition will they allow it to take them in and assimilate them by force. But they nourish secret longings to find a firm footing somewhere among their fellow human beings.

In general they accept the idea of the family even though they regard it less as a spiritual, God-given community than as a small cell of reliable partners who support each other. There is a wide gulf between them and their elders, whose attitudes and actions do not inspire them with much confidence; however, the decline in adult authority keeps the problem of generations from being as obvious as it used to be. Inclining to feel themselves misunderstood, they seek mainly the company of their contemporaries. At the same time they have developed a skeptical attitude toward large groupings, of youth or otherwise, with purposes which they cannot fully fathom. Tradition of any kind does not mean much to them, though they may "join" where it seems advantageous (as, for instance, in the traditional student "corporations"). They are less inhibited in speaking their mind than former generations. They react sensitively against demagogic catchwords which seem to them to lack intellectual or moral content. Though they are eager to keep their personal independence, they are aware of what constitutes proper authority. Their highest ideal is harmony of word and action. At the bottom of their hearts they would like character to be sovereign—in other words, they seek genuine discipline in an age where empty phrases and shallow claims for happiness abound.

Their feeling toward the state is still skeptical, though there are signs of a more favorable attitude. Their knowledge of democracy is limited to the fact that it secures rights for them which they are very anxious to retain. They have a sober feeling of moral obligation toward the community; and for practical reasons they recognize the necessity for taking a place in it. Though they sometimes fail to recognize the limitations on individual freedom of action, they regard freedom as a value. They react to religion with some bewilderment, but respectfully, without mockery; here, too, there seem beginnings of deeper understanding. On the whole, they trust their reason more than their feeling.

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They wish—and for them this is most important of all—to be "recognized," to be taken seriously.

The soldier's world is alien to them, unpleasant and disturbing. Many of them are nevertheless resigned to the fact that they will have to serve in the army sometime. They feel as skeptical about propaganda against military life as about its dramatic glorification. If there has to be military service, they think, it should be tough yet humane. They would like it to allow them some time off and that if possible what it teaches them should be useful in civilian life afterwards.

They reject Bolshevism instinctively but without any deep knowledge of its nature. In general they respect other nations and feel no hate. Whether it would be worthwhile to die for the life they know they have not as yet decided. One might speak of the "waiting generation."

The picture of our youth thus reflects the lack of direction characteristic of a period of upheaval. Two age groups are recognizable among them. Those who took part in the war as anti-aircraft auxiliaries or as very young soldiers are more skeptical, more tense and more forlorn than the postwar youngsters. The latter are, on the other hand, more naïve, more credulous, more inclined to let themselves be guided. Strict yet sound military service can rouse many young men to their first knowledge of what a system of human values and a community are all about. During their period of service their indifference toward the state will develop into either loyalty or rejection. Here lie the great chance, the great responsibility and the great danger facing our future military leadership.

V. THE DUTY OF THE FUTURE SOLDIER

One thing must by now be evident. When we probe the German situation on the borderlines between yesterday and tomorrow, East and West, dictatorship and democracy, we become aware of requirements in the field of rearmament which go far outside the constitutional framework.

The politician may be tempted under pressure of daily events to give priority to the institutional side of the question, to the obvious need for parliamentary supervision. The soldier who has to rely on himself to find answers to the problems of his world discovers nothing but unstable ground as soon as he asks questions reaching beyond the institutional framework. The dividing

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lines between many old antitheses—war and peace, friend and foe, fighting army and civilian population, military ethos and criminality, military responsibility and political responsibility, patriotism and treason, international law and criminal law—have lost much of their clarity. If only the standard answers of the past are available we find ourselves in hopeless confusion. But if we take this as an occasion to dismantle and expose the traditional ethics of the soldier down to its healthy roots, we shall be making a real start toward finding new ways. Tradition cannot provide a recipe for every circumstance. We have to choose the right traditional attitude and live it in the way that suits our times.

By using the term "citizen in uniform" the planning department of the German armed forces is trying to indicate what its guiding considerations are and what it thinks should be the future standards of selection and education.

To be able and willing to defend a community a man must have a stake in it, must know that his own existence depends on its continuance. Since this happens only to those who participate actively in the life of the community, it follows that the soldier should retain all the rights of citizenship which he is supposed to defend. Limitations should be permitted only where required in the performance of a special duty.

The more technical the service routine, the more inhuman the battle, the greater the need for a humane spirit and decent manners. The soldier will not give trustful obedience unless he feels that behind the order is a set of moral values which asks only what is fair in a given situation. Naturally, no military system can turn the exceptional case of responsible disobedience into standard practice. Nevertheless, command and obedience in armed forces will always depend on whether or not there are men in the ranks and among the officers who in a conflict of conscience are prepared to risk their lives for a moral principle or to save lives which have been entrusted to their keeping.

The fact that he is a citizen as well as a soldier obliges a man to expand his sphere of life and widen his interests, to participate as largely as possible in intellectual, cultural and social activities —in short, to work to improve himself apart from merely improving his professional skill. Men who carry a responsibility for others must be able to think along general lines. Unless a man has gained knowledge of life at many levels he is not equipped to

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resist propaganda slogans and he will not be able to follow an opponent into his own world of ideas and win an ideological dispute. Bolshevism acquired strength as a result of the spiritual and social failures of the Western World. It can be overcome only by new spiritual beginnings and creative social actions.

A man's country is of course a natural and essential part of his life and responsibility. "Fatherland," however, must never stand for just power—power which must be increased by any and every means against both external and internal obstacles. Nor can we agree that beside it all moral and human values shrink to secondary importance. The misdeeds of past governments made many people in Germany lose their feeling for the fatherland. It will grow again if we succeed in reviving the old historical obligations in purified form and in making clear the new responsibilities of citizenship.

The citizen accepts war only as a necessary defense of human freedom; he finds aggressive war, therefore, unthinkable. This rules out the necessity of representing the enemy to him as evil incarnate or telling him that as long as that enemy lives there can never be peace. Moreover, since totalitarian methods contradict his picture of a free society he is not tempted to adopt them. If he did adopt them, even to fight totalitarianism, he would lose belief in himself.

The ideal which I am presenting here has often been criticized as unattainable, but the criticism ignores the fact that an essential part of our defenses against totalitarian threats consists of superior moral quality. It also fails to recognize that when you set up an ideal you do not expect it to be realized from one day to the next; you show a goal and indicate a direction. All who still remember the German catastrophe as a cathartic shock —as our youth do today—have a profound longing for clear new standards and clean new ways. Our hope lies with them, not with those who for one reason or another escaped the healthy shock of the war and the collapse.

VI. INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING

When the new armed forces begin to be formed the initial steps will have to go in the direction indicated above. To set up a "temporary situation" of another sort would be to relinquish the valuable opportunities offered by a really fresh start; and if once an incorrect temporary situation is accepted, the inertia of custom

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would tend to prolong it. The same effect would be caused by too quick a pace of development.

The organic military law providing for the integration of the armed forces into the state apparatus will form the chief foundation of the new organization. It must not be created without the coöperation and approval of the opposition parties. The reader will understand that I cannot discuss details of the proposed legislation at the moment, for to do so would usurp the privileges of parliament.

It is permissible to say, however, that the second big undertaking will be the choice and training of the future leaders of the armed forces. The choice of officers down to the rank of colonel will be made by a personnel committee which has the confidence of parliament and the government. It will consist of civilians who are independent of parties and organizations and former officers who are not returning to the service. In 1945 there were about 1,400 German generals; today about 40 will be needed. Since most of the former generals have now passed the age limit, the selection will be made chiefly from among the former colonels. There are enough of these to provide army and division generals who are qualified intellectually, professionally and in character and who are open to democratic ideas.

The training of the future corps of officers and noncommissioned officers will be carried out in a series of courses. Some of the ticklish problems which must be discussed can be indicated by such titles as "The Reichswehr in the Weimar Republic," "The Third Reich," "The 20th of July, 1944," and "Nuremberg." Each officer will be supplied with information and historical facts to help him reach his judgments.

As a rule, future lieutenants and noncommissioned officers will be found among the new volunteers. The training period for officers will be three years from the date of formation of the armed forces. As in the old Wehrmacht, officer candidates will join the army as enlisted men so as to have shared good and bad with those who later serve under them. During the first year of service, the young lieutenant will be assigned for at least six months to the "Academy for All Armed Forces," where civilian instructors will use university methods in giving him an intellectual grounding. Inter-relationships among historical, political, social, technical and educational factors in the development of Germany will be brought out. European history and the discus-

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sion of Bolshevist philosophy and practice will be given particular emphasis.

We may now state in summary form some of the essential measures for the inner structure of the future army. The soldier is to have the right to vote and engage freely in political activities in so far as this takes place outside the service routine and off military reservations. In other words, he will keep the basic rights of the citizen in the framework of his military duties. All ranks will choose representatives in a free and secret ballot to speak for their comrades before the commanding officer and help the head of the unit look after its members properly. Superiors will be entitled to exercise the authority of their rank only in fulfillment of their own duties. Off-duty they will not possess such authority except in cases of public emergency such as riots or where the behavior of men in uniform jeopardizes discipline in general. Training for citizenship will not be just one subject among many on the instruction program; it will be considered an indispensable part of the education of all ranks, and all commanders and heads of units will have responsibility for seeing that it is not neglected. Courses in general and current information will equip the soldier to view his country and himself against the larger background of world problems. Other items on the program for the care of the soldier will be: training in civilian professions; maintenance of cultural civilian contacts during the period of military service; guidance in off-duty activities; and encouragement of social activities.

VII. WAYS AND MEANS

The German armed forces no longer claim to be "the school of the nation." Their duties of instruction are restricted to preparations for performing their own task as a reliable arm of the civilian executive. To do this they need the help of all the forces existing in civilian life—in the home, in schools, in vocational training, in youth organizations—which stimulate young citizens to take their share of responsibility in the community. In turn, the armed forces will do everything possible to make the soldiers trust the community. They will cultivate understanding among them of the value of legal order, readiness to coöperate, respect for the opinions and rights of others, and personal courage.

Armed forces everywhere have now become similar in equipment, armament and organization. They vary widely, however, in their spiritual foundations, in their political aims, in their

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whole "inner structure"—that is to say, in their all-round moral characteristics, in the manner in which they consider that men should be led.

When two systems are approximately equal in armament, equipment and strength, the one which is superior spiritually will be the readiest for defense and will come out on top. The decentralized order of battle increases the necessity for spiritual readiness of the individual. Without it, the soldier will not withstand the wearing physical and emotional strains of battle. Decisive things may depend on individual actions. It is therefore the supreme task of modern military training to rouse the sense of responsibility in the individual and to increase his confidence in himself and in his comrades. This can be achieved only if every opportunity is taken systematically to assign tasks to individuals or groups which they have to solve according to their own judgment. It is a mistake to ask whether there should be more or less "discipline." The point is to find ways and means to encourage self-discipline and a readiness for coöperation.

The days are over when it was of no concern to the citizen how the soldier conducted a war; but the days are over, too, when the soldier need not concern himself with the daily problems of his people. The state of mind developed in the armed forces will naturally depend on that of the German people as a whole. On the other hand, as things stand today, Germany's armed forces may become a field of energy radiating vital influences through the entire nation. The only justification for the risks and sacrifices of rearmament will be the army's defensive strength. But this is not the sole consideration which requires a climate of freedom within the army; concern for the development of Germany along democratic paths points in the same direction. For we may be sure that the attitude of a great part of the German youth toward the state and the system of life for which it stands will be determined by their experiences in the service and the insights they have gained there. Rearmament thus has very important implications for Germany's domestic political evolution. Whether this will be a healthy one will depend to a large extent on how far Germany's Western partners are able to help the German soldier find his place in the ranks of the free world.

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AFTER GENEVA:
A GREATER TASK FOR NATO

By Lester B. Pearson

THE "summit" at Geneva seems to have been a more comfortable and relaxing place for a meeting than "summits" often are. The results achieved there have been rightly hailed throughout the world as marking the beginning of an effort by the leading nations of the two power blocs to adjust by discussion and negotiation their conflicts of national interest and ideological difference which have divided and distressed the world during the last decade.

This conference, however, was not an end but a beginning—though a good beginning—and it would be foolish, perhaps dangerous, to draw premature and exuberantly optimistic conclusions from it. Peace will not be achieved by one or even by two or three meetings at the "summit," but by many meetings and much hard, constructive work at lower levels. This work, which is one of negotiation, and is now well launched by top statesmanship, remains to be carried on through day-to-day diplomacy. It will be conducted, one may hope, without all of the fanfare and publicity which unavoidably and, no doubt, rightly attended the conference at Geneva. While it is important to relate the results and implications of the Geneva meeting to the current international situation, it is even more important to decide the right course to follow in the new and warmer international climate which the conference has generated.

The Geneva talks have a special and immediate significance for NATO. The Atlantic organization, indeed, is involved in terms of both cause and effect. The collective strength—political and military—which we have developed in NATO was perhaps the most important of the international forces which made the recent discussions possible; just as the growing realization by Soviet as well as by Western leaders of the dread risks and consequences of nuclear warfare made them essential.

It is indisputable that NATO's collective strength has been a major deterrent against aggression in Europe. Without NATO, and the united defensive purpose which it represents, the successors to Stalin might not have gone smilingly to Geneva to join in the effort to diminish the risk of war and to lighten the crushing

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burden of armaments which Stalin's threatening policies placed on many peoples, including his own. NATO, which was brought into being primarily in response to the fears aroused by overwhelming Soviet military force used as the spearhead for Communist expansion, will obviously be affected profoundly if the threat from that force has, or appears to have, diminished.

The adjustment of conflicting national interests between the big Powers which we hope has now begun is, of course, entirely in accord with the principal, persistent and permanent objective of NATO: to prevent war without sacrificing the freedom and security of its members. Our long-term aim remains to eliminate altogether the use of force for national purposes by establishing the general collective security system intended by the United Nations Charter and by operating through the world organization. But only when that is accomplished can NATO, as a security agency, safely "wither away" like the state in a pure Communist society. (The analogy is a somewhat discouraging one.) So long as fears and ambitions and aggressive ideologies result in the division of the world into power blocs, and thereby make a universal system of collective security unattainable, the prevention of war through a regional security system based on the unity and defensive strength of its members is the best way open to us; and it is entirely consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

No person, no nation, no group of nations can view with comfort, however, the prospects for a world where peace rests primarily on the deterrent effect of collective military strength and regional political unity. That discomfort becomes deep anxiety in the face of the fantastic development of nuclear weapons and their inclusion in the armament of a few big Powers now, and of many other Powers soon. This makes it more than ever necessary, while maintaining military strength, to put forth every possible effort to reduce the danger of war and gradually make such strength unnecessary. In all the long story of mankind, arms alone, however powerful, have never been sufficient to guarantee security for any length of time. Your strength for defense becomes the weakness of those against whom you feel you must be ready to defend yourself. Your security becomes their insecurity. So they in their turn seek safety in increased arms. A vicious circle commences which in the past has caused untold misery and destruction and might now, if we cannot cut through it, cause

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mankind's extinction. Even adequate collective force for defense, then, is no final solution. It is merely a means to an end—peace based on something more enduring than force.

Furthermore—and this must increase our anxieties in the nuclear age—it is more difficult under conditions of fear and mounting international tensions for governments to distinguish between real and apparent threats to their vital interests. The frightened man is usually the most trigger-happy. This consideration makes it all the more necessary to reduce tension in order to avoid a war caused by accident or miscalculation.

Paradoxically, the growing realization of what nuclear warfare means in terms of global destruction has already created what many consider to be the greatest deterrent to war. It has also been one of the major impulses which brought about Geneva; and it may lead us still further on the road to peace. The knowledge that any aggression might bring about total war, that all-out aggression would certainly do so, and that the aggressor could not hope even through massive surprise attack to escape nuclear devastation himself, has inevitably had a sobering effect upon the conduct of international relations.

When the use of nuclear weapons could bring global catastrophe, a special responsibility rests upon the Powers possessing them to exercise restraint in the conduct of their foreign policies and self-denial in using threats of force. They are called on to make a supreme effort to adjust conflicts of national interest so that these do not lead to war. Negotiations such as those at Geneva should serve to increase the awareness by the nuclear Powers of this special responsibility to resolve their conflicts not only in their own interests but in those of the international community as a whole. That is another reason why the members of NATO join with all other peaceful nations in welcoming such negotiations.

That welcome, however, should not lead us into wishful but unrealistic thinking and happy but premature conclusions. Diplomatically, it is true, we seem now to be out of the trenches and manœuvring in the open. This discloses hopeful possibilities of victories for peace. But it also has its dangers, inherent in any fluid situation. Now more than ever we shall need imagination and caution in the right balance. Above all, in this warmer climate of today we shall need to be resolute against the temptation to relax our vigilance or abandon our defense efforts. Until

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the underlying conflicts between the two power blocs are peacefully resolved—and that has not happened yet—nothing could be more dangerous than to yield to such a temptation. NATO has assumed special responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security. The discharge of them has never required that we should brandish our arms. They do require, however, that we should not now discard them and thus give grounds to any potential aggressor for believing that it might be safe to take risks with peace.

Refusal to weaken our NATO strength does not mean, of course, that we should not reëxamine in NATO the strategy which determines the use and purpose of that strength. This has, I think, become increasingly necessary as conditions have altered since the NATO pact was signed. Various experts have recently pointed out that there is now virtually an atomic stalemate and that this, along with the over-all balance of power which it represents, is now the main protection for Western Europe. If so, then NATO strategy, which has tended to emphasize the importance of large conventional forces on the European continent, should be looked at again.

No one would deny the value of such forces and the desirability on both political and military grounds of including North American contingents among them. But equally important in European defense and as a deterrent against aggression is the protection of the centers on the American continent from which atomic retaliation—if it ever has to be used—must come. For this reason, North America in a very vital sense may be a NATO center of as great importance to the defense of Europe as any defense line or barrier on that continent itself.

Until the present improvement gets beyond the atmospheric, at all events, until we are sure that it is not merely designed to remove apprehensions of conflict without removing the sources of the conflict itself, any weakening of our strength and unity would be no service to peace. Let us try to distinguish, though it will not be easy, between the real product of hard bargaining and diplomatic negotiation, and a gambit in psychological warfare.

The current Four-Power negotiations themselves provide the best means we have had in many years for testing how real the apparent change in Soviet international policies may be. They also give the Soviet leaders the same opportunity to test the words and attitudes of Western leaders. This alone would make these negotiations desirable and worthwhile. Up to the present, however, con-

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flicts of interest and policy have not been settled and the basic security of the West has not improved. The problems facing the Big Four—and all of us—have been identified and clarified but they have not been solved. If I may switch to a meteorological metaphor, the dampness has disappeared but the cold remains—even though we don't feel it so much! It would be premature in these circumstances to discard our "woollens" but permissible to look forward to the day when, perhaps, it might be safe to do so.

There is another important question related to the above. If the current relaxation of international tension, based mainly on a realization of the completely new dimensions of nuclear warfare and its consequences, is interpreted to mean that war is now unlikely, or at least far less likely, what effect will this have on NATO and the relations between its member countries?

For one thing, it will strengthen the temptation, which I have mentioned, to relax our collective and individual defense efforts —and save a lot of money! As the direct military threat may seem to recede, the fear of aggression which brought NATO into being in the first place will lessen. With that, it must be admitted, NATO will lose much of the cohesive force which still holds it together. There are those who are counting on this. These dangers to NATO must be faced. Defense strength and unity must be maintained, yet we may not have for this purpose the same incentive which we have had before. We must, therefore, develop a stronger bond of unity than a common fear. If the challenge of the Communist nations to our free institutions should take new forms, avoiding tactics and policies which risk nuclear devastation, NATO should, in its turn, while maintaining whatever collective military defensive strength is necessary, develop new impulses for unity and community.

NATO cannot live on fear alone. It cannot become the source of a real Atlantic community if it remains organized to deal only with the military threat which first brought it into being. A renewed emphasis on the nonmilitary side of NATO's development would also be the best answer to the Soviet charge that it is an aggressive, exclusively military agency, aimed against Moscow. One way in which NATO might pursue this objective would be to initiate consultations from time to time on the economic policies of its members, just as we now hold frequent consultations—to great mutual advantage—on foreign and defense policies. It might also be found useful to consult together informally but

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frankly on matters normally dealt with in other international bodies, not with a view to the adoption of a common NATO policy —which would be undesirable as well as impracticable—but in order to develop a better understanding of each other's policies and to avoid conflict between those policies and the interests of the broader international community.

NATO, then, while resisting the temptation to weaken its collective defense effort merely because of the warmer post-Geneva climate, must also broaden and deepen the basis of association of its members in nonmilitary fields. It must prove to those who profess to fear that it is aggressive that it has no other purposes than defense and no greater interest than the resolution of serious international issues in such a way as to bring about genuine security.

One such issue is the conflict of interest between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers over the right of a reunified Germany to associate herself with the West through membership in NATO—if her people freely decide so to do. Now Soviet policy in Europe since the war has clearly been designed and stubbornly enforced to prevent any German settlement which would permit the alignment of a rearmed Germany with the Western Powers. This policy was presumably based on the premise that the addition of German military, political and economic power to the side of NATO would prove a serious threat to Soviet security, as well as adding substantially to the means at the disposal of the Western alliance to resist direct and indirect pressure.

Surely under the overriding necessity of avoiding a war in which both sides have enough atom bombs to knock each other out, a way will be found to settle even such an important conflict of interest as exists in Germany by seeking a compromise through negotiation—a compromise in which the claims of German unification can be reconciled with those of Soviet and European security. Such a compromise cannot be found, however, in the determination of the Soviet Union and its friends to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO and drive its overseas members out of Europe. About that there should be "no possible, probable shadow of doubt, no possible doubt whatever." NATO can safely disappear as a security agency only when these functions are absorbed by a United Nations which is able to guarantee the security of each by the collective action of all.

Is what the Soviet Government fears most about Germany

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her potential threat in the future rather than the actual political and military measures authorized under the limiting and restrictive clauses of the London and Paris agreements? If so, assurances and guarantees could be worked out which should serve to remove any such fears. These safeguards might cover such matters as Germany's eastern borders and the level, deployment and equipment of NATO and anti-NATO forces in Central Europe. There is room for negotiation, for bargaining, if you will, over reciprocal concessions of this kind—provided it is clearly understood that both Germany and the other members of NATO are free to choose the kind of international association they require for the collective protection of their security.

In order to make the necessary safeguards reasonably acceptable in Moscow, the Soviet Government will have to be persuaded that the participation of a united Germany in NATO and in the Western European Union is not, and will not be, a spur to German aggression, but, on the other hand, represents an effective means of limiting German power and controlling German action. The fact is that NATO, in its expanding network of relationships, in its developing consultative machinery, does exercise such a limiting and controlling influence on the activities, not merely of any one but of *all* of its members. In this case there is indeed more safety in our numbers even for the other side!

Is it beyond the capacity of our diplomacy to convince the new leaders of Russia of this—that a united Germany in NATO would be a defensive and defensible solution to the German problem, preferable in every way to an independent, armed Germany free-wheeling in the center of Europe, or to a Germany divided in a manner which cannot be permanent but which while it lasts frustrates European security or stability?

Moreover, if the Soviet Union were successful in destroying NATO, through its German policy or in some other way, would that really add to Soviet security? On the contrary, it would increase tensions between the two great super-Powers by driving the United States, unweakened in its nuclear strength, but now more resolute and determined than ever to maintain that strength, behind its continental ramparts. From that position its capacity to retaliate with overwhelming power would still be great, indeed decisive. But there would also be a more intense and fearful feeling that such capacity might have to be used.

Would the Soviet Union feel more secure with that situation

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than with one where the United States and Germany were grouped with other states in a defensive NATO arrangement of checks and balances? If Moscow, however, clings to its own solution of the German problem, if it insists on remaining implacably hostile to NATO, determined to do everything it can to break it up, then it will indeed be difficult to convert the "spirit of Geneva" into constructive and lasting diplomatic achievements at the forthcoming meetings "below the summit."

These views may seem pretty dark in the light of the new hopes and relaxed tensions of recent weeks. They are not meant to be so. Nothing will be gained, however, and ultimately much may be lost, by nourishing illusions that Geneva has solved our problems, that the dangers to peace dissolved when four men smiled into 40 cameras. A sense of proportion and sober realism in the months ahead will be more useful than premature hosannahs in ensuring that the progress recently made is continued until we find a peace that is something better than mere coexistence.

We have had concrete evidence, and we can rejoice in it, of a greater willingness on the part of the Soviet leaders to negotiate over conflicting issues. This is a situation which we have always hoped to bring about because there is no tolerable alternative method of settling disputes in the nuclear age. But this does not necessarily mean that the basic long-term aims and policies of the Soviet leaders have changed. Nor have those of the West.

It will be well also to remember that the huge Soviet military capability remains intact, and the well-tried Communist techniques of political infiltration and subversion are still readily available for use. Nor is there much evidence as yet that the extension of Communist control over other countries by nonmilitary means as opportunities offer has been renounced. It is to be hoped that convincing evidence of this kind will soon be forthcoming. Otherwise there is bound to be an ultimate limitation on the final degree of *détente* which we can expect in the relations of the West with the U.S.S.R.

In all these circumstances, I repeat, it would be folly for NATO not to remain on guard, strong and united. It used to be said that "eternal vigilance is the price of freedom." In the nuclear age it is the price of survival. NATO should at the same time avoid any provocation in action or attitude that might seem to substantiate any possible feeling that it is an aggressive threat to those whose policies and actions actually brought it into being in the

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first place. One way to remove this feeling would be to convince the Soviets that we realize that armed strength is relative; that a reduction of armaments which is general and equitable does not decrease anybody's strength, but *does* increase everybody's security—provided, of course (and this is a vital proviso), that there is confidence in the effectiveness of the arrangements to ensure that the undertakings given are being carried out.

Limitation of armaments is a cause which all men of good will can support, but we must be wary of proposals which would be unfair and unbalanced in their effect. We must remember also that there can be no effective and general disarmament until some measure of security and trust has been established. And let us not forget that even if arms are reduced, if security is increased, if the cold war thaws away in the sunshine of Geneva, there will remain certain basic conflicts between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The task of statesmanship will remain: the resolution of these conflicts without war.

Let us also remember that if we are approaching peaceful coexistence, it will be also competitive coexistence. In this competition, which is not new but may now gain new emphasis, NATO and its individual members will have to show that their system of free society is not only militarily defensible but does more for the individual than Communism can ever do. Ultimately it is on this test that NATO—and the non-Communist world—will succeed or fail. To ensure success in expanding economies, full employment, social justice and welfare and the freest possible international trade will count as much as atom bombs and jet aircraft.

In this marshalling and collective employment by NATO of its nonmilitary as well as its military resources, NATO's influence will extend beyond its immediate membership. It covers, of course, only a limited geographical area. But it includes the most powerful nations of the West which have world-wide interests and responsibilities. Thus, inevitably, NATO impinges on the rest of the world. Its members have the right to hope that their motives and policies will not be misunderstood or misinterpreted, even (or possibly especially) by those who may feel, sincerely and for reasons which seem to them convincing, that regional security systems of any kind do not make for peace.

May I conclude by summarizing what is, in my opinion, the best course for NATO to follow after Geneva? The Atlantic organization must become more flexible. It must adapt itself to meet

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the new challenges which will come if happily we enter a period of peaceful but competitive coexistence, and its member governments will have to use it more for that purpose. This is no time for NATO to weaken or limit itself. On the contrary, it should redouble its effort to fulfill the full promise of the Atlantic Pact. It has already proved to be an effective agency for organizing defense coöperation to meet a military threat. It must now develop greater cohesion and coöperation among its members in the pursuit of common political, social and economic objectives.

Increased consultation within NATO is essential in order to ensure that NATO unity will not melt away under the warming rays of Big Four cordiality. It is not surprising that in foreign and defense policy more has been done in this regard than in other fields. If countries are pledged to stand by each other if any one is attacked, it is to be expected that they would consult together about policies which might result in such attack. But the maintenance of expanding economies and healthy social structures must surely be regarded as being as much a common interest of all members as the maintenance of common defense measures. Harmony between the governments in the economic and social field is, therefore, almost as essential as is coördination of foreign and defense policies.

We need not only to persuade our own membership of the continuing value of the organization for maintaining the collective force which our security requires; we must also be convinced of its value as a vehicle for developing those closer political, economic, cultural and social relations which can give greater vitality both to the Atlantic community and to the broader community of the United Nations. To the world as a whole we have to prove that our hopes and plans for an enduring peace envisage more than a reliance upon the fear of nuclear devastation. We have to demonstrate in action the worth of NATO as an effective international organization based upon democratic principles and as the guardian of our "freedom, common heritage and civilization" when matched against the Communist bloc in the competitive coexistence which lies ahead. This will be a time of severe tests for NATO. If it fails to meet them, far more than NATO will suffer.

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"WHICH CHINESE?"

Diplomatic Relations and Official Representation

By Stanley K. Hornbeck

THE few Americans who urged in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor that China be treated as a Great Power and be included as one of the "Big Four" were taking account not only of actualities but of past performance and future possibilities. They contended that China's capabilities, although not at the moment obviously effective, were latently enormous, and that she should be groomed to step into the place of leadership in Eastern Asia which would be rendered vacant through the defeat of Japan.

Their estimate of potentialities has been substantially confirmed by the emergence since 1945 of mainland China as a potent political entity. But their expectation that China's capabilities would be exercised within the orbit of the free nations has been dashed by the fact that the free nations both failed to do the essential grooming themselves and in effect facilitated that grooming by the Soviet-Communist régime. The result is that mainland China, under the control of the "Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China," now functions not as a free state in the free world but as a powerful ally of the Soviet Union in the Communist bloc.

A part of China, however, remains within the free world orbit. The "National Government of the Republic of China" still functions, on Chinese soil; and that government, still recognized by a majority of the world's states as the government of China, speaks to and for untold millions of Chinese nationals—on Formosa, on the mainland and overseas. The beliefs and aspirations of these Chinese are on the side of freedom. They are opposed to Communism and have resisted and are resisting the onward march of Communist forces in Eastern Asia.

Statistically, the jurisdiction of the Central People's Government extends far more widely than that of the National Government. However, the location of the Nationalist domain, the character of its government, the qualities of its population and the fact that it is a critical area in today's global conflict give it an importance in terms of political and military strategy and of

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moral values that substantially discounts the disparity between its size and that of the Communist-dominated mainland.

II

For those governments which still recognize the National Government, problems of law, of rights, of duties and of policy in relations with and regarding China are one thing. For those countries which have recognized the Communist Government they are quite another thing.

During the years since the United Kingdom recognized the Central People's Government in 1950, British spokesmen, official and unofficial, have been explaining, defending and praising that action; they and many others have urged that other countries, especially the United States, should take similar action, and that China's seats in the United Nations should be transferred from the National Government and be given to the Central People's Government. They have declared variously that the Central People's Government is a fact, that its control of most of China is a fact and that those facts warrant recognition; that recognition is merely a diplomatic formality signifying awareness and establishing a political orientation but involving no implication of approbation; that the United Kingdom has economic interests which its government must safeguard and promote; that it expects through diplomatic contacts to exert a restraining influence; and, with special emphasis, that its action was and is based on principles and requirements of international law.

In this country the views which have prevailed have run somewhat as follows: Whereas the Central People's Government and its extensive control are indeed facts, such facts alone neither call for nor warrant diplomatic recognition. The principles and criteria to be applied to the question of according diplomatic recognition are many, and sound policy-making calls for weighing not only physical and political facts but legal *and* moral *and* social considerations together with a careful estimate of probable consequences. Diplomatic recognition is more than a formality, signifies more than awareness, establishes more than a political orientation and, while it may or may not imply moral approbation, does certify to political acceptance by the according state, does give the recipient state or government a legal status, and does bring into being a set of rights and duties as between states. Especially important: the idea that there exists in the corpus of

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international law a principle or rule whereunder a government which exercises effective control is legally entitled to recognition —that idea simply does *not* prevail in the United States. There is mention of it by some American authorities on international law, but not with acceptance or endorsement. It certainly has not been entertained in the formulating of American policy.

III

Diplomatic recognition obviously demonstrates awareness of a political reality, and it of course facilitates the conduct of business between the states concerned and between their respective nationals. But recognition is not essential or indispensable for any of those purposes. The government and people of the United States were well aware of the existence of the United Soviet Socialist Republic, and business was carried on between them for more than 15 years before we accorded recognition to the Soviet Government. We have carried on some business with Communist China without having recognized the "Central People's Government." Business has been carried on between Great Britain and Communist China notwithstanding the latter's refusal until recently to reciprocate fully Britain's diplomatic attestations and activities. And several of the countries which have withdrawn their recognition from the National Government still communicate with that government and carry on trade with its citizens.

Diplomatic recognition has a value—especially to the state or government to which it is accorded. In the case under discussion, the worth to the Central People's Government of recognitions already accorded it has been great, and that of recognition by the United States would be enormous. Conversely, withdrawal of recognition takes from any state or government a thing of value, and were the United States to withdraw its recognition of the National Government, the loss of that asset would be ruinous to the political credit of free China.

Diplomatic recognition gives birth to a corpus of rights and duties. In theory these rights and duties are reciprocally identical as between the according state and the recipient, but in practice the according state imposes upon itself obligations and confers upon the recipient rights without assurance that the latter will reciprocate. The consequences to the accorder may be either a gain or a loss, but to the recipient they can be only a gain.

Diplomatic recognition of a new government which is exercis-

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ing undisputed control over an entire country and all its people has implications far less extensive than are those in situations where there are two governments, an old and a new, each controlling a part of a country and some of its people, each claiming right to the whole and each trying to make its claim good. In the latter situation, countries which have previously recognized the old government are under obligation to take into account the fact that it has, *ipso facto,* a status in international law which is not lightly to be disregarded. Some authorities on international law go so far as to say that a premature recognition of a new government constitutes a tort against the old.

Diplomatic recognition is an expression of policy. It is a fundamental belief of the American people that, as stated in the Declaration of Independence, "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" and that "to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Generally speaking, this concept has played a substantial part in the shaping of United States policy on questions of diplomatic recognition.

It is often affirmed that Thomas Jefferson laid down as a guiding principle for United States recognition of new governments the simple test of mere *de facto* control. Thomas Jefferson did no such thing. Jefferson did indeed say, "We cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own Government is founded—that every one [nation] may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change those forms at its own will." But with regard to diplomatic recognition he had already written: "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any Government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared;" and in the later context he went on to say: "The will of the nation is the only essential to be regarded." True to form, Jefferson emphasized not *control* but "the will of the nation"—which equates with his better known "consent of the governed."

Whatever may be the use or abuse of what "Jefferson said," the world has changed considerably, the foreign relations of the United States have expanded considerably and the foreign policies of the United States have developed considerably since Jefferson's time. By the end of the nineteenth century it had become possible and appropriate for Acting Secretary of State Hill to write officially: "When, by reason of revolution or other internal change not wrought by regular constitutional methods, a

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conflict of authority exists in another country whereby the titular government to which our representatives are accredited is reduced from power and authority, the rule of the United States is to defer recognition of another executive in its place until it shall appear that it is in possession of the machinery of state, administering government with the assent of the people thereof and without substantial resistance to its authority, and that it is in a position to fulfill all the international obligations and responsibilities incumbent upon a sovereign state under treaties and international law." In 1913 Assistant Secretary of State Adee wrote officially of the "recognition necessary to the conduct of international business between two countries" as being "dependent upon the existence of three conditions of fact: the control of the administrative machinery of the state; the general acquiescence of its people; and the ability and willingness of their government to discharge international and conventional obligations." And in 1940 the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Mr. Hackworth, wrote, "It has been the practice of the government of the United States to require fulfilment of certain conditions by new governments as a prerequisite to recognition."

All of this adds up to there having developed a tendency in the conduct of United States foreign relations for policy-makers to inquire in regard to a new government: What are the extent and the quality of its jurisdiction? Has it the capacity to fulfill the international obligations of the state in which it operates? Does it manifest a disposition to respect and fulfill those obligations?

This tendency derives not from legalistic thinking but from the influence of fundamental concepts in American political thought regarding the nature, rights and duties of men and governments. Right or wrong, American thought runs to the effect not only that governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed" but that moral and social as well as legal, political and economic principles and standards are involved in all relationships, and that in formulating and implementing policies with regard to any foreign governing entity all of these must be taken into account.

IV

Decisions to accord or to withhold recognition are made by political not by judicial authorities. In this country—and, of course, not here alone—those authorities are substantially in-

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fluenced by public opinion. Traditionally well disposed toward China, the people and Government of the United States look at developments there and combine with a concern for American interests a concern for what they conceive to be the interests of the Chinese. During recent years they have seen two governments, and they have thought about the capabilities and performance of those governments in terms of advantage or disadvantage to the United States, to China and to the free world. What have they seen and what have been their conclusions?

China's National Government is a product of revolution and conflict internal to China. It came to power by use of armed force and skillful propaganda originally organized with Soviet assistance; but its creators had broken with Communism before victory was achieved and throughout its existence it has been under Communist attack. It gave China during the years preceding 1945 a nearer approximation to unity than that country had known since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1911. It kept China united in resistance to Japan's attacks from 1931 on. It was an ally of the United States and other Powers throughout World War II. It has resisted Communism from an earlier moment, more foresightedly and persistently than any other government.

The National Government retreated to Formosa in 1949 with a substantial following, and there, still on Chinese soil and functioning more liberally than before, it is keeping Nationalist China in the orbit of the free world. It is the symbol and rallying point of Chinese resistance to Communist aggression and of aspirations to freedom. It has reciprocated and fostered the spirit of good will which is traditional in the attitude of the United States toward China. In its defense of Formosa, it is serving purposes common to it and to us. It favors the "ways of life" of the free peoples, especially those of the United States. It has, generally speaking, shown respect for China's international obligations. Its representatives in the United Nations speak in terms intelligible to free peoples, and their voices and votes have been on the side of the free world.

China's Central People's Government is a product of conflict partly internal to China and partly international. It, too, came to power by use of armed force and skillful propaganda, with Soviet assistance. But its creators not only have not broken with Communism; they have remained ardently committed to the Communist cause, to which they are substantially indebted. This

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Government has employed most of the methods found useful elsewhere in the Communist empire for acquiring, exercising and expanding political authority. Since gaining control over most of mainland China, it has done its utmost to destroy all thought of individual freedom and to impose upon the 500,000,000 people of China a régime modeled upon that of the Soviet Union. Associating itself with the Soviet and other Communist governments in the "cold war" upon the free world, it has made China a focal point for the propagation of Communist ideology and activity among the peoples of Eastern Asia. It has openly declared itself indebted to the Soviet Union for its very existence. It has entered into formal alliance with that country and draws upon it for sponsorship and guidance. It employs tens of thousands of Soviet nationals, civilian and military, as "advisers" and technicians. It maintains a very large and ever-growing military establishment which depends on the Soviet Union for most of its equipment, much of its training and some of its operations. It abuses its own nationals and the nationals of other countries. It vilifies the United States and seeks to inflame its own and other peoples against the free world.

The Central People's Government has disregarded China's international commitments. It has become an aggressor, and the United Nations has formally declared it to be such. It was an aggressor directly in Korea, where it defied and made war upon the United Nations, and indirectly in Indo-China, where it supported the Viet-Minh by supplying munitions to armed forces seeking to bring the Associated States under Communist domination. It has made mainland China an asset to the Communist world and a liability to the free world. There is ample warrant for believing that, were it given China's seats in the United Nations, its representatives would pursue the Moscow-made "line" and thereby add greatly to the strength of the Soviet-directed Communist bloc and its capacity for manœuvre. And, Communist ideology being what it is, there is room for doubt whether it—or any Communist government—is morally capable of living up to its international obligations.

Recognition of the Central People's Government has thus far involved withdrawal, express or implied, of recognition from the National Government, with consequences highly advantageous to the Communist world. As matters now stand, recognition of the Central People's Government by the United States presum-

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ably would not follow exactly that pattern and would not terminate our concern for the National Government and its domain. But, no matter how achieved and with what safeguards, it would be fatal to the cause of Chinese resistance to the onward march of Communism. It would estop the United States from further support to that resistance. Followed as it would be by similar action on the part of other governments, it would shatter the morale of the National Government and its adherents. It would virtually ensure consolidation of Communist jurisdiction throughout all of China and thus legally affect Chinese nationals everywhere. It might even prove to have set the stage for an early assault upon Formosa by Communist armed forces and for the liquidation of huge numbers of those Chinese who are "oriented toward the West" and have sought to keep their country within the orbit of the free world. Whatever might be its consequences in China, it surely would tend to confirm the doubts already entertained in many quarters in Asia and elsewhere regarding the advisability of association with the United States in pursuit of a policy of resistance to Communist aggression. It thus would facilitate the onward march of Communism both on the Asiatic fronts and on other fronts.

Moreover, it would bar the United States from any reasonable further opposition to the seating of the Central People's Government in the United Nations. In addition, it would give that government the right, which would surely be fully exploited, to establish diplomatic, consular and other official agencies in the United States; and it would impose on us the obligation to accord those agencies the courtesies and immunities that are standard conventions of international intercourse.

In the light of these calculables it seems obvious that recognition by the United States of the Central People's Government would be inconsistent with and highly damaging to the over-all effort in American foreign policy to contain Communism and achieve security. Concomitantly, it would confer upon the whole of the Communist empire various immediate benefits.

V

Were United States recognition a thing to be bargained for—which it never should be—what may it be thought or hoped that Communist China or the whole Communist world would give in exchange? The Communists might relinquish some territory

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which they have taken unlawfully; they might release some foreign nationals whom they unlawfully hold prisoner. Such actions would cost them little, would be to their advantage in psychological effect, and would profit the United States little if at all in the realm of *political substance*. They might give promises, handsome promises, to do or not to do this or that, in Asia or elsewhere, in accordance with stipulations already or newly agreed upon. They might promise a "cease fire;" they might promise independence for Formosa; they might promise, in one context or another, nonaggression, free elections, trade and peaceful coexistence. The value, however, of those promises would be speculative, would depend on Communist estimates of the advantage or disadvantage of honoring them, or on the will and capability of the free world to enforce them. Latest examples: the Panmunjom promises in 1953 and the Geneva promises regarding Indo-China in 1955.

Promises of commercial opportunities and hope for benefits to the American economy should not mislead the American public and should in no way distract or confuse American policy-makers. Has any non-Communist country substantially improved its national economy by virtue of its recognition of any Communist government? Trade with the Soviet Union or with China could under some circumstances be of substantial value to some countries—for instance, Japan—but not, in any circumstances now foreseeable, to the United States. The Soviet Union and China have no great purchasing power, and the Communist régimes have little desire for trade with the free world except as that trade may contribute to the Communist program. Trade with Communist China has been, is and can be profitable for some individuals or firms, but its net value to the American or British economies is and will be relatively insignificant.

Promises purporting to put an end to the cold war might be worth having, but not on a basis of purchase and payment. They would be of no reliable value unless preceded by deeds clearly testifying to a change of heart on the part of their Communist givers. For so long as the Communist world remains committed to the objective of world domination it will continue to make war in one form or another on the free parts of the world.

There is little or no warrant for believing that our recognition of the Central People's Government would cause the Communist world or any part of it to modify its over-all objectives and thus

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resolve or diminish the ultimate cause of tensions in Asia. The net effect probably would be to increase the self-confidence, the will to conquer, and the capabilities of the Soviet-Communist empire. Those who think otherwise would do well to review the circumstances and the aftermath of our recognition more than 20 years ago of the Soviet Government, and of the British recognition five years ago of the Central People's Government.

The United States' recognition of the Soviet Government was achieved in 1933 on a basis of diplomatic trading. In an exchange of Notes, the Soviet Government gave promises—to desist, to refrain, to perform and to permit—and the two Governments agreed to establish normal diplomatic relations. Which of its promises then made has the Soviet Union honored? In what respect have its Communist rulers altered their over-all objectives? Of what profit has recognition of the Soviet Government been to the United States—or to the free world?

The United Kingdom transferred its recognition from China's National Government to the newly established Central People's Government in 1950, without trading and on a basis of wishful assumption and trustful hope. In what respect has Communist China altered its objectives or shown itself to have been affected for the better by that gesture of confidence? In what context has the United Kingdom succeeded in exercising a "restraining influence?" The Central Peoples' Government has, *inter alia,* snubbed the United Kingdom officially, confiscated British properties, destroyed British business and abused British nationals within the area over which it exercises jurisdiction. What, then, has recognition of the Central People's Government profited the United Kingdom nationally—in terms of prestige, of influence, or, on balance, of pounds, shillings and pence?

Nor is there warrant for the contention that recognition of the Central People's Government would give American policy-makers and negotiators greater latitude for manœuvre, greater freedom of choice. It presumably would relieve the United States of some commitments, momentarily embarrassing, to the National Government; it would reduce at least one of the areas of discord between the United States and some of its allies; and it would satisfy at least one of the demands of the Communist world. But it simultaneously would enmesh the United States in commitments to a government hostile to the free world and party to the conspiracy which seeks to destroy it. In total effect it would

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reduce rather than enlarge the area wherein American policy-makers are free to make choices.

VI

It has been suggested that the United States, while continuing to recognize the National Government, should also accord recognition to the Central People's Government. Under this proposal, other states would likewise accord recognition to *both* of those governments, each of *two* Chinas would be accorded membership and seats in the United Nations, and each would agree to refrain from the use of armed force against the other and to respect the rights of the other as a sovereign state. This "solution" would be achieved perhaps under the aegis of the United Nations and be underwritten by the Security Council or by sponsoring Powers.

The "two Chinas" idea has the merit of extensiveness. That it will meet with favor in the United States is not likely, primarily because it runs contrary to the traditions of American thought and policy in regard to China. This country has long been committed to a policy of respect for China's territorial and administrative integrity and of opposition to plans for partitioning that country. The whole plan would be suspect in many circles in the United States because of skepticism regarding Communist promises and United Nations' capabilities. Were it proposed officially, the Chinese Nationalists surely would oppose it, and if it were pressed they would probably resist. It might conceivably be accepted, perhaps even be favored, by the Communists—for tactical reasons. If adopted, it would give them more than it would cost them and it would consolidate gains which are at present speculative. Were it by chance agreed upon and implemented, it might produce some momentary relaxation of tension, but because the Communist appetite increases with every concession it would make no lasting contribution to the cause of peace.

There sometimes is coupled with the "two Chinas" proposal the further suggestion that China's permanent seat in the Security Council be transferred to India. Were that suggestion to attain the status of a serious proposal it could be considered either in combination with the original proposal or separately. Either way, to make such a transfer possible it would be necessary to amend the Charter of the United Nations. Either way, the idea of such a transfer would be anathema to the Chinese—Nationalists and Communists alike. That fact alone should give pause to those

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to whom the idea seems attractive on its merits or as a contribution toward solving, by means of a package deal, a twofold problem of representation. Any government or group of governments which may think of proposing or sponsoring it in the United Nations will need to ponder the complications to which an open and official discussion of it—and still more the adoption of it, if and when—might lead in the relation of India and China, of India and the Soviets, and of the Soviet Union and China. For India, the idea of having *a* permanent seat on the Security Council might have great appeal, but the idea of acquiring such seat at China's expense would be quite another matter. In world affairs, to impose upon China an externally devised political dichotomy would produce nothing stable; and to take China's seat in the Council from Nationalist China, withhold it from Communist China and give it to India would in no way strengthen the United Nations or add to its repute as an instrument for collective security. What contribution, then, could this deal or any part of it, if consummated, make toward safeguarding and promoting the long-swing interests of the United States and of the family of nations?

There comes also a suggestion that the will of the people of—more accurately, *on*—Formosa be ascertained by a plebiscite. It may be doubted whether implementing that suggestion would be practicable or profitable. Authorities familiar with the situation on Formosa affirm that, of the nearly 10,000,000 people there, more than 98 percent of whom are Chinese, few indeed would vote in favor of Communist China; and it is considered probable that the majority would vote for independence without in the least understanding the implications of an independent status. Their vote, while possibly informative, would solve no problem and might create new difficulties. The question of Formosa's future is a part of the far greater question: China's future. That question is of concern, conscious or unconscious, to all Chinese—and to other countries. If knowledge of the will of the people is to be sought by plebiscite, should not that procedure be applied on the mainland as well as on Formosa?

From time to time the question is asked: Having recognized the Soviet Union and having raised no objection to its becoming or remaining—together with other Communist countries—a member of the United Nations, why decline to recognize Communist China and why object to admitting it to the United Na-

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tions? If the question stood alone it would need to be dealt with in terms of a patient and extensive statement of facts; but, propounded as it has been in a context of debate, it can be dealt with briefly by asking other questions in rejoinder: Having recognized some Communist states and governments with unhappy consequences, why add to our own embarrassment and the troubles of the free world by recognizing another? And, being in no position to object to the presence in the United Nations of Communist states that are members, why *not* oppose admission to the United Nations of another government whose voice and votes would augment the strength of the Communist world and diminish that of the free world?

Recognition of the Central People's Government by the United States would presumably be followed promptly by its admission to the United Nations. Were this accompanied by the ejection of the National Government, it would mean one more delegation contributing to the Soviet-directed Communist effort in that forum and one less on the side of the free world. In the Security Council, that change would greatly facilitate the operations of the Communist bloc. The argument, actually advanced, that this really would matter little because "two vetoes have no more effect than one" is myopic—to say the least—for in any context one less delegation on one side and one more on another means much in the realm of manœuvre and often may be decisive.

VII

In their appraisal of China's two governments and in choosing between them, some authorities give more thought than others to the ways and means by which those governments came into existence. The conflict in China is far more than a "civil conflict;" it is in fact a local deployment in the global conflict between the Communist world and the free world. Some authorities give great weight to the fact that the effective jurisdiction of the Central People's Government is far more extensive than is that of the National Government. Policy-makers ask, of course, what action by their government will best serve their country's interest—as they see it.

Has not the time come when, in approaching this problem, all men and all governments in the free world should ask with common solicitude: Which of those governments more truly expresses the way of life, the aspirations and hopes, the undeclared but

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fundamental will of the Chinese people? Which government can and will most authentically represent China? With which Chinese spokesmen can the representatives of other countries most amicably and most dependably deal? Which Chinese represent a "peace-loving state," "accept the obligations contained in the . . . Charter," and are "able and willing to carry out these obligations?" Which Chinese, if given wholehearted support by the free world, could contribute in greater measure to the cause of peace, security, freedom and justice? In regard to those governments, then, what action by our country and others will most truly serve the interests of the family of nations and, in so doing, best serve our own? Are not these the most important questions that can now be asked in order to choose wisely between the two governments now functioning in China?

VIII

The American polity is rooted in a belief in the reality of a corpus of natural, moral or divinely ordained law and a practical application of principles evolved and expounded in the corpus of Christian doctrine. Thanks to many favorable factors, the United States has become a Great Power. Thanks—or no thanks—to developments in world affairs, there have devolved upon it great responsibilities. Because of its emphasis on the right of men and nations to be free, and because of its possession of material and moral strength, other free peoples and peoples seeking to be free look to it today for honest leadership in the cause of freedom. To give such leadership, we must first, last and always be true to our own heritage of concepts, principles and commitments.

American policy-makers have declared over and over, and not alone during the present Administration, that the United States will judge other countries and governments by their deeds rather than by their words; and American public opinion endorses that declaration. As one judges, however, so is one judged. The world will judge the United States by its performance in relation to all of its commitments, formal and informal, multilateral, bilateral and unilateral.

The United States must of course enter into agreements with other countries. Agreements may or may not involve trading: bargaining, bartering, "concessions," "compromises." With the strength that it possesses and the qualities of that strength, the United States is in position to trade exclusively on a basis of fair-

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ness to itself and to all concerned. We can offer substance and we can decline anything not substantial; and above all we can refrain from trading that which is not ours to trade.

Diplomatic recognition by the United States should be regarded as a thing not tradeable, for, in American theory and practice, recognition is a certification that its accorder deems its recipient qualified and acceptable: a certification to be given, withheld, withdrawn or transferred on a basis of facts, not on a basis of barter or agreement.

Could it happen that American policy-making negotiators, intent upon particular and immediate objectives, might again make errors of oversight and misplaced faith such as were made by their predecessors ten years ago? Before and at Yalta there was bargaining: there was exchange of substantial inducements for glowing promises. The Yalta Agreements purported to ensure coöperation in pursuit of a common victory and a common policy of collective security. The Soviet Union thoroughly exploited the authorizations given it in the Agreements, but after V-J Day went right on with its program of conquest. From study of that bargaining and its aftermath at least one lesson should be learned: The Communist world will bargain, but Soviet Communist overall policy is not for sale and cannot be purchased. Promises, yes; but abandonment of purposes, no. Change of heart, perhaps some day and for some reason, but not in return for "concessions" or to honor promises. In no transaction should the United States rob Peter to pay Paul. At no time should the United States think it possible to buy Communist basic policy.

The United States wants peace, of course; the American people and peoples throughout the world want peace. There now is talk in many quarters about the possibility of ensuring peace through new agreements providing for "peaceful coexistence." The action most needed toward ensuring peaceful coexistence is performance by the Soviet Union in fulfilment of the many promises which it has already given, and for which the free world has already compensated it. Among the many promises are those made to the United States in return for recognition in 1933, those made to the United States and Great Britain at Yalta and at Potsdam in 1945, and those made to the world in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. In the absence of such action new promises would have little value, and in the presence of such action new promises would be essentially redundant. Certainly new

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promises not preceded by substantial indications of good faith should not be bought in terms of "concessions" by the United States. Nor should the United States pay in terms of "inducements" or "compensation." Let the Communists first give evidence by simple acts of restraint and restitution that they understand peace, want real and lasting peace, and desire that there be honest coexistence on a peaceful basis.

IX

The United States cannot insist that other states subscribe to its principles or live and act as it would wish. In many instances it has to tolerate conduct of which it thoroughly disapproves. It is, however, under no compulsion to give assent to such. It certainly can refuse to authorize, it can decline to sanction, and it can withhold endorsement.

No matter by what process it might be effected, or with what "guarantees," our recognition of China's Central People's Government while that Government persists in attitudes and practices utterly hostile to us and to the free world would compromise the United States in the eyes of all people—even those who urge that we take that step and those who would profit from it.

As matters now stand in world affairs, our continued recognition of China's National Government is in line with American commitments and with the over-all purposes of American policy on behalf of peace, security, freedom and justice. It serves a broad moral purpose and particular political and strategic purposes. It signifies to all concerned that the United States is truly committed to "supporting free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."

In the current quest for ways and means by which to promote the cause of peace, the question of keeping faith is of paramount importance. In the quest for new agreements, with its emphasis on the process of give and take, what could be sounder than an understanding at all stages and by all concerned that the United States, while prepared to negotiate and, if need be, to bargain, with a view to making new commitments, intends to stand by its existing commitments and will not subject them to the bargaining process?

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JAPAN'S NEW RÔLE IN EAST ASIA

By Toshikazu Kase

THE "Summit Conference" at Geneva threw the limelight on European affairs so strongly that for a while Asia has seemed to be relegated to the background. Yet the Asian theater is currently fraught with grave dangers that threaten the tranquillity of the world; in a sense, the need for pacification in Asia is even more urgent than in Europe. It is Asia, rather than Europe, that requires an immediate treatment.

The very fact that the Geneva Conference took place shows that there had already been a measurable improvement in the European situation. This no doubt is due largely to the consolidation of the military position of the Western Powers; they have considerably rectified the imbalance of forces that for years handicapped them in their dealings with the Eastern Powers. One might say that it is the vindication of the policy of "peace through strength." At the same time, it cannot be denied that the approaching stalemate in atomic armaments is exercising a formidable psychological restraint on bellicose tendencies through the establishment of what we might call the balance of fear. For common sense teaches that a nuclear war is bound to be nothing less than cosmic suicide.

Now, in contrast with Europe, the situation in Asia remains highly fluid and fluctuating. Although the policy of "peace through strength" has been applied there with some success, as witnessed by the inauguration of SEATO, it has by no means stabilized the situation. A deep-rooted neutralist sentiment prevails in the vast region of uncommitted Asia. This preference for remaining unaligned in the cold war is partly ascribable to the anti-colonialism of the Asiatic nations which have won independence only recently after many years of struggle. The nationalistic aspirations of the Asian peoples can no longer be disregarded. They are determined not to be either dominated or exploited by alien Powers. The day of colonialism is over. However, some of them seem to be blissfully ignorant of the dangers of the new colonialism now threatening Asia in the guise of Communism. Apparently they do not understand that Communism can be as ruthless an aggressor as imperialism once was.

Communism thrives on hunger, of course, and hunger is the

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scourge of Asia. Indeed, the primary cause of Communism's success there is the appalling poverty of the Asian peoples. But there are many and various shafts in the quiver of Communist propagandists. And, as "many arrows loosed several ways come back to one mark," their psychological offensives produce a cumulative effect. Whether they seek to inflame anti-colonial passions or to exploit the low standard of living of the Asian masses, they always lay the blame on the Western Powers. While in the past their propaganda often took the form of dark threats, more recently it has assumed the tone of subtle persuasion. They preach "peaceful coexistence" while simultaneously painting a lurid picture of an atomic holocaust. Under the stress of emotional anti-colonialism, hunger and the fear of involvement in nuclear war the peoples of Asia are prone to accept the false concept of neutralism, forgetting that if it were not for the deterrent power of the free nations Asia as well as Europe might by now have been completely at the mercy of the Communists.

What, then, has been the psychological impact of the Geneva "Summit" talks on the state of mind of Asia? They were enthusiastically reported and highly appreciated throughout East Asia. In Japan, for example, they have been regarded as a great diplomatic success inaugurating a new era of good feeling among the Big Four. That may very well be true. But what was accomplished at Geneva was mainly the improvement of the diplomatic climate; this, though very important in itself, did not settle any of the great issues that divide the world even though it provided new opportunities for further consultations about them. It is most gratifying that ten years after Potsdam the responsible leaders of the major Powers have recovered the healthy habit of relaxing together around a green table. But an improvement in the mere intangibles of coexistence should not encourage boundless optimism; the acid test, as President Eisenhower has put it, is yet to come.

And who knows the Kremlin's true intentions? On certain fundamental issues such as German reunification and European security its position does not appear to be amenable to persuasion. Experts presume that this is because the Kremlin has not been deflected from its basic policy of eventually communizing the whole world. However, even if peaceful coexistence is only a tactical readjustment of Soviet revolutionary policy and even if the long Soviet design remains unaltered, it is wiser, we submit, to

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make the most of the peaceful overtures of the Russian leaders, provided always we do not slacken the tautness and vigilance that have helped us through the dark hours. The free world must, to be true to its own ideals, explore every avenue of conciliation, so long as there is even a glimmering hope of peaceful compromise on a safe and stable basis.

II

Peace is the supreme objective of Japan's foreign policy. We desire concord and conciliation with all the nations of the world. It was in this spirit that at the Asian-African Conference last April our delegation submitted the "Bandung Peace Declaration" which later was incorporated in the "Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Coöperation" issued by that historic Conference.

However, peace cannot be secured by gestures. And since a genuine peace must be based on justice and liberty, we have fully aligned ourselves with the free nations, in particular the United States. In consequence of this Japan now occupies a foremost position in the vanguard of freedom in East Asia. Our policy of maintaining close coöperation with the United States is supported by an overwhelming majority of our people. Like other nations, we have a quota of people considering themselves intellectuals who make a profession of anti-Americanism; but, though very vocal, they are a small minority. Often unconsciously they are stooges for the Communists. Fortunately the broad masses of our people are more realistic, more intelligent than the "intellectuals," hence more aware of the perils of Communism and more firmly opposed to it.

Opposition to Communism as such, however, does not prejudice our present policy of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. We believe it is high time that the technical state of war still prevailing between Japan and the Soviet Union was liquidated and diplomatic relations restored. It is anomalous, to say the least, that ten full years after the termination of hostilities the two countries should still remain legally at war. Resumption of normal relations will go far, we believe, in reducing the tension and stabilizing the situation in East Asia as a whole and will benefit all nations, the United States included. When coexistence is so much in vogue, nations should at the least maintain diplomatic intercourse.

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Japan and Soviet Russia do not have diplomatic relations because the latter refused to adhere to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, hailed by some 50 countries as a fine specimen of reconciliation. This made necessary the present negotiations with the Soviet Union. The questions involved include, among others, the territorial disputes regarding Shikotan and Habomais, two islands universally recognized as part of Hokkaido, and the final disposition of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin in the North Pacific. Although we renounced claim to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin in Article 2, Paragraph 1, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Treaty does not transfer title to the islands to another state. Moreover, the secret agreement concluded at Yalta is not binding upon Japan. In short, the ultimate disposition of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin has not been determined and is, legally speaking, a matter for further consideration by the Powers concerned.

A matter of utmost urgency is a prompt release by the Soviet Government of a large number of Japanese nationals still detained in Siberia and elsewhere. Simple humanity demands that these unfortunate prisoners should now be permitted to return home after ten years of painful separation from their loved ones. We are, therefore, appealing to the Russians to expedite their repatriation. Of late, thanks to the efforts of Messrs. Malik and Matsumoto in London, there has been some progress in this matter and we hope and trust that the Soviet leaders will be humane enough to respond to our plea and settle this question without further delay.

The question of how to regulate our relations with Communist China requires delicate considerations since we maintain diplomatic relations with the government of Nationalist China in Formosa. In view of our geographical propinquity, the critical situation prevailing over the Formosan straits gives us grave concern. We earnestly hope that the recent *détente* in the cold war will lead to an early pacification of the region, without which there can be no tranquillity in East Asia. We believe that under no circumstances should resort to violence be countenanced.

It is common knowledge that there exists in Japan a widespread impatience with the government for not having put forth enough endeavors to remove the barriers of trade with continental China. The reasons for this pressure are clear. At one time China took one-fourth of our total exports and was the major source of supply of coal, iron ore, salt, beans, bean oil and other materials essential

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to our industry. Those who now clamor for the expansion of trade with China, however, tend to overlook the enormous changes which the last decade has brought there. In any case, an embargo is now enforced by the free nations against Communist countries, and an even tighter ban exists on trade with Communist China than with Soviet Russia and the East European countries. This gives rise to the feeling among our people that, because of our geographical position, we are unduly discriminated against. Inasmuch as we have faithfully observed the rules of the embargo, and are determined to continue doing so in the future, we hope that the present unequal distribution of sacrifices among free nations will be removed and that the pattern of embargo will be applied uniformly to all Communist countries.

It cannot be denied that the massive strength of continental China exercises a peculiar psychological spell on the adjoining countries of Asia, and Japan is not an exception. This psychological pull is gathering force as the Peking Government develops its propaganda for peace in the form of coexistence. With the double impact of the parallel Russian offensives, the effect is not to be despised. Too many forget that "things sweet to taste prove in digestion sour." To counteract this impact, it becomes imperative to consolidate anew our relations with the United States and other free nations. For the paramount aim of the Communist effort is to detach Japan from the United States, then to neutralize her and eventually to win her over to the Communist camp. Thus our situation is closely analogous to that of West Germany. The fate of Europe will be decided by the disposition of the German question; the destiny of Asia will depend on the orientation of Japan.

III

Three years have now passed since the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the accompanying Security Pact between Japan and the United States. During this period the world situation has undergone a significant change, and with it has come a change in more than one sense in the outlook of our people toward their foreign relations, including those with the United States.

Certainly, we shall not deflect from the policy of preserving and promoting the closest possible coöperation with the United States; that is the fundamental national policy to which we are

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firmly committed. We believe that this coöperation has been highly instrumental in consolidating the position of the free nations in East Asia and this fact in itself enhances the common interests of our two countries. But we feel that the time has now come to review our relations and readjust them to present needs so as to make them even more enduring. If this is not done we foresee the possibility that the present Japanese Government based on moderate conservative forces will be subjected increasingly to attacks from the extremists of both right and left on the score of being unduly subservient to the United States. This might have undesirable repercussions on our future coöperation.

A speedy readjustment is called for in rectifying certain measures initiated under the Occupation which, though largely benevolent in character, nevertheless were foreign in many respects to our basic tradition. Our democratic institutions will not thrive unless they become accepted and adopted by the people at large as truly their own. A case in point is the present arrangement for our national defense. Under the Security Pact, we invited the American forces to stay in and around Japan, and they have undertaken to assume increasing responsibility for our defense. In view of the fact that international tension was then increasing and that Japan had been completely disarmed, our public accepted the idea that it was necessary and desirable to entrust the task of defending our soil to the American forces. It must be remembered, however, that even then the Socialists—and in general the segment of our public called "intellectuals"—were opposed. Naturally their opposition has grown in vigor with the apparent easing of the international situation. In consequence, a psychological gap seems about to develop between Japan and the United States. In the American view, the international situation is still grave, and especially in East Asia. Consequently, the United States urges Japan to fulfill her obligations to increase rapidly her own defense forces. On the other hand, our people incline to take a more hopeful view of the global situation. Not believing in the imminence of war, they do not feel the same urgency that the American military command does to increase Japanese defense efforts sharply. Quite possibly their assessment of the international situation is unduly influenced by sanguine hopes or is affected by the peace offensives of the Communist Powers. All the same, this is a factor which we must take into consideration in shaping our defense policy. The fact that recently

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the Socialists in the Diet obstructed the passage of the bill for a National Defense Council is an indication of the strength of opposition to rearmament.

As is well known, the present Japanese Constitution, prepared during the Occupation, forbids our rearmament and this seems to give a legal sanction to the popular movement against rearmament. It is unfortunate that the inherent right of a sovereign nation to provide for her own national defense is disputed as a violation of the Constitution and that the issue of rearmament is replaced by and confused with that of upholding the basic law of the state. A vocal section of our public suspects that outside pressure is being brought to bear upon the government to revise the anti-rearmament clause of the Constitution and criticizes the Security Pact as likely to involve Japan in a war with the Communist Powers. In fact, the leftists loudly denounce the Security Pact as an instrument of "Imperialist America" designed to make selfish use of Japan in an emergency. Thus, the security arrangement as it now operates is open to exploitation as a cause of friction in American-Japanese relations; and in fact the Communist Powers do exploit the situation to their advantage, since it is their avowed policy to wean Japan away from her allies. Consequently, the question of increasing our defense efforts is inseparably linked with the anti-American movement.

As we gradually augment our defense forces (euphemistically called self-defense forces) we desire gradually to replace the American garrisons with our own troops, thus reducing the burden on the American taxpayer and also removing causes of friction due to the stationing of American forces in our country. This is the policy we are now carrying out in earnest.

But as we are still beset with severe economic difficulties there is obviously a limit to our defense efforts, since these must be regulated by our financial resources. Otherwise, the standard of living of our masses would seriously deteriorate. This would invite social unrest and, in turn, encourage leftist machinations. It seems highly advisable for our two countries to work out a new defense arrangement accompanied by a joint plan that will cover the needs for at least a few years to come. If such a plan is adopted, then the thorny question of our defense contributions which yearly involves painful negotiations would be largely obviated, since under a mutually agreed plan the amount of our annual contribution would be decided automatically. In elaborating this joint

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program, it is of the utmost importance, we believe, that we should exchange views freely and frankly on the respective defense requirements of our two countries so as to make our combined efforts as effective as possible in ensuring the stability of East Asia.

After all, common security forms the very foundation of American-Japanese relations. Once the question of how best to establish our common security is settled to our mutual satisfaction, other questions such as how to ensure Japan's economic viability and facilitate the expansion of her trade in the markets of Southeast Asia may also be discussed and disposed of. In this connection, it should be stated that we are anxious to coöperate with other free nations in elevating the living standards of the teeming millions of Southeast Asia. We hope that we shall be able to do so by rendering technical assistance to the nations of the region and expanding our trade with them. By integrating our policy for Southeast Asia with that of the United States, we shall be able, we believe, to expedite the attainment of our economic independence.

IV

Since we are quite aware that the key to economic independence lies in self-help, we have been pursuing a policy of austerity by which we are gradually improving Japan's balance of international payments. While in 1954 our imports were $1,960,000,000 against exports of $1,530,000,000, representing an unfavorable balance of some $430,000,000, the first half of 1955 ended with $878,000,000 in exports against $905,000,000 in imports, a trade deficit of $28,000,000 as compared with $426,000,000 for the same period the preceding year. This reveals, however, that to balance our international payments we are still dependent, although to a lesser degree, upon the procurement orders from the American forces in Japan and the spending of American military personnel.

Even so, we have been making serious efforts to settle the reparations question which constitutes a serious obstacle in normalizing our relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. Our good neighbor policy toward them has recently culminated in an agreement with Burma based on our undertaking to pay by way of reparations a sum of $200,000,000 spread over ten years, and $50,000,000 to finance Burma-Japan economic coöperation. More recently, Thailand has come to terms with us, in the matter

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of discharging our wartime indebtedness, with Japan offering to pay $15,000,000 in cash and to make available $26,000,000 for economic coöperation. As for reparations to the Philippines, some progress is now reported as a result of preliminary negotiations in Tokyo, and we earnestly hope for a speedy conclusion of the question. Next in line stand negotiations with Indonesia. Thus we are determined to settle our wartime liabilities once and for all. In this connection, it is extremely unfortunate that, in spite of genuine and continuing efforts at conciliation on our part, relations with the Republic of Korea still remain unstable.

If one realizes the fact that our territory has been reduced to the size of Montana and that the four narrow islands which constitute it fall far short of providing the sinews of life for our population of 88,000,000, it must be admitted that the problem confronting us is indeed most grim. It presents a challenge not only for Japan alone but also for the rest of the world. Every evidence of good will shown by friendly nations in helping us deal with this problem of overpopulation will naturally elicit warm appreciation.

Although it does not have great bearing upon the population pressure, permission for the former inhabitants of the Bonin Islands to return to their homes will be greatly appreciated as a sign of good will. Our people hope, as a matter of national sentiment, that full sovereignty over the Bonins as well as the Ryukus, which are now under American administration, will be restored to us as soon as circumstances permit. Meanwhile, the distress caused by the current situation could be alleviated by allowing the Bonin islanders who were moved to the mainland of Japan during or after the war to go back to their home islands, where they have the basis for a scanty livelihood. Furthermore, since the only former Bonin inhabitants who have been allowed to return so far are those with Caucasian blood, the others feel that they are being subjected to racial discrimination.

Another question close to Japanese hearts concerns the fate of the war criminals still held in prison, in number some 200. They received prison sentences from the United States military courts soon after the war. Whatever their wrongs, they have surely paid for them by having served ten years of their terms. Even on casual journeys through Japan, one often comes across moving scenes as relatives and friends of the prisoners gather to make personal appeals for their early release. Indeed, it is hard

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for those who fully support the democratic cause to find reasons why their compatriots should still be incarcerated. We are appreciative of the gradual release of some of these men by the United States, and the decision to release them all would further strengthen the bond of friendship with the United States.

Ten years have elapsed since the Instrument of Surrender was signed on board the U.S. Battleship *Missouri*. It has been a decade packed with fateful events. In April 1952, Japan regained her independence by virtue of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In signing that noble instrument she has firmly aligned herself with the community of free nations. We are proud that we have consistently upheld the cause of justice and liberty as a loyal ally of the free nations. Even so, despite a record which is above reproach and oblivious of overwhelming support for our admission, Japan is still barred from the United Nations. This painful fact is bitterly frustrating. We are not unaware, of course, of the complexity of the world situation which accounts for the delay. We trust that dictates of reason reinforced by the massive weight of world opinion will soon bring it to an end and that we shall obtain a seat in the organization and thus add another solid link in the chain of nations devoted to peace.

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THE CHALLENGE OF PLANNING ARMS CONTROLS

By David F. Cavers

THE nations of the world have never essayed a more difficult task of creative statesmanship than designing an arms control plan for the atomic future. The rewards and risks are great; the hazards of doing nothing may be vast. Recalling the brave start and the early failure at Lake Success, with the long stalemate that followed, one wonders whether as yet the work has really begun in earnest. Do the encouraging developments of the past year, and especially of the past months, represent more than the exploratory testing of positions by nations which are not yet sure whether they wish to become collaborators or remain antagonists?

Grounds for this doubt lie partly in the political context of the disarmament negotiations since the seven-year deadlock was broken by Vyshinsky in the General Assembly last September. But the doubt also springs from the way in which the problems have been attacked. Save for the initial studies at the United Nations in 1946 and 1947, the treatment of the congeries of military, technical, legal, political and economic issues which emerges in planning for an effective system of arms control has been superficial and at points cavalier. Thus far, the search has been for formulae which, even when accepted, have barely concealed wide areas of potential disagreement.

These disagreements could be fatal to success. Arms control is an inescapably practical business, however much its ultimate success may depend on the spirit of the participants. If a workable plan is to be pursued in good faith, we need a protracted period of careful preparatory studies, followed by bargaining in which we must expect to give as well as to take.

This prospect brings to the fore the disquieting fact that there is little informed opinion concerning the problems of arms control even in the countries where it can shape national policy. Public knowledge has been curtailed by the technical and even secret character of many of the facts; by its infrequent consideration in the United Nations; and, above all, by the pervading pessimism with which Western publics have come to view the possibility of agreement with Communist states. Now, however,

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a chance for real negotiation may exist. The U.N. Disarmament Commission must report to the General Assembly on the London meetings of its five-Power Sub-Committee which ran from late February till mid-May and resumed in late August. The Assembly in turn will doubtless give this report a prominent place on its agenda. So, too, will the October meeting of the foreign ministers of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States (four of the five Sub-Committee members, only Canada being unrepresented).

The succession of reports and debates now in store can be evaluated only against the pattern of agreement and disagreement that has been evolving since the Sub-Committee's first meeting in London in May and June of 1954. Just at the despairing close of that meeting a British-French compromise plan laid the basis for the Soviet concessions the following September. This article will seek to trace that developing pattern, even though the materials for a thorough account are still inadequate. We have the verbatim record of the London Sub-Committee meeting in 1954 but not of that in 1955. However, we also have the debate in the General Assembly in October 1954, the public record of the Geneva meeting "at the summit," and, of special value, two sets of documents from the Sub-Committee's meeting this May. One of these sets was released by the Soviet delegate on May 11, 1955, in breach of the Sub-Committee's rules. It comprises three draft resolutions which, pieced together, form the skeleton of an arms control plan and constitute the source of Premier Bulganin's statement on disarmament at Geneva. The other set of documents, released in self-defense by the four Western Powers on May 13, comprises several joint draft resolutions and memoranda to which all four Powers had agreed, other memoranda commanding the assent only of the British and French delegations, and an earlier Soviet draft resolution. All these are carefully formulated documents.

The questions posed by any attempt to devise an effective arms control plan may be roughly grouped as follows: What is to be done with nuclear bombs and other "weapons of mass destruction?" How are armed forces and conventional armaments, including foreign bases, to be limited? What should be the stages for putting the control plan into operation? How should compliance with its requirements be policed? Is "enforcement" important and practicable? What political adjustments are essen-

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tial if the control plan is to function effectively? These will be considered in turn.

II. NUCLEAR AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

It might appear logical to approach the planning of a system of arms control by first considering the objectives and the level of armaments which would be compatible with them. But to do so now would be to depart from the actual approach to the control problem that has been taken for the past eight years. In language of firm generality, all five Powers have declared their hope that armaments will be reduced to the levels required for internal police and the fulfillment of their obligations to the United Nations. However, they have also agreed that reductions to this depth should not be taken until more limited reductions had been effected, and they have confined their planning accordingly. Their restraint will be paralleled in this article. We shall pursue neither the alluring vision of an almost disarmed world nor the challenging problems of how it would be governed.

The approach taken plainly reflects the world's initial preoccupation with the atomic bomb. To devise ways to bring nuclear weapons (and "other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction") under international control was the purpose for which the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission was created in 1946. Even after its merger in 1951 with the inert U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments to form the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the focus remained on atomic weapons and the perplexing and special hazards which they raise. From the start, it has been agreed that all forms of nuclear weapons are to be eliminated. But what are "nuclear weapons?" The documents permit a clear answer: not the loaded A- and H-bombs but simply the bomb cases used to hold the nuclear explosives, with the devices they contain for precipitating nuclear chain reactions. The nuclear explosives are to be kept for peaceful uses.

The unloaded weapons are complicated pieces of apparatus, varying quite widely in size (it will be recalled that tactical A-bombs can be fired from a cannon). Once their design has been perfected, they presumably can be reproduced in volume without great difficulty by any nation possessing advanced metallurgical and metal-working industries. As armaments expenditures go, their total cost cannot be large. Scrapping presents no technical problems. But there is no sure way to tell whether all previously

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made weapons have been accounted for and whether new ones are being secretly manufactured. As a Soviet draft resolution candidly declares: "Thus there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for circumventing this control and organizing the secret manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons."

This pessimistic forecast assumes, as the Soviets put it, that "states having enterprises for the production of atomic energy are able, in violation of their agreements, to accumulate big quantities of explosive materials." Is this assumption valid? Can anything be done about either the past or the future production of fissionable materials (uranium 235 and plutonium) and such difficult-to-make products as may be essential to fusion, *e.g.* deuterium (heavy water) and tritium? Neither the Western Powers nor the Soviets propose to do away with the current stocks of these materials, though certainly they would require an accounting for all past production. Unfortunately, checking the accounts rendered would leave a margin for error that has been estimated unofficially at 20 percent of past production.

If controls were operating, both the United States and the Soviet Union would, of course, render accounts disclosing large stores of weapons-grade fissionable materials; the United Kingdom would have relatively small supplies to report. Are these stockpiles to remain available for use in weapons in case the control plan broke down in its critical early years? If it seemed worthwhile to take expensive precautions against this hazard, the stockpiled nuclear materials could be placed in reactors and contaminated radioactively in order to render them unusable again either in weapons or in power reactors without time-consuming reprocessing. Or chemical contamination might be used, a less effective if less expensive technique.

The British-French memorandum of June 14, 1954, which Vyshinsky accepted last fall as the basis of renewed negotiations, proposed that the elimination of nuclear weapons be followed by the "conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful uses;" and in a draft resolution of March 8, 1955, the United States and Canada also agreed to like language. This may refer to no more than would take place over a number of years as existing stocks were actually used in atomic power reactors. It may contemplate contamination by the means suggested above. The Soviet documents make no reference to conversion.

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Presumably a control plan would require that military stockpiles be drawn on to fuel atomic power reactors; if so, we may exhaust the disclosed supplies of weapons-grade nuclear materials in a relatively few years. In the interim, additional output of nuclear fuel might be confined to uranium enriched in uranium 235 by not over 20 percent. This enrichment, effected by the costly gaseous diffusion process, is sufficiently fissionable for an atomic power or research reactor, but it is not weapons-grade. On the other hand, some major reactors (*e.g.* those at Hanford, Washington) convert uranium into plutonium which, after chemical processing, is weapons material. Moreover, the so-called breeder and converter types of power reactors also yield plutonium which, when processed, is ready for weapons use. Hence, if stocks of weapons explosives are to be kept from expanding before the demand for nuclear fuels for power reactors builds up, the plan may have to require at least that reactors producing plutonium and not power be closed down until demand begins to press on supply. This tactic seems to have been envisaged by the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission back in 1947.

Of course, whatever the steps taken to guard disclosed stockpiles and to limit new production, the risk of secret stores remains. Some critics of controls argue that this is a risk to which we alone are exposed. The Soviets, they say, would surely maintain illicit stores of nuclear arms, whereas the cumbersome democratic processes of our Government would preclude our concealing either nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives. Let us hope the critics are right; secret violations would buy us dubious protection and would vest terrible power in an unknown and self-perpetuating group of officials. But the Soviets could not *know* what we have done. Elementary prudence would require them to assume that we had hidden enough bomb cases and nuclear materials to retaliate quickly in case they attacked.

We wind up, therefore, with the possibility of an atomic standstill *de facto*, if not *de jure*. The "elimination of nuclear weapons" would be treated by both sides as a fiction, even if measures were taken to contaminate weapons-grade materials and to limit the output of new materials to immediate peaceful needs. However, the output of new weapons would at the least be slowed down. If an inspectorate were operating, clandestine manufacture on a substantial scale would involve risks of detection. Moreover, the development of new and sinister forms of nuclear weapons could

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also be restricted, especially if the control plan embraced the Soviet proposal to stop nuclear weapons tests. (Since presumably our much more extensive testing has advanced our nuclear weapons technology further than that of the Soviets, it is rather surprising that they should have originated this proposal.)

All five Powers agree that "other weapons of mass destruction" are to be eliminated, but they have not yet identified them. Materials for chemical and bacteriological warfare and devices to spread them would doubtless be covered. However, since these do not require large-scale specialized facilities of a sort readily detected, the prohibition might not be fully effective. More helpful, perhaps, would be the inclusion in this category of ballistic and guided missiles designed for use against mass targets. The greatest danger of a devastating surprise attack would come from intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads. They would render the heavy bomber obsolete and presumably they would be easy to hide. But if they have not yet been designed and tested, an inspectorate probably could inhibit their development by preventing their testing and their mass production. If, however, controls were not begun until some time after such missiles had been in volume production, no effective accounting for past output could be hoped for. There would be another big loophole in one or both sides of the arms control system.

A significant problem of definition remains open. Is the big bomber to be regarded as a weapon of mass destruction and therefore to be eliminated? Or is it to be considered as a conventional weapon and therefore to be controlled?

III. ARMED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, FOREIGN BASES

Modern armaments are so diverse and so specialized in function that the task of reducing the entire array is indeed formidable. The conferences of the inter-war period struggled long over such simple variables as the tonnage of cruisers, the caliber of guns and the size of tanks. Understandably, therefore, when the Powers seek measures of arms reductions they turn to the one interchangeable part in all modern military machines: the human being. In May 1952 the United States made the first attempt at specification by following up its proposal for a five-stage arms census with a suggestion by Secretary Acheson that maximum limits be set on the military and para-military personnel of all Powers. For the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China—*a* China—he

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proposed uniform ceilings of from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men and, for Britain and France (who joined in the proposal), ceilings of between 700,000 and 800,000 men.

The Soviet Union had only scorn for this proposal. Vyshinsky called the figures "out of the hat." Account had to be taken, he said, of the differing defense tasks facing nations with different areas, boundaries and neighbors. He still preferred the long-standing Soviet solution: a proportional cut, one-third or maybe one-half of existing forces.

This position, which, of course, would have preserved the Soviet quantitative advantages, was suddenly abandoned at London last May when the Soviet representative accepted our 1952 approach in principle. (The Western position at London had been stated in terms of a general objective: "No state shall have armed forces strong enough to be a serious threat to international peace.") The Soviet proposal was for ceilings of from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men each for the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China, and 650,000 men for Britain and France. The levels permitted all other states were to be "considerably lower" than these five.

In setting the levels for all states, including the Council's five permanent members, the Soviets would have account taken of "demographic, geographic, economic, and political factors." These criteria they borrowed from a comparable Western proposal, but their specific reference to the permanent members probably means that the U.S.S.R. intends to argue that application of these factors entitles it to a higher ceiling than our own, though within the 1,000,000–1,500,000 range. The British and French accepted the Soviet figures, but on condition that the three top ceilings be uniform.

At the Geneva meeting, Premier Bulganin proposed ceilings for Powers other than the permanent members within a range of from 150,000 to 200,000 men. In so doing, he sharpened a significant difference between the Soviet and Western positions. The Western Powers had seen Germany, Japan and Italy as a special problem. Applied to them, the criteria would call for increases rather than reductions in their armed forces. Accordingly, a Western resolution, though naming no names, calls for "special arrangements" for "certain specified states." Needless to say, German rearmament is closely tied to the complex problems of German reunification and of European security arrangements. Indeed, this inter-relationship is disturbingly reminiscent of the

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conflicting goals of French "security" and German "equality" which brought the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva in the thirties to a halt.

Should limits also be placed on the arms available to the curtailed forces? The virtue of limiting only military manpower is the relative simplicity of the device. The defect is the obvious one that a lively arms race can continue between two nations with equalized armed forces.

The Western Powers, in a draft resolution of March 12, 1955, propose that the quantities of "armaments and equipment" for "the maintenance of the armed forces permitted under the convention" shall be agreed upon and that no state shall "retain or acquire" any excess. Moreover, the "levels and types of such armaments and equipment shall be such as to prevent undue concentration of total permitted armed forces. . . ." The obscurity of this criterion emphasizes the disheartening difficulty of the task. If our total military personnel were cut to, say, 1,200,000, and we decided to keep 300,000 naval personnel, how many battleships, submarines and aircraft carriers might we retain? Shades of Washington, London and Geneva! With an air force of 400,000, how many air wings? And would the controversy with the Soviets be any sharper than within the Pentagon? The Soviet treatment of the problem is no more specific than this sentence from one of their May draft resolutions: "The five Powers undertake to reduce correspondingly their conventional armaments as well."

Obviously we have here a pitfall in the path of agreement even if everyone shows good faith. We are not going to scrap carriers that take years to build in return for the scrapping of tanks that take weeks. The difficulties in working out equivalent arms cuts supply one of the strongest arguments for a drastic, one-step reduction of all armaments to internal police levels. Once this is ruled out as impracticable, what alternatives present themselves?

Budgetary control is one. As the comment on Premier Faure's reliance on this device has made plain, it is hard to equate Communist military budgets with those of the capitalist West. But budgetary restraints may have utility as an auxiliary to ceilings on military manpower. Another and perhaps more promising approach would allow existing conventional armaments to be kept but not increased. Replacements could be allowed for deterioration, though not for obsolescence. Coupled with a deep cut in manpower, such a standstill would probably lead to the moth-

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balling of military surpluses from planes to battleships, but each state would be judge of what should go into storage. A few years of successful control would make it vastly easier to negotiate schedules for scrapping rusty weapons.

Foreign bases pose special problems. Soviet spokesmen for years have fulminated against military bases on foreign territory. However, these complaints have seemed on a par with their complaints against war propaganda. We have usually rejoined by calling on them to evacuate the satellite states, and the matter has not gone beyond an exchange of unpleasantries. Now, however, a Soviet draft resolution prescribes that "states possessing military, naval and air bases on the territories of other countries undertake to dismantle these bases."

The point is not easy to meet. If nuclear weapons are "eliminated" and other arms so reduced that no state remains "a serious threat to international peace," what function do the bases have? If the disarmament program could be trusted fully, the bases naturally would be superfluous. But dismantling a base is a little like scrapping a battleship. If the control plan were repudiated or sabotaged six months later, it would be hard to reconstitute either. Before relatively permanent steps like these are taken there should be a longer period for testing controls than the two years set by the Soviets.

In view of this hazard, foreign bases might be dealt with in three ways. Some could be dismantled in the regular course of the arms reduction program. With even 1,500,000 men under arms, we could not hope to hold all the bases which we now maintain with 3,000,000 men. Other bases might be relinquished to their respective sovereign nations to be preserved in at least stand-by condition. A third group might be designated for dismantling or surrender at the end of specified periods, long enough to permit a thorough test of the viability of the control program.

IV. INITIATING A CONTROL PLAN

One reason why the Powers have dealt only cursorily with so many of the above matters has been their concern with the phasing of the control plan. This is due partly to the tactics pursued by both the United States and the Soviet Union. More deeply, however, it lies in the nature of the control problem itself.

Since World War II, both nations have relied on secrecy as an important factor in sustaining their military power. We have

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jealously guarded our dwindling store of atomic secrets; the Soviets have depended on the Iron Curtain and drastic restrictions on travel to conceal their military installations and supporting industries, including atomic facilities. Arms control would mean disclosure of many, perhaps all, the secrets of both Powers. This itself has given them pause. Still more, each side has feared that it might find itself making unilateral disclosures.

We have insisted that disclosures proceed by stages, with the revelation of atomic secrets left to the last. To the Soviets this has seemed a stratagem to enable us to learn their secrets while concealing our own indefinitely. They have therefore pressed for prohibitions against the use and even possession of atomic weapons prior to setting up effective controls. To us this seemed a way for them to deprive us of our strongest weapon and then to sabotage the controls before we had learned their secrets.

In the past seven years the Soviet insistence on an initial ban on atomic weapons has slowly weakened. Even as late as the 1954 London Sub-Committee meeting, however, the Soviets insisted that all nations agree at the outset not to use atomic bombs even against an aggressor who was using them. When they accepted the British-French compromise proposals as the basis for negotiation in September of that year they left the preliminary pledge against the use of nuclear weapons open for further study. Now they accept the Western position that the bomb might legally be used in defense against aggression. However, they attach a nullifying provision that such use must await "an appropriate decision" by the Security Council—to which, of course, the veto could be applied.

The British-French compromise sought to limit arms reduction to three stages (though the first was not so identified). In the preliminary stage, military manpower and budgets were to be frozen. In the first stage of the plan proper, 50 percent of the agreed reduction in armed forces and conventional arms would be carried out. The second stage would see the remaining 50 percent of the reduction completed. At the start of this second stage all production of nuclear weapons would be banned, and at the end they would be eliminated. The Soviets complained that the British-French program was "uncoördinated," a euphemistic way of stating the suspicion that the cuts in conventional arms would be completed and those in nuclear weapons would not. This led the two Powers to propose that the prohibition on nuclear

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weapons go into effect when the reduction in other arms was 75 percent complete, both processes to be finished by the end of the second stage. Since the processes would differ greatly in scale, the synchronization might be more apparent than real. The Soviets accepted the formula in May. We did not.

Under the British-French plan none of this procedure, not even the preliminary steps, would be taken until the inspectorate was in a position to carry out its functions in that stage, and had so certified. In Soviet eyes this promised to delay indefinitely the final step, abolition of the A-bomb and H-bomb. At the 1954 Assembly they agreed to the concept of two stages but specified that these be of prescribed duration, six months or a year each.

This difference as to timing of stages continues. In their draft resolutions of May 10, 1955, the Soviets proposed that the first stage be scheduled for 1956 and the second for 1957. Last spring in London, the United Kingdom and France, though not the United States and Canada, agreed to the principle of fixed periods for each stage, "subject to any extension of time essential to permit states to complete" the scheduled measures. This compromise seems sensible, and if the problem of stages were simply a matter of timing it would appear well on the way to solution. But it has been tied closely to the problem of inspection, which as we shall now see is highly complex.

V. POLICING THE CONTROL PLAN

The significance of the problem of policing any control plan has risen as the prospects of the Baruch proposals have declined. The Baruch proposals followed the lead of the Acheson-Lilienthal report in seeking to minimize the need for policing by giving the control agency managerial control or ownership of all facilities required for nuclear fuel production, together with ownership of the fuels produced. In the U.N.A.E.C. majority report this was expanded to make the agency the owner of all "dangerous" facilities. The task of the inspectorate was chiefly to uncover clandestine operations—a hard mission to perform without also uncovering secret non-atomic military installations not supposedly under control.

The Soviets at once scented a move toward American monopoly in the ownership plan and refused to discuss it. Their concern had some substance; the West could count on a clear majority in the proposed Atomic Development Authority, and its powers

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and discretion were to be wide. We clung to the plan long after it had any prospect of acceptance, and only withdrew covertly in a working paper on the administration of controls submitted at London in 1954. In the interim, after a dust-raising insistence that inspection of atomic facilities be "periodic" and not "continuous," the Soviets abandoned this point. But the original function of inspection—discovery of undisclosed operations—is still at issue.

The Western position as set forth in a 1955 London draft resolution is unequivocal: the inspectorate must be stationed permanently in the countries under control and have "unrestricted access to all installations and facilities as required by them for the effective performance of their responsibilities and functions." At the Assembly in September 1954, the Soviets proposed that the task of inspection be divided into two parts. A temporary body was to police the first stage, involving only armed forces and conventional arms. Though their statement was not clear it seemed to allow for some independent checking of the accuracy of government reports. The second stage, involving atomic armaments as well, was to be entrusted to a permanent control organ which would continue its policing indefinitely. Again it was not clear how extensive would be this organ's power to check suspected activities in undeclared premises. There seemed no change from the negative position taken at London in June 1954.

Since that time the gap seems to have widened. The Soviet draft resolution of May 1955 was prefaced by a long and candid explanation, quoted above, of why inspection is unable to detect atomic violations and of the "tension and distrust" which "make difficult the reaching of agreement regarding the admission by states to their enterprises, particularly those engaged in war production, of foreign controllers who could inspect the enterprises." Then came a proposal that during the first stage inspectors be stationed only in "big ports, railway junctions, motor roads and airdromes" where they could make sure that "no dangerous concentrations" of armed forces were being prepared to make a sudden attack. In the second stage the control agency would continue this function; but, "within the bounds of the control functions they exercise," inspectors would also "have unhindered access at any time to all objects of control." This clearly begs several questions as to both "control functions" and "objects." The reason is not hard to guess. The power of inspectors to search

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for undeclared facilities or stockpiles would probably be confined to cases where grounds for suspicion could be produced—a hard condition to satisfy in a totalitarian state.

It is puzzling why the Soviet representatives have been so obdurate in the matter of inspection once the control concept had been extended to cover all forms of armament. Do they suppose that the policy of military secrecy could survive an inclusive system of arms control? It is less difficult to explain the caution they have evinced in proposing limited inspection in the first stage. It probably springs from their fear of unilateral disclosure. The Soviet secrets are of a sort that would be laid bare by free-ranging inspection in the first stage; ours, in the second.

This concern may explain Premier Bulganin's subsequent rejection of President Eisenhower's call at Geneva for an exchange of "military blueprints" and reciprocal aerial surveys. It is symptomatic of the improvement in relations, however, that he based his position on the inadequacy of aerial inspection, not on its one-sided character. Also, he took pains not to shut the door tightly. The President's proposal seems prompted by much the same pessimism about the effectiveness of nuclear controls as the Soviets expressed last May.

Taken together, the President's proposal and that of the Soviets for watching mobilization centers have opened up the critical problem of inspection to a fresh examination. Objectives as well as methods should now be reviewed. Inspection can accomplish some tasks effectively and without too great difficulty; others it can achieve only with skillful planning and meticulous execution; for still others it is not reliable at all. Perhaps a few quite specialized inspection techniques, ranging from metallurgical testing to aerial surveys, would give virtually all the assurance that can be provided by policing; in that case, its further extensions would create needless problems for us as well as for the Soviets.

Our new attitude reveals some of the same nervousness regarding inspection that the Soviets have shown from the start. Thus President Eisenhower, at a press conference not long before Geneva, said: "Are we ready to open up every one of our factories, every place where something might be going on that could be inimical to the interests of someone else?" Read now in the light of his proposal for aerial surveys and his expression of readiness to combine it with the Soviet plan of watching mobilization centers, we gain the impression of an emerging American preference

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for a control plan which would not attempt to control the level of armaments but rather their use. This gradual approach would check the arms race only if it bred mutual confidence to a degree that made cuts in military spending more palatable. It would relax tensions more if there were not the risk that "something . . . inimical" might be going on in uninspected places on either side, and that it might be volume production of the intercontinental ballistic missile.

VI. ENFORCEMENT?

We have been concerned with how to enforce controls ever since Mr. Baruch stressed the need to define violations of the control treaty as "international crimes" meriting measures of "condign punishment" free of the veto. Some authorities insist that nations must disarm fully and leave all military power to a United Nations "police force" if controls are to be enforceable.

The concept of enforcement assumes that unwilling nations can be coerced into observing a control plan much as citizens are coerced into obeying national laws. But is the assumption true of nations the size of the United States and the Soviet Union? The coercing nations could, of course, go to war against the offender; but since the purpose of the plan is to avoid war, a war to force observance seems self-defeating. To be sure, other pressures can be brought to bear against a violator, even a large one. This may take the form of moral censure, U.N. resolutions, judgments of the International Court of Justice, or economic and diplomatic measures. All these have their place. But when the danger is that the suspected state may be preparing to launch an atomic war, pressures of that character seem inadequate.

The inspectors policing an arms control plan may some day find evidence pointing to a willful and menacing violation. The fire alarm rings. The control agency would, of course, call for prompt explanations and corrections. The U.N. Secretariat, the Security Council and the General Assembly, if in session, would be notified. This machinery is cumbersome, and so far as the Council is concerned the veto can paralyze action. But if it failed to work the threatened nations would not be helpless. Their armed forces would have been curtailed, but so would those of their opponents. During negotiations for a peaceful adjustment they could take steps to rearm and make clear their intention to fight if necessary. Article 51 legalizes measures of self-defense.

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The violator would then have a choice between peace and war. The choice would long have been open to it. Would it have deferred a decision to turn to war until it had accepted the control plan, disclosed at least some of its secret installations, destroyed a considerable part of its nuclear weapons and sharply curtailed its military forces? This is possible, but is it likely? How, for example, does this risk compare with the recent danger that a little atomic war over Quemoy and Matsu might grow into a big atomic war over New York and Moscow?

Another danger is more probable. The Soviets and their allies have a bad record for not carrying out international obligations and for using disputatious tactics that in effect repudiate duties even when they stop short of formal breaches. An arms control plan might be sabotaged in like fashion. There could be delays in the destruction of nuclear weapons; armed forces could be camouflaged as police or athletic societies; inspectors could be balked at every turn. The control agency's efforts to straighten out the tangles might merely breed more frustrating controversies.

If this situation begins to emerge under a control plan, there is one way to deal with it. The United States and its allies can make it plain that they stand ready to denounce the control treaty if the operation of it is obstructed. They must not be bluffed. If they are firm, probably the Communist states will conform. Presumably they would not have signed the treaty if they had not considered arms control in their own best interests. If that calculation changes, the sooner we find it out the better.

The obstructions which occur may not always involve such present danger that quick action is imperative. Legal procedures could be provided for testing in the International Court of Justice whether the failures of one side to perform its duties had relieved the other of its duties; thus the obligations of the arms treaty should be declared interdependent, as are the obligations of most contracts. This would act as a continuing reminder to the Communist states that they could not enjoy reduced arms burdens and freedom from the threat of war for long unless they were meeting their own responsibilities.

As tensions relaxed, budgets fell and peaceful industries expanded, there would develop a vested interest in peace and disarmament. The beginning period would be the critical one. To bring self-interest to bear in support of the plan, the phasing of it should prevent either side from gaining at any stage an advan-

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tage materially greater than the disclosures, arms reductions and other sacrifices that had been required of it at the start. Otherwise an advantaged Power might accept the controls in bad faith, knowing that an early breakdown of the system would leave it with a net gain.

These considerations bear directly on the wisdom of the position now taken by the United States as to the control agency's powers. We withdrew our insistence on the abolition of the Security Council veto in the working paper which we submitted at London in 1954. In its place, we proposed that the agency be authorized to "order" control measures in cases involving violations, including the cutting off of nuclear fuel supplies and the closing down of reactors. The Soviet Union claimed that this would usurp the Security Council's exclusive authority over disputes: the control authority might "recommend" action to the Council but the Council alone could "order" action.

The difference seems less significant when one considers what will lead a Power like the Soviet Union or Communist China to obey an "order" or a "recommendation." If it considers the continuation of the control system to be in its interest and knows that a refusal would jeopardize it, then it will obey an "order"—but, given these assumptions, it would obey a "recommendation" as well. If it is prepared to risk the collapse of the control system, neither an order nor a recommendation would be effective.

VII. SOME NECESSARY POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS

It is often said that agreement on arms control must await a general political settlement. What is less often recognized is that arms control implies the settlement of political issues, at least to the point that warfare is not to be used to resolve them. An operating arms control plan might have prevented the North Korean attack, but it could not have continued in existence for long after the hostilities began. If the Soviet Union and China had wished the plan to survive they would have had to keep the North Koreans under check. Applied to existing situations, this means that an arms control plan would require firm restraints in Korea, in Vietnam and its neighbors, in Israel and the Arab States, and in Formosa and the coastal islands. The political settlements involved would not need to be final, but they would have to be such that the use of military force was barred.

The question arises how a plan operating under the United

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Nations could function effectively if a number of large nations remained outside the organization. This is not a technical problem of draftsmanship; legally the problem could be solved. Under almost any control plan the administration of that plan would become the chief function of the United Nations. States as large as China, Japan, Germany and Italy could not long remain outside the central body.

As these tough political problems are examined with the needs of arms control in view, the happy suspicion grows that it may be easier to settle a dispute as a means to achieving some larger and independent purpose than it would be to resolve it wholly on its own merits. Thus the United States could more easily recognize Red China's claim to a Security Council seat as a step in setting up an arms control plan under the U.N. than on grounds bearing exclusively on the merits of that claim. For its part, China would find it easier to give up the effort to capture Formosa by force if this were part of the procedure of joining a control plan. Thus the initiation of arms control could involve political adjustments which in turn would make it easier to reduce armaments still further.

Before such a beneficent cycle can begin it is necessary to do more than secure Soviet acceptance of a workable plan. Somehow the American people and their political leaders must be prepared to go along too. This will not be easy. We have come to distrust the Soviet Union deeply and with cause; there are powerful isolationists in both parties and there are many organizations in which patriotism slips over easily into chauvinism. Our tolerance of our present pitiably inadequate civil defense organization indicates how ignorant and indeed how indifferent we are about the perils from which a workable arms control system might preserve us.

Fortunately, we probably have some time left. The present era of improved international feeling may persist. The present uneasy balance in nuclear armaments may continue, at least until one side, by virtue of advances in the technology of delivering or repelling an atomic attack, feels that it is in a position to overwhelm the other. Will the Great Powers have achieved political maturity before that point is reached?

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ON THE "ORIGINALITY" OF MAO TSE-TUNG

By Benjamin Schwartz

A NEW official edition of Mao Tse-tung's "Selected Works" calls to mind the curious fact that in some respects the political landscape in Communist China presents a more familiar aspect to the student of Communism than the current landscape in the Soviet Union. This edition,[1] with its editorial comments and explanatory footnotes, is clearly designed to lift the figure of Mao Tse-tung to the position of the unerring Communist philosopher-king in the classic tradition of Lenin and Stalin. Like Lenin and Stalin before him, he has faithfully applied the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism to the requirements of time and place in China. From the very outset of his political career, he has possessed those principles of the New Democracy which were to remain his unerring guide. While other groups and individuals were diverted into eddies or dashed on the rocks to the left and right of the stream of history, Mao proceeded down the navigable channel.

Now, whatever may be the case in the future, the fact remains that none of the present group ruling in the Kremlin has as yet shown the slightest propensity or courage to claim anything like an analogous position. Whether this drastic diminution in the theoretical rôle of the Soviet leaders represents a "basic change" or whether it is merely a function of a passing situation is a question which we shall not attempt to consider here. Whatever may be the case, the contrast with China where the older tradition is still very much alive is most striking.

Since the edition so obviously serves an official purpose, one immediately suspects editorial tamperings. As a matter of fact there is room for such suspicion. A spot comparison of the Chinese, Russian and English texts does not suggest any tampering via translation and while one might readily suppose that the selection of texts for inclusion has been tendentious (obviously embarrassing pronouncements have, of course, not been included) actually the bulk of Mao's most significant pronouncements has been included. There has, however, been evidence of some tam-

[1] Three volumes of the "Selected Works" are now available in English (New York: International Publishers, 1954 and 1955).

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pering with the texts of the various items themselves. At least one deletion of an unhappy phrase has been noted and a detailed comparison of these texts with some of the older butcher-paper editions of Yenan days may yield more.

More important than any possible tampering with texts in giving the editorial slant are the editorial notices which precede each item and the explanatory footnotes which follow. In addition, we have the inclusion of a few items which do not stem from the pen of Mao himself but are designed to underline the impression of his unfailing correctness. Every effort is made in the notes to bring the edition in line with the current official interpretations of Party history.

Since all of the writings included belong to the pre-1949 period, they naturally turn one's thoughts once again to some of the major problems of Chinese Communist history. A rereading of these pronouncements has suggested to this writer that the writings of Mao have so far not been scrutinized as carefully as they might have been for the clues they offer to historic developments. The source is, of course, suspect, but a primary source nevertheless.

In this article I should like to consider some of these historic problems and then take up once more the much-discussed question of Mao Tse-tung's "originality" or lack thereof.

II

One of the significant problems of Chinese Communist history on which the "Works" may shed some further light is the problem of the rôle of that rather shadowy group known as "the returned student faction" or the "twenty-eight Bolsheviks." It will be recalled that this group of students of the Sun Yat-sen Academy in Moscow, including such persons as Ch'en Shao-yü, Chang Wen-t'ien and Ch'in Pang-hsien, had practically been imposed on the Chinese Communist Party by Stalin after the disgrace of Li Li-san in 1931. During the whole period from 1931 until 1935 members of this group continued to hold the highest Party positions. In the last few years it has become clear that a struggle between this group and Mao's faction continued for more than half a decade; that when this group was forced to take refuge in the Soviet areas in 1933 it was actually able to push Mao from his leading position in those areas and to enforce its own policies; and that it was only at the Tsunyi Conference of 1935 that Mao finally achieved a position of clear dominance within the Party.

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There are two items of Mao's "Selected Works" which bear on this conflict—one called "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," published in 1936 immediately after the conclusion of the conflict, and another significant item of 1945, the "Resolutions on Some Problems of the History of Our Party," passed by the seventh enlarged plenum of the Central Committee. These items, taken together, furnish considerable testimony on the issues involved in this conflict and some indirect testimony on the question of where the Stalinist leadership stood.

To consider the second question first—there is considerable circumstantial evidence which would suggest that Stalin supported the "twenty-eight Bolsheviks" during this whole period. As late as 1935 they continued to occupy the highest Party positions, although there is little evidence that they enjoyed rank and file support. Their ability to overrule the local leadership within the Soviet areas would certainly suggest support from high quarters. What is more important, when they were finally thrust aside from leading Party positions in China there was no attack or censure forthcoming from the heights of the Kremlin. There were no humble pilgrimages and confessions in the manner of Li Li-san. In the very year in which Mao Tse-tung vented his spleen against them in his "Strategic Problems," one of their number, Ch'en Shao-yü, played a seemingly spectacular rôle as Chinese representative at the Seventh Comintern Congress. It is therefore interesting to note that while this tract by Mao is full of venom against "left opportunists" and "adventurists" he nowhere names names. This reticence vis-à-vis a defeated and discredited faction is by no means a characteristic of Communist behavior and can perhaps be best explained by the assumption that Mao could not identify and openly attack this group at a time when Moscow had not withdrawn its favor from them. It is not until the document of 1945 that we find an open and detailed attack on these "left deviationists" which actually singles out Ch'en Shao-yü by name as the leader of the group. One is somewhat puzzled, as a matter of fact, by the amount of attention devoted by a Party document of 1945 to the errors of a "left deviationist" group operating during the 1931–1935 period. Is it possible that Ch'en Shao-yü was still a troublesome factor in 1945 and that the document has a current rather than a purely historic bearing? Or is it perhaps more likely that in the mood of high self-confidence which prevailed in 1945 it was now felt possi-

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ble to indulge in open attack on all those groups in the Chinese Communist Party who had ever attempted to stand in Mao's way, regardless of whether they had or had not enjoyed the favor of Moscow?

It is significant to note in this regard that the same document also ventures for the first time to criticize the famous Sixth Congress of the C.C.P. (1928)—a Congress which had taken place in Moscow under the eye of Stalin and which had enjoyed a peculiar odor of sanctity. In all his earlier discussions of this Congress, Mao had always taken pains to demonstrate his complete solidarity with its decisions. Now, for the first time, we read of "inadequacies and errors in the work of the Congress" (*e.g.* it underestimated the importance of the rural bases, etc.). In retrospect it would now appear that these "Resolutions on Some Problems of the History of Our Party" actually set the mold for all subsequent interpretations of Chinese Communist history, including the now official work of Hu Ch'iao-mu.

If our assumption is correct that the "returned student group" enjoyed the support of Stalin during the whole 1931–1935 period, the discussion of the issues involved between the two factions assumes a new interest. It is unnecessary to point out that the struggle between Mao and this group was a struggle for power. As is so often the case, however, this struggle for power was inextricably wedded to a struggle over issues, since both groups had become committed to certain positions and had a stake in maintaining them. The two documents provide us, of course, with only Mao's version of the issues involved and hence cannot be accepted without reservations.

In any case, the heart of Mao's complaint is that the policies of this group differed in no major respect from the policies of the much-maligned Li Li-san. In sum, the "twenty-eight Bolsheviks" had no faith in the long-term efficacy of the Maoist strategy of concentration on the peasantry, the establishment of rural bases and the build-up of a peasant-based Red Army which would be used for propaganda and educational purposes as well as for purely military purposes. To the extent that circumstances had made it necessary for them to rely on the power of the Red Army, they wished to use it as an immediate tool for achieving more grandiose ends such as the occupation of urban centers and the crushing of Kuomintang troops. They were thus willing to risk the total loss of the army in ambitious adventures while Mao

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was interested above all in keeping a Red Army in being. They referred to the Maoist approach as a manifestation of a "localistic and conservative peasant mentality." It is by no means strange, incidentally, that these Moscow-trained Communists should have regarded Mao's exclusive obsession with peasant bases and guerrilla warfare as a cul-de-sac which offered no hope of victory. Had it not been for the continued ineffectiveness of the Nationalist Government and the spectacular effects of Japanese aggression they might well have been proven right.

At any rate, if we can safely assume that the "returned student faction" continued to be the true voice of the Kremlin during these years, then the present writer and others have been wrong in supposing that Stalin had acquiesced by 1932 or 1933 to Mao's sway in the Chinese Party as well as to the exclusive reliance on a Maoist strategy. Actually, it would appear that he had by no means acquiesced before the Long March of 1935. Furthermore, there are even spotty evidences (and this is a matter which bears further research) that while he had acquiesced to Mao's leading position during the Yenan period he continued to be somewhat less than enthusiastic about the Maoist strategy.

III

Another problem on which examination of these "Works" raises some speculations is the question of Mao Tse-tung's attitude to the whole problem of the United Front during the period between 1931 and 1937. It is well known, of course, that in 1935 Kremlin policy changed sharply from one of total non-coöperation with all other organized political groups, which were invariably labelled "Fascist" or "Social Fascist," to one of collaboration with any political groups willing to coöperate against Germany and Japan. Furthermore, the evidence is fairly overwhelming that the international line on this matter was applied to Asia as well as to the West.

In the case of Mao Tse-tung, however, we find evidence of a certain degree of consistency in his approach during these years. It was an approach which seemed to combine a deep-laid and genuine hostility to Chiang Kai-shek with an inclination to seek collaboration with all organized political and military groups willing to coöperate with the C.C.P. One of his accusations against the "left deviationists" of the Soviet period is that they blocked all moves to establish such collaboration, thus presumably cut-

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ting off the C.C.P. from excellent opportunities for infiltration and for influencing wide areas of public opinion. Again a word of caution is necessary. The works in which Mao makes these accusations stem from a later period and we have no direct contemporary evidence of his attitudes on this subject during the Soviet period. It should further be emphasized that to the extent that the "left deviationists" opposed such collaborative moves they were merely adhering to the general Comintern line.

There is every reason to believe, if this hypothesis is true, that Mao welcomed without reservation the resolutions of the Seventh Comintern Congress of 1935, for while this Congress called for a united front with "bourgeois" groups it did not as yet clearly indicate that Chiang Kai-shek and his followers constituted a "bourgeois" element. At any rate it is quite clear from Mao's tract of December 1935, entitled "On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism," that he had not at that date the slightest intention of seeking a rapprochement with Chiang. He openly identifies Chiang not with the "national bourgeoisie" but with the "bad gentry and compradores" who are incapable of opposing Japanese imperialism. It was not until the Sian incident of 1936 with its complicated behind-the-scenes intrigues that Mao Tse-tung finally shifted his approach. There is, however, evidence that Stalin and Ch'en Shao-yü in Moscow had striven almost from the very outset for a rapprochement with Chiang Kai-shek—a man who may have seemed to Stalin to constitute the only center of effective power available in China.

IV

In sum, then, a rereading of Mao's writings combined with the testimony of other sources would suggest that divergences and tensions between the Maoist faction in China and the Kremlin on both matters of power and policy did not cease in 1931 with the founding of the Soviet Republic but actually continued well beyond that date—conceivably up to the very eve of the Chinese Communist assumption of power.

If this is so, does it imply that Mao was not, after all, a good Stalinist? I would not tend to draw this implication. There is every reason to believe that Mao and his followers accepted wholeheartedly the entire Stalinist development in the Soviet Union, that they accepted the Stalinist definition of "Socialism" with all its totalitarian implications. There is also every reason

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to believe that Mao's admiration for Stalin as a practitioner of "creative Marxism" was profound and genuine. It would imply, however, that Mao never really accepted the notion of the unvarying correctness of Stalin's directives and policies on Chinese matters when such directives and policies clashed with his own views or threatened his power position. Furthermore, Mao's acceptance of Stalinism does not seem to have been accompanied by acceptance of the view that Stalin was the last legitimate innovator within the Marxist-Leninist tradition. On the contrary, the claim that Mao has made "creative additions" to the tradition has gained strength in the course of time.

The question remains whether there is any justification for the claim. This brings us back to the much-discussed problem of the reality of Mao's innovations. Behind this question there looms yet another: What is the meaning of "innovation" within the Communist tradition? The Communists themselves speak of Lenin and Stalin as men who "enriched," "deepened" and "applied creatively" the universally true principles of Marxism to the unfolding process of history. The implication is that these innovations imply no breach in orthodoxy. They simply actualize the rich possibilities implicit in integral Marxism. To the Trotskyists, Lenin was indeed an innovator of this type while Stalin's innovations were purely destructive.

Now it is my view—which I shall not attempt to justify at this point—that most of the Communist innovations in Marxism beginning with Lenin himself have been destructive innovations tending toward the disintegration of Marxism as a system. They have generally been a response to a situation in which certain unforeseen, intractable realities have run directly counter to the teachings of Marxism as they existed up to that point. In this view, Lenin's innovations are more a tribute to the flexibility of Lenin than to the flexibility of Marxism. To the extent that Mao has been an innovator, he has contributed to this process of disintegration.

Furthermore, "innovation" in this context does not necessarily imply the presence of great "originality" or "intellectual creativity." In the case of Lenin one may indeed speak of a certain degree of originality in his resourceful manipulations and molding of elements of Marxist doctrine to serve his purposes. In the case of both Stalin and Mao, however, whatever may be their historic stature as politicians and statesmen, we find little evidence of

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great intellectual "originality." Thus, given the situation in which Stalin found himself, given his general acquaintance with the apparatus of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the theory of "Socialism in one country" represents no great intellectual feat. The same may be said of Mao's contributions.

Finally, one should not suppose that these "innovations" arose out of any burning desire on the part of Lenin, Stalin or Mao to demonstrate the richness and limitless flexibility of Marxist doctrine. Actually, they tended to arise in a time of trouble and were counterbalanced by a tremendous will to orthodoxy—by a desire to keep intact as much of the orthodox structure as possible. This, in spite of the fact that both Mao and Stalin have piqued themselves on their creative rôle. (The attitude of the present ruling group in Moscow to this whole range of problems is still very much a mystery.)

Using the word "innovation" in this sense, what can one say concerning Mao's claims as an innovator? First, the notion that a bona fide Communist Party can exist indefinitely without any ties to a proletarian base—that the proletarian nature of the Communist Party is a function of its possession of correct doctrine rather than of any tie to an actual proletariat—may still be considered one such innovation. It is interesting to note that the latest official interpretation of Chinese Communist history makes this much more explicit than it has ever been in the past. Secondly, the notion that China can pass from New Democracy to Socialism without a "dictatorship of the proletariat"—first hinted at in the tract, "On Coalition Government," and officially confirmed in the new Constitution—constitutes another. It should be added that the latter concept probably has little relevance to the internal political situation within China where the Communist Party reigns supreme. It is relevant, however, to the whole issue of the possibility of one or several paths to Socialism.

Recently it has been vehemently denied in some quarters that Mao Tse-tung has been an innovator in any sense. According to this view, all of Mao's innovations are already present not only in Stalin but even in Lenin; all the essential innovations required to explain the Chinese experience can be found in Lenin's writings. Now it is, of course, true that Lenin opened the doors to all subsequent developments of world Communism. This does not mean, however, that he marched through all the doors which he opened and that all the developments of Stalinism in the Soviet

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Union and of Maoism in China are simply untroubled applications of Lenin's teachings. The Trotskyists may be profoundly wrong in their assumption that Lenin would never have resorted to such an expedient as "Socialism in one country," or the notion of a Communist Party without a proletarian base, if the situation had called for such expedients. They have nevertheless been able to marshal impressive testimony to support their view that he had not developed these notions at the time of his death.

Without Lenin's theories regarding the rôle of the peasantry, without his theory of Communist Party organization, Mao would never have been able to develop his own innovations regarding the relation of Party to class. However, while Lenin had created a political organization which could exist without any real ties to the proletariat, there is little evidence that he accepted this implication. On the contrary, there is a great weight of evidence that from beginning to end the notion of the necessary proletarian base colored all his thinking. An enormous portion of all his writings is devoted to the question of proper strategy in labor union activities. At the time of the October Revolution, he continually stressed the fact that the Communist Party had a genuine proletarian base in the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets and he continued to scan the horizon with anxious eyes for signs of support from the huge proletarian populations of Western Europe. Had he lived on, he might himself have made the necessary doctrinal adjustments. Since he did not live on, elements of orthodoxy which he had not tampered with remained orthodox.

The only concrete bit of evidence offered on the other side of this question is a document on the colonial and national question stemming from 1920. In this document Lenin speaks of the possibility of Soviet régimes in "backward" areas led by the proletariat of the metropolitan countries. It has been claimed by some that Lenin was contemplating here the existence of Communist Parties in "backward" areas which would have their proletarian base in the Soviet Union. Actually this is not clearly suggested by the text and at one point Lenin explicitly raises doubts whether Communist parties can exist in countries without proletariats. Nor has any Communist Party in the "backward" areas ever tried to justify its existence in this way. They have all continued to claim indigenous proletarian bases. During the whole period from 1921–27 there was no faction in the Kremlin or in the Chinese Party which did not assume without further question

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that the acquisition of a proletarian base was one of the primary tasks of the Chinese Communist Party. All factions within the Party which opposed the Maoist trend after 1927 continued to raise the issue of the proletarian base time and time again.

V

Therefore I would suggest that the process of disintegration within Marxism for which Lenin laid the bases has been a slow and painful process inextricably enmeshed with struggles for power and the emergence of new historic situations created by local circumstances. I would suggest further that Mao has also played his modest rôle within this process—a process which has by no means terminated. Even if such a process of disintegration has taken place—some may ask—what is its importance? Lenin has provided Communism with the "organizational ideology" of the Communist Party. Stalin has provided it with the model of a fully crystallized totalitarianism. Whatever may happen to doctrine in general, the power system which has been called into being can now live a life of its own.

I would stress, however, that the vicissitudes of the faith are by no means unimportant. In the first place, even if the power system can survive on its own momentum, the story of the decay of doctrine may still hold a burning relevance for those elements outside the Soviet world who are still attracted by the apocalyptic promises and scientific pretensions of Communist doctrine. Secondly, the fate of doctrine may in the course of time have a profound effect on the relationship among Communist states such as China, Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union which are not directly subject to each other. Finally, human power systems are not perpetual motion machines operating in a vacuum. They are subject to many influences. If the original doctrines which have nourished and legitimized a power system gradually wither and decay, this may have profound effects on the morale, vitality and style of life of the ruling classes. If the Communist ruling classes should in the course of time cease to justify themselves in terms of the original doctrines and resort instead to justifications in terms of national power and the achievement of industrialization, this would not necessarily presage their downfall. One can venture to speculate, however, that it would involve many profound changes in the whole Communist scheme of things.

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FOREIGN TRADE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

By Raymond Vernon

TODAY it seems an extraordinary thing that when the Trade Agreements Act was first passed in 1934 its preambulatory statement of purposes was innocent of the words "defense" or "security." It is even more extraordinary that the Act lacked any specific reference to these subjects until its ninth renewal in 1954. In a broad sense, of course, security considerations did play a part in the original conception of the Act. Cordell Hull rarely spoke of the program without voicing the view that increased international trade would reduce the risks of war. And much of the public support for trade agreements in the years before World War II derived from a widespread conviction that Mr. Hull was right.

It was not until after World War II, however, that the security theme came to dominate the presentation of the trade agreements program to Congress and the public. As one Administration after another was confronted with the task of obtaining Congressional consent to the program's renewal, the emphasis on its security aspects was gradually increased. A trade program which once was justified to the Congress largely because it might sell more American goods to foreigners began to be based on the contention that it built up defense strength, increased the mutuality of interest of the free nations and reduced the risk that any of them would be trapped by economic dependence on the Soviet bloc.

But what was sauce for the program's proponents was sauce for the protectionists as well. If Administrations could argue for the program on broad security grounds, particular industries could argue against it on narrow ones. Accordingly, contentions multiplied that this or that industry was essential and needed protection. Some of the contentions, of course, were close to absurd. In the name of defense, the dairy lobby succeeded in restricting imports of foreign cheese. The lace manufacturers claimed defense status because they manufactured mosquito netting; the glove manufacturers because they made soldiers' gloves; the cutlery producers because they manufactured machetes; and the lead-pencil producers simply because pencils

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were "indispensable." But other pleas, whether more plausible in the end or not, demanded a closer appraisal. Producers of chemicals, heavy electrical equipment, microscopes, watches and others protested that increased imports were weakening their industries for defense.

Pressures of this sort could not be forever denied. Early in the postwar period, representatives of the defense agencies were added to the Trade Agreements Committee, the inter-agency group which directed the trade program. Still the pressures persisted; and when the Trade Agreements Act was renewed in 1954, it contained a new provision admonishing the President not to reduce the tariff on any article "if the President finds that such reduction would threaten domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements."

A few months later, the watch producers succeeded in their long, carefully-directed campaign to obtain more protection from imports. On July 27, 1954, the President proclaimed an increase in jeweled watch duties, basing his action partly on the claim that it would "have an important collateral effect in contributing to the maintenance of a satisfactory industrial mobilization base. . . ." And having thus recognized in principle the possibility that new restrictions on imports might be necessary to permit the development of an adequate defense establishment, the President had no choice this spring but to endorse an amendment to the Trade Agreements Act specifically authorizing him to restrict the imports of any product whenever such imports threatened "to impair the national security."

The watch decision may have represented an aberration in policy reluctantly undertaken in a close Congressional campaign, or it may have been deliberately arrived at after a profound weighing of all its defense implications. But the original circumstances and motivations of the decision do not matter very much. What matters more is that the decision establishes a precedent which, under the new amendment to the Trade Agreements Act, could well be widely applied. Because this is so, there is need to reconsider some of the fundamental relations between our foreign trade and our national defense.

II

The basic pattern of United States security planning is too obvious to demand much recapitulation. Our evident strategy,

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as reflected in our NATO commitments and other military arrangements, is to maintain a solid coalition of nations against the Soviet bloc; to try to hold Western Europe and Japan in the face of attack, despite the enemy's heavy manpower resources; and to rely in part on the ground troops of our allies for this purpose, supported by United States air power and, if need be, by nuclear weapons. No doubt our Joint Chiefs have plans for a last-ditch defense as well, to deal with the contingency that our forces may be pushed off the face of Western Europe and out of Japan. But though one may guess that our forces will always be deployed so as to permit such a plan to be put into operation if necessary, the concept of an independent second line of defense is not the dominant feature of our military policy.

The economic counterpart of these policies of global defense is to be found in various programs of our government. The European Recovery Program of the 1940's, the Offshore Procurement Program of the early 1950's and our current defense-support and developmental aid undertakings all are grounded in part on the premise that the strengthening of foreign economies is helpful, even indispensable, to our own security. This thesis is supported by the familiar propositions that economies in process of growth will resist Communism more stanchly than stagnating economies and that economically vigorous nations will make a better showing in wartime than those which are flabby.

But our international economic policies, shaped in part by haphazard political forces, seem to suffer from schizophrenia in their defense implications. Unlike our military plans which are based on global strategy, our economic defense plans seem to be influenced much more heavily by the assumption that in wartime the economy of the United States may be expected to stand alone. This is in evidence not only in the evolving pattern of our Trade Agreements Act but in other governmental programs as well. For example, we have a stockpile program, the objective of which is to develop emergency supplies of scarce raw materials within the continental limits of the United States. This stockpile program takes some account of the resources and prospective needs of our allies; and in some cases nearby foreign sources of raw materials may be encouraged by United States funds for defense purposes. But far-off sources of supply are discounted, even when they are located close at hand to our allies. The underlying conception seems to be of a continental bastion, relying

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on no one else to help supply its own needs and those of its surviving friends.

Beyond this, the administration of the so-called Buy American Acts has recently been tailored to the principle of defense autarky. These Acts were originally adopted in the depressed 1930's to force government agencies to make their purchases at home; recently the administration of them has been codified by an Executive Order. Although the general effect of the Executive Order was clearly intended to reduce the handicap of foreigners in bidding on United States Government business, an apparently unlimited priority was granted at the same time to domestic suppliers wherever "necessary to protect essential national security interests."

The United States merchant marine policy is another case in point. The lavish subsidies extended to our shipping and the various provisions of law which require that our ships be given a preference in the handling of certain types of cargo are commonly justified mainly on defense grounds. Yet these grounds would not have much validity unless we were contemplating the possibility of fighting without the help of the ships of the world's principal seafaring nations.

We are justified, of course, in planning for the contingency of the last-ditch fight. For, if we and our allies are pushed out of Europe and the Far East, our defense may have to be based largely on our own industrial resources. But the difficulty is that the emphasis on autarky, when it is developed unilaterally by us rather than by common consent, can undermine the possibilities of maintaining our preferred plan of battle—collective defense supported by collective economic strength.

Obviously, the free world is held together by economic as well as political and cultural ties; the strength of these economic ties depends in good part on trade; and an independent autarkic policy on the part of the United States would weaken both the sense of interdependence between us and our allies and the material strength of the free world. It is hard to think of maintaining the security of our forward attack bases in the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Greenland and Pakistan while shrinking the exchange of our goods with these countries. If in our trade policy we plan for an autarkic defense, therefore, that very fact may reduce the possibility of pursuing less dangerous and less damaging alternatives.

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III

The insurance provided by autarkic policies has to be questioned not only from the viewpoint of its cost but also of the amount of protection that it really provides. Suppose we assiduously pursue a policy of reducing imports of commodities which do not seem to have a "satisfactory industrial mobilization base," what consequences may we reasonably expect in terms of the strengthening of such industries?

In the raw materials field, the case for restricting imports of critically short raw materials seems, on first glance, to be close to absurd, for such a policy would appear to reduce our reserves even before hostilities had begun. But this may be regarded as only a superficial reaction, since the size of the domestic supplies of an exhaustible raw material available in an emergency depends on a number of factors. Exploitation in peacetime will, of course, reduce the supplies available in wartime, but peacetime imports can also reduce the amount which an economy could readily produce in wartime. For in a market economy, the reduction of domestic production is usually accompanied by the abandonment of diggings, which sometimes reduces domestic reserves through flooding, cave-ins and the underground leeching of deposits. The dispersal of a trained work force and the scrapping of mechanized equipment also reduce production potentials, at least until mines and processing plants can be put back on an operating basis. And the curtailment of domestic operations, whenever it is accompanied by a decline in exploration and in the proving out of added reserves, has a like adverse effect.

The relative importance of these conflicting forces differs from one commodity to the next, but some preliminary generalizations may be justified. In the case of crude oil resources, a *prima facie* case seems to exist that the heavy draining of domestic reserves through consumption has been offset, at least up to the present time, by the stimulus which such consumption has given to the full utilization of such reserves and to added exploration. Proved reserves of petroleum in the United States, which represented about 12 years' supply in 1921, have risen fast enough since that date to maintain the same relation to consumption in 1951. This is a remarkable record, achieved in the face of a persistent concern that our reserves may finally peter out.[1]

But there have not been many commodities in which domestic

[1] See "Resources for Freedom," President's Materials Policy Commission, v. I, p. 107, and v. III, p. 5.

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reserves have kept pace with domestic needs. In the next decade or two, allowing for continued exploration and for the development of substitutes, our domestic reserves of manganese, copper, lead, mercury, zinc, uranium, vanadium, tungsten, antimony and sulfur can reasonably be expected to decline, both absolutely and relatively to consumption;[2] or, to put it more precisely, the real cost of extracting usable ores of these types from domestic sources is likely to increase very rapidly if we continue to draw upon domestic reserves to supply our growing civilian economy. In an emergency, we would probably have to divert inordinate quantities of badly needed manpower and equipment to supply our needs or to fashion substitutes. The economic loss in foregoing foreign sources of such materials in peacetime could be very high.

However, as we suggested earlier, import restrictions in the interests of defense have been proposed and applied not only with respect to raw materials but also with respect to fabricated products whose manufacture requires difficult skills. To maintain these skills in being, it has been argued, domestic manufacturers must be allowed to operate at some minimum level of production; otherwise, the skills will be almost irretrievably dissipated into other occupations. This contention, of course, underlay the classic jeweled-watch affair but it has also been claimed repeatedly for other industries as well. Any industry may be pardoned for contending that it provides the vital nail on which hangs the kingdom's fate, but mobilization planners must go deeper into the facts. The blitz experiences of World War II illustrated again and again the general proposition that the ability of industrial nations such as Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan for emergency improvisation is extremely high. Where, as in the United States, the industrial craftsmen facing foreign competition constitute a minute fraction of the skilled labor force, we are dealing with mobilization factors which may have minimal importance.

This is not to belittle the importance of generalized machinist, engineering, scientific and managerial skills in wartime. On the contrary, such skills are absolutely indispensable to flexible production in an emergency. These are the skills which turn washing-machine factories into bomb-casing plants and which find a way to use plastic for tin plate. To foster them is altogether consistent with the needs of wartime production. But they are not the skills for which protection is sought. It is the glass-blowers, the watch-

[2] *Ibid.*, v. I, p. 26.

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makers, the cable-winders and the lens-grinders on whose behalf import restrictions are more commonly demanded—the little pools of skill which run to specialization rather than to flexibility and which are relatively incapable of being applied in other industries. And the evidence of past wars suggests that craftsmen of this sort are relatively dispensable.

As a matter of fact, there is every reason to suppose that, in an emergency, our capacity to produce by unorthodox methods products which had previously been regarded as requiring high degrees of specialized skill would exceed that of the Soviet Union and Germany, remarkable as were the accomplishments of these nations. Our capacity in this respect was illustrated in World War II when aircraft construction, lens manufacture and many other types of production previously regarded as the craft products of highly skilled workmen were converted by our engineering methods into mass production industries; indeed, by the war's end, some lens-grinding teams were being trained in as little as six weeks to do the job which individual craftsmen once had learned in a training period of four or five years. This experience was being duplicated in Germany, where Soviet women and other unskilled foreigners were being quickly and successfully trained in the machine tool and optical goods industries to replace the dwindling supply of skilled German males.

But the case for maintaining imports rests on more than the contention that it would have a minimal impact on industrial skills. The fact is that a number of our industries respond to continued pressure of competition from abroad by making the very adjustments that are needed to reduce their dependence on rare and expensive industrial skills. United States industries which have been under competitive pressures to reduce costs and prices commonly have had one main recourse—to reduce the labor cost of their product. This has been done in two ways: by reshuffling job requirements to permit the substitution of lower skills for much of the work previously done by higher-skilled workers; and by developing highly specialized machine tools which could be substituted for skilled and semi-skilled human labor. Cost-pruning developments of this sort have occurred in many industries as a way of meeting competitive pressures, domestic or foreign. The photographic industry represents a major case, in which a substantial part of the pressure for change has come from abroad. Manufacturers of organic chemicals, heavy electrical equipment

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and microscopes are being goaded to find cost-saving devices to compete with imports. None of these industries will disappear from sight if foreign competition continues. But, in each of these cases, it seems reasonable to conclude that a reduction of imports would lead to a reduction in cost-cutting pressures and to the continuation of our dependence on a high labor content in these products.

But there is a more general and a more significant point to be made on the impact of foreign trade on United States skills. Increased foreign imports could well stunt the growth of our hat-making, glass-blowing, bicycle-fabricating, watchmaking, cable-winding, lace-making, and high-grade textile-weaving industries. On the other hand, the United States industries which benefit from foreign trade by their increased exports include trucks, agricultural implements, chemicals, drugs and machinery. From a defense mobilization viewpoint there is no doubt which of the two industrial groups would be more useful. Not only are the end-products of the second group of industries more relevant to the efforts of a nation at war; it is also the fact that the characteristics of versatility and adaptability which would be needed in the critical phases of any future war are to be found much more commonly in the second group than in the first.

What follows is the familiar conclusion that things are seldom what they seem. Situated as is the United States, a movement toward autarky would surely not strengthen its industrial base for conventional war nor would an increase in foreign trade inevitably weaken that base. The weight of the evidence, in fact, runs the other way. The continental bastion may well derive added potential strength by husbanding its scarce raw materials and exposing its processing industries to the pressures of foreign competition.

IV

In the debate over defense and the trade policy, neither side as yet has tried seriously to assimilate the implications of nuclear warfare. This is to be expected. Only a beginning has been made on educating the public to the meaning of nuclear warfare, and the odds are that much of what is publicly assumed today will prove in time to have been distorted, incomplete or imperfectly understood. Moreover, it is at least conceivable (though it may not be likely) that thermonuclear weapons would not be brought

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into play in another major war; or that, by mutual consent or practice, they would be confined to tactical rather than strategic uses and would not greatly alter the grand pattern of conventional warfare. Yet a start has to be made in exploring the trade implications of nuclear warfare; the issues at least have to be defined. For few things are more dangerous to a nation's survival than cultural lag, and it would be a tragedy if the trade policies now being pursued in the name of defense proved after all to have been undertaken for the wrong war.

To sharpen the issues, we may set aside the possibility of the restrained use of nuclear weapons and consider their uninhibited use by both sides. On this assumption, can defense production planners think in terms of prolonged warfare?

The importance of this issue, of course, stems from the fact that most concepts of an "adequate mobilization base" are meaningful only if one is thinking of a prolonged war. The efforts of government defense agencies to stimulate the domestic production of scarce raw materials such as mica, mercury, beryl, monazite, tungsten, antimony and talc, as a supplement to stockpiling, are inescapably based upon the assumption that hostilities would be of long duration—many months or perhaps years—at any rate long enough to mine and refine these materials, to process them into end-products and to deliver them to their point of use. The United States Government stockpile program, in accordance with which minimum supplies of scarce raw materials are being stored for use, is also based upon the assumption of many months of war. Similarly, the concern for maintaining adequate domestic watchmaking, lens-grinding and heavy electrical equipment facilities also seems to imply that future wars might well last a considerable time.

Whether these are realistic assumptions is something for experts in nuclear warfare to determine. But if the answer is that the outcome of the war would have to be decided in a relatively brief period, then our concept of the "mobilization base" would need a drastic overhauling. For then our defense problem would be primarily how to stock the end-products—guns, planes, clothing, food and medical supplies—in sufficient quantities at points near their place of use, to be available in the period while the war's outcome was still at issue. The availability or absence of talc or antimony in this brief period would hardly be relevant.

The chances are that the possible length of a nuclear war will

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depend in part on the size of the battlefield. Warfare concentrated by the enemy upon the continental limits of the United States could not be expected to last for very long. Then whether or not our watchmaking establishments were fully equipped and ready to produce would have very little bearing. Such, at least, is the evident implication of much of the published analysis to date. To begin with, the greater part of our industry is concentrated in a relatively small land area. Five metropolitan areas account for over 30 percent of our total industrial production; 15 account for 45 percent of all our manufactures and 52 percent of our hard goods manufactures. The instrument industry (which includes the watchmakers protected by the President's decision of July 1954) has 52 percent of its production in three cities.[3] There is no evidence that the recent public disclosures of the damage potentiality of nuclear weapons is doing much to affect this picture. Recent pronouncements by representatives of a number of large industrial companies clearly indicate that the controlling criterion in choosing new plant sites is still the cost of doing business.

Nor is there any program now on foot which gives promise of any greater dispersion of our industrial plant on D-Day than exists at present. The governmental devices available for the encouragement of geographic dispersion are not of sufficient consequence to matter very much in the general pattern of industrial growth. Certain limited types of plant—those immediately associated with defense production—may be entitled, in effect, to a postponement in the payment of some of their taxes by the availability of accelerated plant amortization. The location of a plant may also be influenced in a few cases by governmental policy in allocating contracts. But that is all. In an economy devoted to the principle of free private enterprise it is difficult to envisage a domestic program in peacetime vigorous enough to affect this pattern very much.[4] We must assume that the American industry which faced a nuclear attack at the outbreak of war would be distributed in much the same pattern as it is today.

On this assumption, the published analyses provide cold comfort. It is estimated, for instance, that even if our air defense could be raised to a level at which half the attacking bombers could be intercepted, a few hundred bombers could destroy about

[3] M. K. Wood, "Industry Must Prepare for Atomic Attack," *Harvard Business Review*, v. 33, no. 3 (May–June 1955), p. 120.

[4] But see Karl Kaysen, "The Vulnerability of the United States to Enemy Attack," *World Politics*, January 1954, p. 190, for proposals designed to stimulate dispersion over the long run.

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half our industrial capacity.[5] In addition, the fall-out phenomenon would have to be reckoned with; actual or potential lethal fall-out areas created by nuclear explosions have been variously described as running from over 2,000 to 100,000 square miles. On these facts, it could well be that substantial reliance upon United States industry in wartime is no longer a realistic basis for planning.

Perhaps the concept of an "adequate mobilization base" might still have meaning, even in nuclear warfare, if industrial facilities could be sufficiently dispersed through the whole of the free world. It is not at all self-evident, however, that such dispersion would reduce the vulnerability of our industry to attack. For the dispersion of such facilities would call as well for the dispersion of the planes and other devices for their defense. Moreover, on almost any assumption as to the geographical pattern of such dispersion, the need for transportation probably would increase. Whether these factors would add to or detract from the vulnerability of our industry probably involves some very complex military judgments.

If the experts saw merit in greater industrial dispersion over the free world, however, this could have at least two implications for our trade policy. One is obvious. We would have an added reason to pursue the kind of policy which would increase the likelihood that the other areas would remain in our camp; otherwise their productive facilities could not be counted on in an emergency. The other implication for our trade policy is much fuzzier. We would want to pursue a trade policy which contributed to the desired dispersion pattern, or at any rate did not conflict with it.

It is not easy to define the policy which would contribute most to this latter objective. A persuasive case might be made out that, if trade were allowed to develop free of governmental obstacles and the forces of comparative cost were allowed to determine the international location of industry, the resulting pattern would be about as close to the ideal as one could hope to achieve. But this is not above dispute, for industry located in accordance with comparative cost might be poorly located in terms of air miles from the enemy's attack bases. What is more, the international specialization brought about by the comparative cost criterion would probably tend to increase the concentration of particular industries when dispersal might be better from a military viewpoint.

[5] M. K. Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

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Another possibility, of course, might be considered. We might attempt to blueprint an "adequate mobilization base" for the free world as a whole; we might locate its components in their "proper" geographic position; and we might plan to bring this blueprint into being by the skillful use of tariffs, quotas and subsidies. In short, we might attempt to apply on an international scale the devices now implicitly available to the President to foster an "adequate mobilization base" in the United States.

Those familiar with the limitations of governmental investment planning, especially of planning in terms of specific industries and specific products, may well shudder at such a prospect. Moreover, the risks that such a program would eventually be perverted to protectionist ends, however wisely it may be conceived in the beginning, seem overwhelming. Nevertheless, if it should prove that the international dispersion of resources would contribute to the security of the free world, there would be a challenge to be met in devising the trade policy most consistent with the objective. In the end, however, we may find it feasible to do no more than our international programs so far have sought to do, albeit with reservations and internal contradictions, over the past decade: to help increase the human and material resources of our friends, and to keep the international channels of trade relatively free of the clutter of egregious governmental restraints which hold down the opportunities for such trade and the potential gains from it.

It is clearly too early to draw hard-and-fast conclusions on the implications of nuclear warfare for our international trade policy. But a negative conclusion at least is clear. The elements of defense autarky which are beginning to run as a visible thread through the fabric of that policy are a perilous atavism. The political and military elements of our defense are now irreversibly multinational. The economic aspects of our defense must fit the same pattern.

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BELGIAN "COLONIALISM"

By Pierre Ryckmans

IT HAS often been said that Belgium has no official colonial doctrine, and that is true enough in the sense that there is none which is complete and systematic. Leopold II had no firm plans when he founded the *Association Internationale Africaine* in 1876, nor yet in 1879 when he secured Stanley's services. Neither he nor anyone else could have foreseen then that in 1885 he would be recognized by all the Powers as "Sovereign of the Congo Free State." One thing is certain, namely that Leopold II, acting alone and without the military and financial support of a government behind him, could never have hoped to *conquer* the Congo by force of arms, to impose himself there against the will of the inhabitants. Therefore no attempt at conquest was made. That was a fortunate beginning.

When Leopold II's political and national ambitions became more specific, he based his right on *occupation,* not conquest; on peaceful coexistence with the natives who occupied a very small part of the African Equatorial belt. It is true that in the 1890's Central Africa was not uninhabited; but neither was it fully occupied. The King, and later Belgium, never questioned the prior rights of the natives as first occupants. There was plenty of room for everybody—wide empty spaces where one could take up land without interfering with anyone else, without disturbing the natives in their peaceful possession of widely scattered patches of land, without infringing any existing rights.

In the vast area of the Congo basin there lived a few million natives, lost in the jungle and the bush, tolerated at best by their physical environment, leading a precarious life on what one might call the fringe of nature. Surface and underground wealth were unknown and unexploited. Belgian colonization aimed at tapping these unexploited resources, at occupying unused land, at filling voids.

The concern for native rights can be traced through Congo legislation from the very beginning. Thus an Order by the Administrator General dated July 1, 1885—the very day the Congo Free State was proclaimed—specifies that "no one may dispossess natives of the land they occupy" and that "vacant land should be considered as belonging to the State." The Civil Code,

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Book 2, Section 12, is more general as well as more explicit: "All ownerless property belongs to the State, subject to customary rights of natives being reserved." According to a Decree of September 14, 1886, "Territory occupied by natives under the authority of their chiefs continues to be governed by local customs and practices." The Decree of May 21, 1935, states that no land may be granted to non-natives except after an investigation aimed at "establishing vacancy and assessing any rights which natives may claim regarding the land concerned"—such as hunting rights and rights of way. According to the Mining Law, natives may continue exploiting their mines under the conditions prevailing at the time the law came into force. The same applies to gathering of produce or such undertakings as salt works. For instance, where natives used to cut palm nuts in a wild grove for their domestic needs, or where by their primitive methods they gained, say, a ton of salt a year from some salt springs, the state could grant a concession for exploitation of the palm grove or the salt springs only subject to reserving the customary rights of the natives. In such cases they were supplied free of charge with all the palm oil they needed or were given their ton of salt ready packaged.

This was the rule which prevailed throughout the turbulent history of the Congo Free State. All the extensive concessions of land granted by the state to private corporations—concessions which became the subject of severe criticism—referred exclusively to vacant land, and were made subject to the reserved rights of natives.

In fact, though, criticism was amply deserved. It would be useless to deny that under the Free State natives suffered grievous wrongs; but they were abuses of existing laws. A rubber concessionnaire, for instance, was entitled to employ only gatherers who agreed to work for freely negotiated wages; in practice, however, natives only too often were put to forced labor. Again, the head tax owed to the state was (in the absence of currency) figured in working days, and working days were translated into weights of dry rubber; but in practice calculations were often forgotten and rubber deliveries became an arbitrary and exorbitant tribute exacted from the people. Endless discussion followed between philanthropists who denounced abusive practices and jurists who upheld the written law. The state was no doubt to blame for failing to exercise proper supervision. It is a question, however,

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whether the same abuses could not have been committed as well under a free-enterprise system.

Similar principles prevailed in the political field. The existing native political structure was allowed to stand. No native chief was deprived of his authority. It is stated in the preamble of the Decree on Native Areas that the Decree "does not intervene in the internal life of native communities, where tribal custom remains sovereign." Native custom recognized no authority higher than the tribal level. In the years between 1880 and 1885, before the Congo Free State was founded, some thought was given by King Leopold to establishing a "Confederation of Free Natives" —that is, a Federal Authority above the tribal chiefs. When the state came into existence, it did not supersede any existing authority; it simply filled a political void.

This is a long way from the concepts which prevailed at the time the New World was conquered. Then conquered territories were considered as chattels of the mother country to be exploited by it for its own profit. The supremacy of European over native interest was never questioned. If the aborigines resisted, war resulted; and in more than one case the natives were wiped out. A new European society was born upon the ruins of Indian societies. And when the American colonies rose in rebellion against the European mother countries, it was not the conquered Indians but the conquering whites who gained their freedom. The exception was in Haiti, where by an ironic reversal of things the white colonizers who had exterminated the Indians were in turn exterminated by the slaves they had imported from Africa.

So far as American natives were concerned, the revolution staged by the colonials against the motherland did not put an end to the "colonial régime;" the natives simply changed masters. The process of gradual conquest of Indian lands continued, and in the jungles of the Upper Amazon and Upper Orinoco it has not yet been completed even today. In the United States, the colonial problem was settled in two successive stages. The first ended—for the colonists—with their victory over the motherland in the American Revolution. The second ended a century later —for the Indians—with the capture of Sitting Bull, which put a close to the Indian Wars and marked the final triumph of the immigrants over the original population.

For a citizen of a European colonial nation it is rather irritating to find how much ignorance of fact and confusion of ideas are

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displayed about the so-called "colonial system." Among those who condemn it *a priori* are some who were, and still are, the main beneficiaries of colonial rule. Thus we find that Latin America is "against" Belgian rule in the Congo because the Spaniards of America, the very heirs of the conquistadores, rose against Spain. Guatemala and Ecuador vote "against" the colonial Powers in the General Assembly of the United Nations because they believe that by casting a "pro-colonial" vote they would be false to their own history.

Of course, the fact that the original inhabitants of America were subject to abuses by the white man in the past would not justify the Belgians if they inflicted similar abuses on the people of the Congo today. But then we do not look for excuses. Americans today are the first to condemn the wrongs inflicted by their ancestors and make every effort to repair them in so far as it is still possible. Times have changed since the days of slavery and the Indian Wars. But do Americans really believe that in Europe times have not changed as well? Do they think that we still hold to doctrines and practices of two centuries ago? An Australian representative in the United Nations once very pointedly remarked that at the time abuses were prevalent in the colonies, the people at home were treated hardly any better by the governing classes. Today the people make the laws. The people of Asia and America do not have a monopoly of human feelings. Parliaments and public opinion in London, Paris or Brussels are not less concerned about native rights than parliaments and public opinion in Washington or New Delhi or in Monrovia or Addis Ababa.

The attitude of most members of the United Nations toward the colonial problem could hardly be summed up better than in a phrase used by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in addressing the General Assembly: "The colonial system is obsolete and should be done away with as soon as possible." This saying was warmly applauded and is often quoted. Applied to my country, it might be translated: "Belgium's authority over the Congo is outdated and should be put an end to as soon as possible."

I like to believe that this is not what Secretary Dulles intended, and indeed his statement is open to a less injurious interpretation since it holds at least two ambiguities. If by "the colonial system" he means "exploitation of the colony for the profit of the mother country," everybody agrees that this is definitely to be con-

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demned. But since that sort of régime is ended, it no longer needs to be put an end to. Present colonial systems have nothing in common with those of the eighteenth or even the nineteenth century. I use the plural, for there are nearly as many colonial systems as there are colonies. The colonial system of Papua applied to Malta would certainly be outdated, just as the colonial system of Malta applied to Papua would certainly be premature and would carry that colony back very rapidly into total barbarism.

In the same way the Colonial Powers could subscribe to the Dulles formula if "as soon as possible" means "as soon as the colonial peoples are able to govern themselves along the lines of civilized democracy." But that is not the way the phrase is understood by a large number of U.N. members, mainly Asian nations who themselves have become independent only recently. They take the words "as soon as possible" as meaning "the soonest moment will be the best." Perhaps in their ignorance about the specific conditions in each colony, and with their tendency to identify those conditions with the conditions in their own country, they believe that all colonies have the ability to provide themselves with excellent governments. Alternatively, they may consider independence so much the highest achievement that any national government, however bad, is preferable to any foreign government however good it may be. Mr. Krishna Menon, for one, seems to hold the opinion that the special virtue which resides in independence can of itself make everything right. He said recently that if natives who are still in a primitive state reject necessary measures, it is because these measures are enacted by a foreign authority. "People," he said, "are such that they do not appreciate good things when they are imposed upon them; but they will adopt them spontaneously if left free to choose."

However that may be, it is the fact of colonialism *as such* which the majority of the General Assembly condemns: the mere fact of control by a foreign authority. Or should the word "foreign" perhaps be replaced by "European?" For if the foreign authority happens to be a colored people, nobody dreams of condemning this form of colonialism. The domination of the Javanese over the Dayaks of Borneo, or of the Burmans over the Karens and the Shans, or of the Ethiopians over Bantu tribes, or of the American Negroes over the autochthonous tribes of Liberia, does not seem to find disfavor in the eyes of many anti-colonialists.

The anti-colonialism of the Asians, of the Moslem Powers and

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of the Soviet bloc we find understandable enough. Less explicable, however, is the anti-colonialism of Anglo-Saxon Americans and of Latin Americans.

We believe in the civilizing mission of the West. We think our Western Christian culture is superior to the native culture of Africa and that to have planted it there was good in itself and for it to disappear would be bad in itself. We believe that, if emancipation jeopardized the existence of Western civilization in Africa, that would not represent progress but the reverse. If we were not so convinced we should have no justification for being in Africa.

But an Indian does not believe in the superiority of Western civilization. On the contrary, he is convinced of the superiority of his own civilization. He feels, moreover, that Western influence in his country has been an evil in itself, and from his point of view he may be right. He therefore doubts the superiority of Western culture over Bantu culture. He does not believe that the West has a civilizing mission. He understandably rejects for Africa the civilization which he also rejects for himself. If therefore emancipation would bring the natives back to the culture of their ancestors that does not strike him as something terrible; quite the opposite. The misunderstanding between him and us is irreconcilable.

The American anti-colonial attitude, on the other hand, would seem to be justified only if the flowering of European culture in Africa were not going to wither away as a result of our departure. Everyone who knows the Congo—all the Congo, not just the large towns—is convinced that Belgian rule there is indispensable, and that the end of it would be the end of all that we have built up during three-quarters of a century.

These explanations are necessary for an understanding of the Belgian attitude toward political progress. We do not believe that the extension of the right to vote is an end in itself; we consider political progress to be a means to an end, the end being social, cultural and economic progress. If it is correct to say, "Good government is no substitute for self-government," it is equally correct to say, "Self-government is no substitute for good government."

If we were to grant political rights in the Congo today, we would have the choice between a competent but restricted electorate and a general but incompetent electorate. Restricting the

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suffrage to the enlightened would mean handing over power to the European minority, with the risk that it might be used against the interests of the native masses. On the other hand, primitive tribesmen are obviously incapable of recognizing the common good. Extending the suffrage to them could only mean establishing a caricature of democracy and might endanger the future of civilization in Africa.

Such being the situation, nobody in the Congo has been given the right to vote, neither white nor black. Councils are advisory and their members are appointed. The metropolitan authority holds the balance between the divergent interests of the Europeans, the "evolved" natives and the tribal masses. This solution avoids political friction. The natives prefer it to the domination of the local European minority, because it grants no privilege to the white minority, implies no discrimination and does not set a precedent for the future. The Europeans submit to it, though with more and more reluctance; many of them have settled in the country for good and demand that they be allowed to have a part in governing it. They nevertheless realize the threat which they would face if the right to vote were extended to more and more strata of natives. The system is far from ideal, but it works. In order to make it acceptable, the Administration strives to make the Councils steadily more representative. And since the Councils are merely advisory, they for their part tend to be moderate, knowing that proposals of an extreme nature would inevitably be rejected; and in practice the Administration almost always does follow their advice.

The French and British systems are different. The French have tried to find a solution by establishing dual electoral colleges, one French, the other native; the English, by multi-racial councils in which each race is represented by a given number of members or by qualified suffrage. Both systems are unsatisfactory in that they emphasize the inequality of status and create racial rivalries.

It is noteworthy that native representatives in Congo councils have insisted on continuing government officials in ex officio capacities. It seems to prove their confidence that the Administration acts as a fair arbiter. Indeed, it may well be that equality in the lack of political privileges has been a contributing factor to the Congo's peaceful development.

We are convinced, besides, that political advancement will best

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be promoted by working for economic and social progress, without which political rights would remain a delusion. By promoting such progress we are forging the weapons with which the natives will conquer their political freedom, if we do not have the wisdom to grant it gracefully when the time is ripe.

The absence of a color bar works powerfully in favor of economic progress for the natives. They are not excluded from any profession. On the other hand, we are being taken to task for inequality of wages, for violating the principle of "same work, same pay" which we allegedly qualify by adding "taking into account the different standards of living of Negroes and whites." It is true that on the whole native wages are too low. It is also true that for nearly the same work the natives receive wages far below the wages of the whites. In order to discuss this problem dispassionately and without bias some historical facts must be borne in mind.

First of all, it has to be remembered that we literally started from scratch in the Congo. Economic equipment was nonexistent; previous generations had left no capital; current resources were nil; technique was totally absent. In all the vast country there was not one mile of road, not a single wheel, not one stone building, not one literate native. There were neither draft nor pack animals. The only known means of transportation were the dugout canoe on the rivers, and everywhere else the human beast of burden. The country simply could not afford to pay for building roads, harbors and a minimum of basic equipment at wage rates even remotely comparable to those of civilized countries. There was not, as in the early days of the Soviet Union, a choice between consumer goods and industrial equipment; the choice was between rudimentary industrial equipment at low wages or no industrial equipment and no wages at all.

The first workers who went into the service of the whites had an extremely low standard of living. Moreover, the European peace had relieved them from their most absorbing traditional occupation: armed protection of their working women. They had time on their hands. A job which secured them their daily meat, white protection for themselves and their families, and better lodgings than their huts seemed an acceptable exchange for some of their leisure. If, in addition, they were offered textiles and glassware, which they valued highly and were unable to produce themselves, their very modest wages became an appreciable net gain

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to them. Recruits by the chiefs for military service were slaves who thus escaped from bondage. Similarly, the majority of those who volunteered for labor did not take jobs so much to earn money as to free themselves from the heavier forced labor which was demanded of them in the village, to escape from the persecution of the tribal chief, from the accusations of the magician, from the menace of powerful enemies. A little work was not too high a price to pay for security—even had no salary been attached. Thus labor's demands were cheap.

On the other hand, employers could hardly afford to offer generous wages. All enterprises were "marginal," and one had better admit that many of them still are today. On account of the light traffic, railway rates would be considered prohibitive in an industrialized country; and distances from world markets are long. Katanga copper is carried 1,200 miles to the nearest port, and copper has no local market. Transport rates thus increase considerably the cost of imports and reduce the worth of exports. Dams for hydroelectric plants are built with concrete which sells at a higher price than flour. Skilled European labor costs at least three times as much as it does in Europe and the output of semi-skilled native labor is very low.

These circumstances explain, even though they do not entirely justify, the low native wages. Even today employers tend to link any increase in wages to an increase in output. This would be justified if the initial wage had been freely and normally negotiated, but such was not the case. The initial wage guaranteed the worker a higher standard of living than he had known in his native village; but it would not have allowed him to live and raise a family according to the standards of a civilized society. It is therefore imperative that wages rise faster than the output of labor, and that is what is happening today. Many employers no doubt could raise wages still further without risking bankruptcy, but many businesses were built (doubtless unwisely) on the level of wages in force at the time they started and would collapse if they suddenly had to face substantial wage increases. In the interest of the workers themselves it therefore is necessary to envisage a period of gradual adjustment.

As to the equalization of black and white wages in accordance with the principle of "same work, same pay," that presents one of the most difficult problems facing Africa. Careful study shows that there is no perfect solution. Wages can be levelled up or

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they can be levelled down: those of the Negroes can be raised or those of the whites can be reduced. Levelling down by reducing the wages of the whites would have just one effect: whites would no longer come to Africa. They are urgently needed and the conditions of life there are such that they can be attracted only by the offer of a higher standard of living or higher pay than they would enjoy in their own country. Africa cannot offer them all the facilities that life offers in Europe; one must make up for what is lacking with higher pay and the possibility of saving for an easier future. On the other hand, raising the average wages of the Negroes to the level of European wages would be charging a country with an average income of $50 with the same burdens carried by a country with an average income of $500—quite obviously an impossibility.

The only justification for the higher wages paid to white people lies in the fact that they are indispensable specialists. One could preserve this qualification for them artificially by establishing a color bar, that is, by excluding the natives from qualified jobs. The Belgian Government has always refused to do this. All professions are open to the natives. A number of jobs which were formerly filled by whites—though without being reserved for them—are filled by natives today. They do not receive the wages which were enjoyed by the whites, and that is normal. Progressive Africanization is the only solution. By reducing the ratio of high-wage whites to low-wage natives, savings on the white payroll may be applied to raising the average native pay without increasing the total payroll to an uneconomic level.

This explains the Belgian attitude toward European immigration into the Congo. We aim at attracting only selected immigrants who can fulfill functions which the natives still cannot. Immigrants who would not be able to resist native competition are discouraged from coming. But under these conditions, functions which the natives can perform just as well as the whites ought no longer to enjoy preferential treatment.

What is to become of the whites ousted in this process? In general, they will be entrusted with higher functions. A skilled worker, for instance, will be promoted to foreman or instructor. If he is unfit for promotion, he will go on drawing his current wage, but there will be no further recruiting of labor from Europe for any jobs for which there are African candidates. This is not a wholly satisfactory solution since it perpetuates inequality.

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However, the situation is eased somewhat by the fact that even today most Europeans do not settle for good in Africa and that immigration remains controlled. If Africanization were carried through in one big operation, in large sections, all the whites in such and such a category being simultaneously replaced by Negroes, the inequality in pay would be less noticeable, for Negroes and whites would not be performing the same work at the same time. But that is not how things work. It is a gradual shift, and Negroes and whites find themselves working at the same time on the same jobs.

How is one to make the first black doctor agree to receive a lower salary than that which his European colleague gets in a neighboring hospital, when both have the same qualifications? And yet it is precisely because the country is too poor to be able to afford white doctors in large quantities that it is necessary to supply it with a native medical corps. Adoption of the solution which seems fair and right, the invariable application of the "same work, same pay" principle, would lead Africa into a dead-end road. The formula of "expatriation pay" for white immigrants has been tried. It is easier to apply in a country under a native government, like the Gold Coast, where officials are not suspected of delaying the process of Africanization, than in a colony where the administration may be suspected of holding on to useless whites out of a sense of racial solidarity. The French have gone very far—probably too far—with full assimilation of local and French officials. This makes it impossible to increase the staff to desirable levels without imposing a load which with its present poverty Africa is unable to carry. It is only by increasing national income that the difference between white and black wages can gradually be reduced. The immigrants will be less exacting once colonial life has fewer hazards and inconveniences than it has today; and the increase in average income will be accompanied automatically by an improvement in average wages.

But then, one may ask, why does not the Administration set out resolutely on the road to Africanization by preparing a selected native "élite" to undertake public duties? Why has it not sent natives to the universities of Europe long ago? Is it because it deliberately wishes to keep the natives in subordinate positions that it excludes them from higher education? Unfortunately, statements by certain Europeans from time to time tend to confirm this interpretation. They want their cook to make a

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good soup and not to write letters. They praise the Administration for its "policy" of limiting its efforts to primary instruction and to teaching handicrafts.

That is *not* in fact the policy of the Administration. It aims at endowing the country with a complete educational system, in all grades, as perfect as the limited resources available will permit. Opinions as to how this can best be done differ. Some believe that the best approach will be to divide all available resources among all the branches of education—primary, middle and advanced. Others believe that it would be better to begin at the bottom and to start by organizing as broad a system of primary education as possible. The choice was before us, but it was impossible for us to do everything at once. In order for a few to be given a university training they had to be sent to Europe at a very young age indeed. It is difficult to foresee if a child of seven will be able to go successfully through a complete cycle of training up to the point of obtaining a university degree. If the chosen child does not succeed, all the money the colony has spent for his education will be lost and what is to become of the unsuccessful? If he succeeds, is there any assurance that he will let his compatriots benefit from the knowledge he has received? And will he not have lost all contact with native society after having spent 10 or 15 years in Europe? Will he not have been made into a black-skinned European, as much a stranger in Africa as the white man himself?

But that is not all: How many children must be deprived of the primary education which they might be given in order to achieve the hazardous result described? This is the issue. Sending one single child to Europe for a full training means having a thousand fewer children in primary schools in the Congo. During an interim period we can supply the colony with all the university élite which it needs—an élite selected at the end and not at the beginning of studies, whose education has not cost the colony anything and who can be sent back home if they prove unsatisfactory. But the mother country cannot make up for the primary training taken away from a thousand native children. We have preferred to give primary training to the mass of children right on the spot; to organize secondary education later, as soon as available resources allow; and to give the natives at home, in the Congo, the university to which they are entitled as soon as sufficient recruitment for it can be guaranteed.

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The value of this program is open to discussion, but it has to be admitted, I think, that it is at least a defensible one, that it is not inspired by selfish motives. The Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi together have almost the same population as French West Africa. French West Africa has a thousand children and young people studying in France, while we have just a handful studying in Belgium. Very likely French West Africa spends as much for public education as we do. But we have ten times more children than they have in primary schools, where they learn reading, hygiene and some notions of less primitive agriculture. I sincerely believe that in 30 years' time we shall have in the Congo at least as many university graduates, at least as many high school graduates, and infinitely fewer illiterates than do our French neighbors in West Africa, even though the first university in the Congo opened its doors only last year.

Will 30 years of peaceful progress be given to us?

France and the Netherlands are blamed for not having prepared the élites of Indo-China and Indonesia for independence in good time. The chaos in which these countries are struggling today is charged to former colonialism. The French and the Dutch reply that they are not responsible for the Japanese invasion and that if at the end of the war they were not allowed to reëstablish their authority and finish the job they had undertaken, the Allies were partly responsible. We, in the Congo, cannot afford any mistakes. We know that we cannot maintain our position there by sheer force of arms. This demands that we establish in the Congo "government *for* the people" until the time is ripe for "government *by* the people." We must deserve the consent of the governed. Failing that, the association between Belgium and the Congo sooner or later will be broken.

But Africa is a ferment. The Gold Coast has an African Prime Minister; Nigeria is on the eve of self-government. Shocking violence troubles Kenya. The United Nations countenances all forms of nationalism, whether premature or not. Will not these various outside influences upset the Congo? There is danger of it, no doubt. We are no longer quite free to set the pace of progress according to reason only. Yet I am full of hope. When a visitor asked some Congo chiefs if they did not fear an extension of the Mau Mau movement, they replied, "No, because the reasons for Mau Mau do not exist here." Congolese who have travelled elsewhere in Africa find that, all in all, life at home is best.

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BRITAIN'S CHANGING MILITARY POLICY

By H. A. DeWeerd

GREAT BRITAIN occupies a key position in American defense policies in Western Europe. Her location, military posture, stability and influence on other European nations make her our most valuable and dependable ally. Her traditional policy toward Europe, stemming from her insular position, was to prevent by diplomacy if possible, but by force if necessary, the domination of the power centers of Northwestern Europe by any single nation or coalition. This explains her long wars against Louis XIV and Napoleon, and more recently against Imperial and Nazi Germany. The strategy used to implement British policy was maritime. It utilized economic, political and amphibious power, not to gain territory in Europe but to prevent a dangerous accumulation of hostile naval and military power there.

Since Britain's military aims were limited up to 1914, she could employ limited means. Her influence in the military realm came from her strategic position rather than the weight of her manpower and from her ability (based on her island safety) to deploy her limited ground forces where their location was more important than their size, knowing that they could be extricated by the Royal Navy in case of misfortune. However, the coming of the air age and the emergence of what has been called "total war" threatened to render obsolete the methods by which she had previously exerted her influence in Europe.

It is sometimes said that Britain's decline in status as a Great Power began with her four-and-a-half year war of attrition against Imperial Germany from 1914 to 1918. This is an oversimplified view, since the enormous growth of industrial and military power in Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union would in any case have reduced Britain's relative status. In any event, her position certainly was weakened by her five years of unlimited war against the Axis. At the end of this war she was in acute economic difficulties; she relinquished Empire responsibilities in India, Burma, Palestine and Ceylon; and due to the power vacuum existing in Europe she was unable to effect a balance against the Soviet Union's threatened domination there.

World War II also served to undermine the foundations of Britain's insular security. The successful Allied invasion of Nor-

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mandy showed that, given sufficient industrial resources, an enemy could cross the Channel in the opposite direction. The appearance of jet-propelled aircraft, V-2 rockets and atomic weapons in the final stages of the conflict threatened Britain's crowded cities and ports with new forms of attack and emphasized the importance of keeping potential enemies as far from the Channel as possible. This occurred at a moment, however, when Britain possessed very little ability to act on the lesson.

The way in which World War II was fought also had an important bearing on subsequent British defense policies. A widespread feeling of revulsion against strategic air operations developed in certain circles in England. Some of the most widely read British military critics, such as Cyril Falls, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, were unsparing in their condemnation of the area attacks carried out by the R.A.F. Bomber Command against German industrial and population centers. Less criticism was heard of the daylight bombing of German military-industrial targets by the U.S. Air Forces; but the good marks we received for our precision bombing in Europe were more than cancelled by our employment of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Thus after World War II, when Britain had difficulties in maintaining occupation forces in West Germany, Austria, Trieste and Suez, and when the military weakness of France revealed the impossibility of defending Western Europe with conventional formations and weapons, considerable opposition developed in certain English circles to the thought of employing atomic weapons in area attacks against an adversary's war industries and population centers. Later, when it became clear that in time the Soviet Union would have the capability to employ these same weapons against the cities and ports of England, concern for their own vulnerability became an added reason for many Englishmen to oppose the use of atomic weapons against area targets. These considerations affected the general British attitude toward the concept of defending Western Europe and deterring aggression by means of an air-atomic weapons system.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY

No sooner were the English people freed from the Nazi menace in 1945 than they voted out of office the war-winning Churchill Government and replaced it with a Labor Government under Clement R. Attlee. The Labor Party promptly gave proof of its

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confidence in the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union and its lack of sympathy with colonialism by demobilizing the armed forces and by withdrawing from Palestine, India, Burma and Ceylon. Labor considered a simultaneous withdrawal from Europe desirable in view of what seemed likely to be a prolonged struggle for economic recovery, especially since this was to be sought through the socialization of industry. But the Labor dream that Britain could safely turn its back upon Europe was soon shattered by the flagrantly aggressive actions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. In the period 1946–1951 the Soviet Union provoked a crisis in Iran, consolidated its hold on the satellites, fomented civil war in Greece, helped to strangle the democratic government of Czechoslovakia, blockaded Berlin, shot down unarmed British and American planes in Europe and prepared a North Korean army for the conquest of South Korea. The provocations were great; and considering the unhurried way in which changes usually take place in England the responses of the Labor Government can be said to have been fairly prompt and realistic. The late Ernest Bevin was among the first to recognize and recommend precautions against Soviet expansion.

Before it lost the 1951 elections by a small margin, the Labor Government took a number of important military-political steps. First, and perhaps foremost, it undertook an atomic weapons program, which led in 1952 to the testing of the first British atomic weapon. Secondly, it decided to construct a long-range bomber force capable of delivering atomic weapons on targets inside the Soviet Union. Thirdly, in 1948 it approved the basing of U.S. long-range aircraft on fields in the United Kingdom, an act which Sir Winston Churchill said put Britain "in the front line" in case of war. In the fourth place, it undertook a rearmament program which gradually raised the defense ministry budget from £853,900,000 in the fiscal year 1947–1948 to £1,640,000,000 in 1954–1955. Furthermore, Britain signed the Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Pact, gave a firm commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and approved, under certain safeguards, a limited rearmament of West Germany. (Later, at the London Conference in 1954, Britain promised to maintain four divisions and a tactical air force on the Continent as long as a majority of the Brussels Pact Powers felt that this was required.)

What prompted the first of these far-reaching decisions was a

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realization at the time of the Berlin blockade and the Czech crisis that, if the Soviet Union attempted to overrun Western Europe, Britain would be practically defenseless. Her limited ground forces were scattered in West Germany, Austria, Trieste, Suez, Hong Kong and Africa, leaving no regular formations to defend the United Kingdom. Britain's finest ground units were stationed in West Germany, but these together with other Allied occupation forces could not be expected to prevent the Red Army from sweeping forward to the English Channel in case of war.[1]

Once the Red Army came within fighter plane range of England, paratroop landings would become a serious threat. A modern air force might successfully contest passage through its air space by Soviet fighters and troop-carrying transports; but the British had no such modern air force. The Korean war made clear that the R.A.F. had no fighter of its own design capable of sustaining combat on equal terms with the Soviet MIG-15. And even as late as the spring of 1954, there was not a single regular ground force unit as large as a brigade in the United Kingdom. This might, as Churchill said, redound to Britain's honor, but it was not a reassuring situation. There was the additional hard fact that once the Red Army advanced to within fighter plane range, the whole southern half of the United Kingdom would be within operational range of short or medium range missiles based on the Continent. These threats emphasized the vital need for a modern air force, yet the development of such a force proved to be disappointingly slow.[2]

Britain's strategic situation in the light of Soviet capabilities in Western Europe thus indicated the necessity of keeping the Red Army as far to the East as possible, in order: 1, to provide maximum radar warning against the threat of Soviet bombers; 2, to prevent Soviet fighters and transport planes carrying paratroops from approaching the United Kingdom; and 3, to prevent the establishment of launching sites for missiles within the opera-

[1] At the time of the Berlin blockade there were approximately two American, two British and three French divisions in Western Europe. In the opinion of one American officer, all the Red Army needed to advance to the Pyrenees at that time was "shoes."

[2] A good deal of discussion has taken place in England over the failure to provide the R.A.F. with modern swept-wing aircraft. The Government's *White Paper* on the supply of military aircraft, issued early in 1955, went out of its way to deny that the services were still equipped with aircraft dating back to World War II. It admitted that a calculated risk had been made prior to the Korean war in a decision not to put a swept-wing fighter into operation before 1957. (*The Supply of Military Aircraft,* Command Paper No. 9388, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1955.)

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tional range of British targets. It also seemed desirable to increase the capabilities of the R.A.F. to strike at Soviet bases and potential missile sites as well as to improve the air defenses of the United Kingdom. In addition, it seemed prudent to concentrate British military forces and thus provide a central reserve which might be used where and when required. Efforts to realize all these objectives within the budget limits imposed by British resources led to the adoption of what has been commonly called "the new philosophy" or, in the United States, "the new look."

Like America, Britain's traditional way of preparing to carry out military operations has been to wait until after war has been declared and then convert her manpower and resources to war purposes. These costly methods were acceptable as long as Britain's naval power and the shield provided by the Channel and by continental allies assured England enough time and security to mobilize her resources after hostilities began. But the advent of the atomic bomb, high speed aircraft and guided missiles together with the lack of a strong ally on the Continent cut down both the security and the time available to Britain. The long-term nature of the Soviet threat made an effort to prepare for a military crisis at a particular period of time unrealistic. It became necessary to frame a military policy and program for the long haul.

III. ATOMIC WEAPONS AND POLITICS

The political implications of atomic weapons gave a strong impulse toward the "new philosophy." As early as November 15, 1945, the Truman-Attlee-King Declaration recognized that an adequate defense against atomic weapons would be impossible and that the current American monopoly on these weapons would not last. The concept that peace might be preserved and aggression discouraged by the threat of retaliatory attack by nuclear weapons seems to have appeared at about the same time in England and America.

Speaking before the Congress of the United States on November 13, 1945, Prime Minister Attlee had said he was convinced that the United States would never use its great power for selfish aims or territorial aggrandizement in the future. But he noted that Britain had to look forward to the day when the menace of devastating weapons might develop in every part of the world, and he said that to meet such a situation it was necessary not only to

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"eliminate the bomb" from the arsenals of the world but also to seek "the kind of world order . . . necessary in an epoch in which science has placed in men's hands such a terrible weapon." This meant removing the causes of war, attacking "hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance" and raising the living standards of the masses of the world.

In the light of these statements, one can appreciate the "agonizing reappraisal" of the international facts of life forced upon Mr. Attlee and his associates by Communist aggressions in the next years. The belief that Communism threatened only areas of "hunger, poverty and disease" was fairly well exploded by the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the nation with the highest standard of living in Central Europe. The military steps taken by the Labor Party from 1948 on undermined its capacity to criticize the military program of the second Churchill Administration effectively; for this was essentially an extension of its own policy. After the 1951 defeat, it took refuge in advocating "defensive measures" and criticizing the air-atomic deterrent concept. When thermonuclear weapons appeared, it did not advocate new military arrangements for dealing with this threat but called for negotiations with the Communists on all issues.

Some Labor Party members criticized the "new philosophy" on the ground that the threat of atomic retaliation would not deter an enemy from launching peripheral wars, while others insisted that modern weapons had reduced the value of conventional forces. One group argued that ground forces were required for peripheral wars and another that ground forces should be reduced in size. Against those who advocated spending money primarily on the defense of the United Kingdom, a noisy minority asserted that defense against atomic weapons was impossible and that civil-defense efforts were a waste of time and money. The Party's official position favoring West German rearmament under adequate safeguards was sustained by the Trades Union Conference at Scarborough in September 1954 by the narrowest of margins. In the Parliamentary division of November 18, 1954, on the ratification of the London and Paris Agreements, the Party abstained from voting. But even in this action it was unable to present a united front; several members defied the Party decision.

The great debate on the hydrogen bomb in the spring of 1955 further weakened the unity of the Labor Party. Mr. Aneurin Bevan took this occasion to challenge Mr. Attlee's position on

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this subject in an almost insulting manner. Sir Richard Acland, Labor M.P. for Gravesend, who had won 28,000 votes in the election of 1951, resigned from the Party in protest to its weak stand against the development of the H-bomb. In the subsequent election of May 1955, however, standing as an independent candidate in his old constituency, he drew a paltry 6,500 votes. His fate demonstrated the British public's refusal to consider the H-bomb a political issue. The disappointing showing of the left-wing critics of the Government's defense policies in this election indicated that the British public shared the Archbishop of York's opinion, to the effect that, much as he deplored the necessity of building the H-bomb, he was forced to approve, on grounds of common sense, measures to deter war and defend against aggression.

IV. AIR POWER AND THE "NEW PHILOSOPHY"

Britain's early interest in strategic air power is reflected in the "new philosophy." The enormous casualties and costs incurred in the vast ground-force effort of 1914–1918 caused British authorities to look for other military ways of attaining their objectives in Europe. Already in 1917–1919 Britain had led in the inter-Allied effort to develop a long-range strategic bomber force. The employment of air forces for police work in the Middle East was approved at the Cairo Conference of 1921. The political and military control which the R.A.F. was able to exercise "humanely and effectively" in Iraq and on the Northwest frontier of India in the years between the war encouraged the idea among air force officers that air power might be a substitute for ground forces. The Baldwin-Chamberlain rearmament program of 1935–1939 had as one of its objectives the creation of an air force which would make it unnecessary to send a mass army to the European continent. The effort in that direction was halting and inadequate; nevertheless, the R.A.F. which grew out of it not only protected Britain from invasion when war came but also offered the only immediate means of striking at the Axis after Dunkirk.

The emphasis which had to be placed on the air arm in World War II was carried over into the postwar period, when isolationist hopes revived in Britain in view of the power vacuum existing on the Continent. The military collapse of Germany, the weakness of France and the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe removed all hope that Soviet aggression against Western Europe could

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be prevented by any ground and naval forces available or in view. The air arm offered the only immediately available means of striking at the sources of Soviet military strength or at the bases from which Soviet air attacks might be launched against Britain. These considerations pointed toward an increased emphasis on the rôle of the R.A.F. in British strategy and policy-planning even before it was possible to disturb the approximately equal three-way distribution of funds in the Defense Ministry budget. (The main effects of the "new philosophy" on the budget will not be observable until after 1955.)

The introduction of atomic weapons also had the effect of increasing the importance of the R.A.F. in strategic planning. The attitude expressed by the Defense Ministry as late as February 1954 was that "It will be some years yet before we have enough of these new weapons to bring about any radical modification in the pattern of the United Kingdom defense effort." This probably indicated a tendency to regard the limited stockpile of British atomic weapons as being of primary value in strategic air operations. Holding that a strong and efficient force of medium bombers capable of using atomic weapons efficiently is of "greatest importance to us for our own security and for the defense of Western Europe," the 1954 *White Paper* declared that it was Britain's intention to build up such a force in the R.A.F. as soon as possible. One year later it was announced that Britain had undertaken its own H-bomb program.

V. BRITAIN AND NATO

A necessary corollary to the development of Britain's strategic bombing capability was the creation of a coalition to maintain a ground front in Western Europe. This led to the Dunkirk Treaty, the Brussels Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is the latter which now provides the command machinery for a unified European defense effort. The advantages which the British saw in the creation of a ground front were three: it promised a certain amount of warning against a surprise Soviet ground advance into Western Europe; in certain circumstances it increased the radar warning time in the event of an attack by Soviet bombers; and it would force an invading Red Army to concentrate and thus provide opportunities for the tactical employment of atomic weapons.

Though the British do not officially put the defense of Western

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Europe ahead of Commonwealth security objectives, their behavior indicates that they think of the danger of an all-out war as arising principally from the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. According to a statement by the Minister of Defense in 1952, if a major war came it would be the result either of an "accident" or of enemy initiative, and in either case Britain would not fight alone but alongside her allies. Moreover, she had to have allies on the Continent because, as Lord Fairfax pointed out, she could not again hold out alone in the face of an enemy on the Channel. The destiny of the Empire was now firmly linked with allies on the Continent and elsewhere.

British leaders do not necessarily believe that the ground forces and tactical air forces now allocated to NATO can stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, but they think that the presence of these forces will affect any Soviet decision whether or not to attempt such an invasion. It is generally assumed that the 30 Soviet divisions deployed in East Germany and Poland will not be able by themselves to defeat the NATO forces in a surprise attack. The mobilization of additional forces in the Soviet Union would supposedly give the Western Allies a period of warning—what Churchill called "an alert"—in which to evacuate their cities and issue a final warning to the Soviet Union, perhaps by revealing the full extent of Allied preparation for atomic war.[8]

Alarmed by the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade and the Korean war, the British Government sanctioned plans for the adherence of West Germany to a European Defense Community and the creation of a West German force of 12 divisions. The addition of these forces to NATO might increase the probability of an adequate alert period. It might also convince the Scandinavian countries that they could risk extending the protective radar network to cover part of the Atlantic and North Sea route for attacking Soviet bombers. Finally, it was hoped that the existence of 12 fully-equipped and trained West German divisions might permit the withdrawal of British divisions into a central reserve. This reserve would be given unprecedented mobility by the construction of a fleet of long-range jet transports.

It must be noted, however, that in order to bring Germany into the Brussels Pact and NATO under terms acceptable to France, Britain had to promise to maintain four divisions and

[8] *House of Commons, Debates,* March 2, 1954, Vol. 524, col. 1140.

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one tactical air force on the Continent. This promise would seem to reduce the projected central reserve to forces withdrawn from the Suez Canal Zone, and from Malaya and Kenya when these are "pacified." The limited size of the reserve, at best a few divisions, seems to indicate that its primary function will be in limited or peripheral wars; so small a force could hardly play a decisive or even important rôle in an all-out war with Russia.

When at the London Conference in the autumn of 1954 Britain committed four British divisions and a tactical air force to NATO on a long-term basis, she not only reinforced the entente with France, dating back to 1904; she also took an important step to reduce the risk of an American withdrawal from European affairs following the failure of E.D.C. In recommending the ratification of the London Agreements to Parliament on November 18, 1954, Sir Anthony Eden emphasized their effect on the United States as much as on France and Western Europe.

VI. ATOMIC WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE

Present British policies and strategies for the defense of Western Europe were framed in an environment of atomic scarcity and reflect the experience of an island nation in wars fought with high explosives and conventional weapons. Like other military programs for an approaching day of atomic abundance they show a certain amount of ambivalence. Thus while the British people naturally hope to avoid all-out nuclear war, some of their military leaders, such as Lord Montgomery, talk as if this would be the only recourse if a Soviet attack were made on Western Europe.[4] The difficulty lies in determining what represents real British expectations about the defense of Western Europe in contrast to what is being said to deter the Soviet Union.

For various reasons most British leaders do not believe that the Soviet Union will attack Western Europe in the foreseeable future. The Korean war contributed in a dual way to this conviction. It convinced Britishers of the military menace of Communism to the point where a Labor Government sanctioned a commitment to NATO. At the same time it brought assurance that American isolationism of the old sort was dead. The spectacle of the United States entering a war against aggression *first* and while *in a weak military posture* presented such a complete de-

[4] "A Look Through a Window at World War III," a lecture before the Royal United Service Institution, London, October 21, 1954.

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parture from the experiences of 1917 and 1941 that many Englishmen now feel that they can count with certainty on an American defense of Western Europe from the outset—and that the Russians must reckon with it also.

The second main reason why the British regard a Soviet invasion of Western Europe as unlikely in the near future stems from their views about the nature of atomic war. Although they have proceeded slowly with the manufacture of atomic weapons and have emphasized the peaceful uses of atomic energy, their leaders seem to have grasped at an early stage the double-edged political and military implication of the development which was taking place. They reason that it would not make sense for Russia to plan to conquer Western Europe at the price of her own destruction. That Britain and the United States would also suffer disastrous losses in such an exchange does not alter the estimate. The Defense Ministry's *White Paper* of 1954 expressed the belief that the American stockpile of atomic weapons and the United States Strategic Air Command are what, above all, will deter the Soviet Union from starting a war. Other factors in the British estimate are the immense industrial and economic strength of the United States and the probable inner strains and weaknesses in the Communist apparatus of the Soviet Union.

British leaders act and write as if they both expected atomic weapons to be freely used in a war for the defense of Western Europe and realized that an unlimited atomic war would be an "insane war" for them. In such a war they assume that the United Kingdom would be among the first areas to be hit. They do not count on being able to destroy the war-making capacity of the Soviet Union without suffering unacceptable loss and damage at home. With this honest approach goes frankly-acknowledged concern about the reliability of a system of security which spells mutual destruction if it fails. Both in Parliament and in the press questions have been raised as to whether or not a British or any other democratic government could *in fact* order atomic retaliation for a Soviet breach of the peace knowing that, even if damage to the Soviet Union were maximal, a series of atomic counterblows would be inevitable.

The necessity of convincing Soviet leaders that aggression against Western Europe will certainly bring about atomic retaliation and losses which no sensible nation would willingly accept runs counter to the British desire for limiting atomic war,

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even though it helps explain the British insistence on negotiating with the Communists on all other matters. It helps to make understandable an apparent British willingness to give way to the Communists in peripheral areas of the world and to write off the satellite countries. Recognition of the primary importance of Western Europe is strengthened by an awareness that defense of "colonial areas" is a poor issue on which to ask sacrifices in the modern world. The British might show a different attitude toward resisting Communist aggression in the Far East and elsewhere if the United States demonstrated its seriousness of purpose by committing ground forces. They feel that the willingness to commit ground forces is the acid test of serious intent.

VII. BRITAIN'S DEPENDABILITY AS AN ALLY

Americans today regard British coöperation as essential for the success of any program for Western European defense; similarly, the British think their security depends on the existence of a Western European defense bloc and on American support of it. This attitude may change perceptibly in Britain as she creates a significant atomic capability and it may change sharply if she can develop a relatively invulnerable ballistic missile system.

The dependability of the British people as an ally will presumably be affected by the following factors, among others: 1, their view of the vulnerability of their ports and cities to air-atomic attack; 2, their concept of the relationship of United States S.A.C. bases in England to the likelihood of Soviet attack; 3, their reaction to possible Soviet air-atomic blackmail against the populations of their cities; and, finally, 4, the Government's willingness to make the decision to fight even if unlimited nuclear violence is certain to be involved.

To judge by their public statements, political and military leaders in Britain are aware of the vulnerability of their ports and cities to air-atomic attack. The small size of the country and the continuing necessity to import food makes this awareness acute. As R. T. Paget pointed out:

> It is in the power of the enemy to obliterate our ports. . . . It would not matter much how many people would be killed because it would only mean that there would be fewer left to starve. Not only would we be unable to carry on a war, but we should be in a geographical situation in which it would be impossible to reactivate. Doubtless the war would be continued from Canada to eventual victory, but it is not a war which would concern us as a *political entity.*[5]

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The number of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons required to knock out England has been variously estimated at from 50 to as few as five. On the basis of their experience with manned aircraft and V-weapons in World War II, Englishmen cannot fail to grasp the difficulty of defending their cities and ports against such a small number of bombs or missiles. Yet the British Government is making what is publicized as a determined effort to increase the air defenses of the United Kingdom. The resources which it has at its disposal for this include: 1, leadership in the field of radar and electronics dating back to the thirties; 2, the best system of air-defense control in the world; 3, the densest pattern of fully-developed military air bases in the world; 4, a functioning system of ground observers; 5, a small, highly-developed air force with unsurpassed morale; 6, a technically-advanced aircraft industry; and 7, a remarkable record of achievement in defending military objectives in the past. The attitude of the Air Minister in February 1955 was that Britain "has an effective air defense against what any potential enemy is at present able to bring against us." And he added: "By night, the most likely time for attacks, we have a better defense than anyone else in the world."[6] Against these perhaps oversanguine estimates of British assets must be placed the slowness with which Britain has put advanced types of military aircraft into service; the increasing inferiority of the defensive under present conditions; and the inherent weakness of the British island radar warning network.

Despite the fact that a few left-wing Labor leaders have exploited it for political purposes, the presence of United States S.A.C. bases in Britain has caused less public anxiety than might be expected. The fact that the Labor Party sanctioned these bases is important. If the decision to give the U.S. Air Force bases in England was justified in 1948, it is hard to argue that these air bases have now become a dangerous and unnecessary threat against the Soviet Union. From 1948 to 1953, no protest was made against them on that ground. The motives in establishing them were primarily defensive. To the legal-minded Englishman, they are a matter of exclusively British-American concern, and the predominant anxiety has been for the social problems they involve rather than for their political or strategic effects. Nearly all Englishmen take at face value Churchill's statement

[5] *House of Commons, Debates,* March 11, 1954, Vol. 524, col. 2499.
[6] *op. cit., The Supply of Military Aircraft.*

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that American bombers will not mount atomic sorties from British bases without the consent of the British Government; but they also recall his realistic observation that under certain circumstances, such as might prevail if Britain herself were under nuclear attack, this consent might be impractical to seek or impossible to give.

The writer recently discussed some aspects of the air-atomic blackmail problem with a number of well-informed Britishers. Their attitude was that any Soviet attempt to force the removal of United States S.A.C. bases from the United Kingdom by threatening British cities with atomic attack would fail completely. It is out of character, they said, for the British to give way to threats, and unthinkable that they should make crucial policy changes in direct response to the threat of force. As Churchill has said:

> It is a curious fact about the British Islanders, who hate drill and have not been invaded for nearly a thousand years, that as danger comes nearer and grows, they become progressively less nervous; when it is imminent, they are fierce; when it is mortal, they are fearless. These habits have led them into some very narrow escapes.[7]

It is sometimes suggested that the "continuous discipline" of the British people rules out a panic reaction in the urban areas in the face of air-atomic threats. This public grimly nerved itself to face the threat of gas attack at the time of Munich and in September 1939—an attack which did not come. It nerved itself to endure the attack by high-explosive bombs which did not come until 1940–1941; and when it did come it was less terrifying in reality than in anticipation. This may cause the British people to underestimate the ordeal of an air-atomic attack until they have experienced one.

There remains the final question, whether or not a British government, in the face of a clear act of aggression by the Soviet Union or its satellites, and in full knowledge of the damage and loss to be expected, will sanction the unlimited use of atomic weapons. The Defense Ministry's *White Paper* of 1955 dealt with the problem as follows:

> In the last resort, most of us must feel that determination to face the threat of physical devastation—even on the immense scale which must now be foreseen—is manifestly preferable to an attitude of subservience to militant

[7] Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World War." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948, Vol. 1, p. 397.

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communism, with the national and individual humiliation that this would invariably bring.

Moreover, such a show of weakness or hesitation to use all the means of defense at our disposal would not reduce the risk. All history proves the contrary.

No other Western country has faced the grim alternatives of the atomic era with equal candor.

VIII. EFFECTS OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN WEAPONS

British attitudes toward Western European defense problems and toward the Anglo-American alliance are certain to change as present and new weapons are developed. The British have accepted long-term commitments on the Continent reluctantly, and they naturally find their present degree of reliance on American military and economic support distasteful. One can be sure that the best minds in England are searching for ways in which to regain as much influence and independence as possible in world affairs.

Even with Britain's limited atomic stockpile and despite her lack of an immediately available modern air force, her leaders have shown at the Geneva, London and Paris conferences that she still exercises a great influence over Asian as well as Western European nations. This influence may be expected to grow as her atomic and carrier capabilities increase. If there is no general war for several years, her atomic stockpile will doubtless become significant, and if at about the same time she should develop a relatively invulnerable ballistic missile system her share of influence in world affairs will be enhanced. Indeed, she could exert a considerable deterrent force independently of the United States and NATO. By that time the nuclear stockpiles in the United States and in the Soviet Union will be so large, and the threat of destruction which they hold will be so universal, that some form of limitation and control may receive serious consideration. Then "old-fashioned" political and military arrangements may again acquire some of their former importance. Britain may enter that new period with many of the requirements for exerting a crucial influence as a "third force" in the decisions of a bipolar world.

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THE CANADIAN ECONOMY AND ITS COMPETITORS

By W. A. Mackintosh

FROM its beginnings the Canadian economy has developed as world markets needed Canadian products and as improved techniques of exploration, production and transportation made possible the conquest of various stubborn obstacles. It has developed at very uneven rates. There have been short periods of rapid progress, succeeded by frustration and painful readjustment. There have been periods of waiting for scientific knowledge to progress and for markets to expand or open as transportation costs were cut or competitive sources dried up. Other conditioning factors were the exacting climate of northern latitudes and the high cost of rearing an economic and social structure on the basis of a sparse population unevenly spread over great land masses.

Political forces also helped shape the Canadian economy. Under a different political history the regions of Canada might have been simply the extended northern frontiers of the United States. But the presence of the French-speaking population and the United Empire Loyalists, the intermittent encouragement of British imperialist policy and the lack of interest shown by the United States all but forced Canada into developing an independent economy. Not until the beginning of the twentieth century, however, did it begin to show promise of vigorous survival.

Up to the time of World War II, the Canadian economy was to a peculiar degree dominated by bulk exports of food and lightly processed materials—pulp and paper, wheat, nonferrous metals. Lumber, fish and some other exports were less important nationally but had great regional importance. A significant export of manufactures in automobiles, electrical equipment, rubber and other products went primarily to Commonwealth countries where they enjoyed the advantage of preferential tariffs. A number of United States firms found it profitable to concentrate their manufacture of exports to the Commonwealth in Canadian branches or affiliates. There also was a considerable production of manufactures for the home market, protected by tariff and other devices but subject to competition over the tariff with products of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries. Dur-

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ing the great depression, faced with practices of discrimination and bilateralism, high protection and oversupplies of food and raw materials, the Canadian economy fell far short of the full use of its resources. Moreover, when the recovery came in the second half of the thirties the persistent oversupply of wheat, pulp and paper gave Canada less than her proportionate share of its benefits.

Counterbalancing the mass exports were certain mass imports to make up national and regional deficiencies, conspicuously in coal, petroleum and iron ore. There were also varied imports of consumer goods, particularly from the United States, which provided Canadians with a range of choice and gave Canadian producers a degree of competition vastly greater than that encountered in such a country as, for example, Australia. Characteristically, also, the Canadian economy received substantial imports of capital in periods of active investment and paid back a portion of the investment in periods of slack business.

Thus the Canadian economy, closely integrated with the economies of the United States and Europe, was peculiarly sensitive to world fluctuations. It was the economy of a sparsely settled country whose main cities lay close to the United States border and under the shadow of the metropolitan centers to the south.

II

With a history like this it was to be expected that after the recent war the Canadian Government would help willingly and substantially with international plans for reconstituting a world based on multilateral trade.

While prepared to be flexible about the improvisations required for the transition period following the war, Canadians had some firm views as to what they hoped for afterwards. They were quite clear that they wanted a framework of multilateral trade in which quotas, exchange restrictions and all the devices of bilateralism were eliminated. They wished increased freedom of trade and sharply reduced protection. They believed that the ultimate aim was convertibility of currencies, without which multilateral trade is necessarily limited. They also wished to generate again the flow of international investment, if possible from private sources, for without this many countries could not progress and thus would be restricted in their trading.

At the end of the war, Canadians, in so far as they had clear

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forward views, expected on the whole that their major mass exports would continue and grow substantially. An exception was wheat, where the hope was for recovery rather than expansion. They probably also expected a considerable industrial extension, with the processing of Canadian materials carried forward to fabrication and with ancillary industries developed. They expected that the home market would be larger and manufacturing more economical in scale. In this there was some reasoning by analogy from the history of the United States, where the development of the home market has played so decisive a part. There was some tendency to disregard the degree to which the consumer market in Canada is narrowly pressed along the United States border. On the other hand, Canadian operators during the war had manufactured standardized products in large volume with man-hour requirements not more than those of the United Kingdom or the United States—and in some cases distinctly less. With a larger-scale production after the war, based on a bigger home market, some manufacture for export and some share of the United States market, they hoped that competitive costs would become possible.

These circumstances predisposed the more alert and venturesome businessmen to favor a policy of multilateralism and reduction of tariffs. Looking for markets in many countries, they also favored policies which would lead to convertibility of currencies and to the freer flow of international investment.

What has actually happened in Canada in the decade since the war has far outrun the most optimistic expectations. The high level of economic activity in the Western World, whether induced by the needs for rehabilitation, by aid under the Marshall Plan, by Korean war expenditures, by continuing defense expenditures or by the vigorous reconstruction efforts of a number of Western countries, has been reflected in increases in the prices and volumes of Canadian exports. Meanwhile, population both from births and immigration has grown by more than 25 percent since the war, and a country which entered the war with barely 11,000,000 people now thinks 20,000,000 a conservative planning figure for 1970. Physical production is nearly two and a half times the prewar level. From 20 to 24 percent of the gross national product is being invested.

More specifically, increased urbanization and improved communications have greatly enlarged the demands for paper and

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have encouraged a great expansion and modernization of the Canadian paper industry. The increased use of nonferrous metals both for defense and civilian purposes and the decline of sources of cheaper supplies have stimulated Canadian expansion and have encouraged widespread exploration with the best scientific equipment for the discovery of new resources. Intensive and systematic prospecting has reaped rich rewards. The extension of electrometallurgical processes and increased demands from a score of industries have accelerated the development of hydroelectric resources, making profitable the use of water powers hitherto too remote for economic development. Until within the last year, even wheat had a buoyant market; shipments to Asia compensated for some decline in European sales. During much of the period, special needs and special shortages here and there provided scattered markets for a great variety of Canadian manufactures which had not normally enjoyed a large export sale.

Not only has the period been favorable to exports but the development of the prairie oil fields proceeded to the point of providing for about two-thirds of our greatly increased domestic requirements, thereby relieving us of foreign payment for much of one of our largest imports. Similarly, for the first time in half a century, iron ore is being uncovered to replace imports and provide new exports.

These great changes have not come about without very heavy investments of capital. They have been supplied in large part (80 to 90 percent) by a high rate of domestic savings but in significant volume also by a persistent flow of capital from abroad, chiefly from the United States. Under these circumstances, the rate of economic growth in the country has been unusually high.

While the realities have exceeded the expectations, there have been some unexpected features in the pattern of postwar economic expansion. There has been not less but more concentration on a few mass exports. There has been a great increase in the share of our exports (about 65 percent) going to the United States. The multiplication of United States, British, Belgian, Dutch and other branch plants and affiliates has been unexpectedly large. Though not just as expected, all this has been very acceptable to Canadians, who were inclined to think for a while that their only worry was the question of how long this prosperous era would last.

When the recession of 1953–54 developed in the United States

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and spread to Canada, creating worrisome unemployment problems during the past winter when business normally encounters seasonal slackness, Canadians became aware that the postwar transition period was over. They were still convinced that they had ahead of them an extended period of rapid growth. They began to realize, however, that the Canadian economy as a whole and Canadian industries in particular must adapt themselves to the facts of a postwar world in which Western Germany had reëmerged vigorously, Japan was making desperate efforts to reëstablish her trade, Marshall Plan expenditures had disappeared, and United States and Canadian expenditures for defense were likely to be less. They realized that they had to readjust themselves to a situation in which efficiency of production had provided plenty of competitive supplies and that both external and home markets had become highly competitive.

III

These circumstances have brought to the surface and sharpened a number of disturbing problems bearing on Canada's foreign economic relations, especially with the United States.

There has been growing concern over the extent and results of United States investment in Canada. The persistent buying of the rather limited range of Canadian common stocks by American investors and investment trusts has lifted Canadian stock prices to levels which seem to forecast a very distant if prosperous future. In some measure the action is encouraged by United States tax laws. This movement of capital, together with other investment in Canada, has until recently been the major factor in keeping our currency at a premium in New York, putting some damper on our exports and making it easier for importers to compete with domestic producers.

In addition, there has been some concern over the extent of the direct investment by which large American corporations, through their wholly-owned subsidiaries, have become fairly dominant in certain industrial fields. Recently there have been some murmurs of complaint that certain areas of Canadian industry and finance are powerfully affected by United States subsidiaries in which there is no Canadian investment, in some of which there is no Canadian share in management, no more than branch-plant discretion, and no full reporting on the results of the Canadian sector of the enterprise. In contrast, of course, there are a consider-

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able number of partly-owned United States subsidiary or affiliated companies which have welcomed Canadian investment in their Canadian operations and which have developed a marked degree of independence of management.

Now that labor organizations are uniting there also is concern over the developing assumption that union contracts in, say, the steel industry should be uniform for North America. It may seem eminently plausible that there should be no difference between working conditions and union standards in Windsor and Detroit or in Hamilton and Buffalo, but in fact market and other conditions are fundamentally different.

Canadian industry has been rudely disturbed by the great increase in foreign competition as a whole, both in export markets and at home. Some Canadian industries have experienced a series of shocks. The first was the elimination of some of the sterling-area markets on the ground of exchange shortage and the necessity to concentrate on sterling purchases. The second was the disappearance of a number of export markets which were based on postwar shortages and which some inexperienced traders did not recognize as being short-lived. The third was the revival of imports in substantial volume from countries which had rehabilitated themselves and were again competing in world markets. Finally, there was the intense competition, coincident with the United States recession, signalized by the resurgence of Western Germany and Japan in particular. Recently the competitive advantages created by devaluation in the United Kingdom have become painfully conspicuous. Many industries have felt the heightened impact of competition, but it was particularly sharp in textiles and in the electrical equipment industries.

In a highly competitive world, Canadian manufacturing occupies a peculiar position. On the one hand, it is subject to the competition of United States mass production. Even after the reduction in United States tariffs resulting from the GATT agreement, the fact is that the access of Canadian manufactures to the United States market is much more restricted than is the United States access to the Canadian market. On the other hand, the Canadian manufacturer is confronted by lower-wage competitors in Europe and Asia, whose position has been enhanced in a number of cases by the devaluation of currency. Competition from these sources is, of course, particularly severe in all products that have a relatively high labor content.

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In these circumstances, many Canadian industrialists are beginning to ask themselves: "Have we gone too far in tariff reduction? Can we really develop an independent rather than a satellite economy on the northern boundary of the United States without higher tariff protection? Does an economy which produces food and materials for the larger countries of the world and whose fate is determined by the policy decisions of Washington and London satisfy Canadian ambitions?"

External trade policies in both the United States and Canada are bound by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, through which the subscribing countries have substantially limited their freedom of action in order that they might obtain concessions in other markets and achieve the general object of wider and more varied opportunities for world trade. GATT has always been subject to criticism because of the number of exceptions and qualifications necessarily introduced in order to achieve minimum agreement and provide realistically for those countries which are still passing through severe postwar adjustments.

There have always been escape clauses in GATT. But it was the stiff requirement put forward by the United States at Geneva last year for a complete waiver validating United States quantitative restrictions, plus Congressional insistence on more liberal interpretations of the President's obligation to prevent any damage to United States industry or to modify any arrangement which might affect continental security, which greatly increased the uncertainty surrounding the trade agreements and reduced the value which other nations attach to them.

Since the war other countries have repeatedly been urged by American spokesmen to make concessions which would enable the President to persuade Congress from time to time to maintain or extend the Trade Agreements Act. There are signs that we are entering a period when other countries may press American representatives to produce evidence that the United States is able to make a dependable agreement. To say this is not to discount the ingenious and sincere efforts which have been made by two Administrations in Washington to further the aim of larger and more competitive trade in the Western World. In future, however, if agreements are to be subject to the heavy discount of escape clauses and modifying legislation, a much greater consideration may be required.

Different in character but similar in effect is the still vexing

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question of customs procedures and valuation. The President has been unable to get Congress to pass new legislation which would conform to international standards and provide unequivocal and prompt customs and valuation procedures. This also has greatly reduced the attractiveness of trade agreements with the United States. Trade in some volume can accommodate itself to almost any tariff structure which is dependable and certain, but tariff schedules which are uncertain and subject to unilateral interpretation and modification simply destroy trade.

As has been noted above, a few Canadian manufacturers after the war hoped that by adding the nearby United States market to their Canadian market they might obtain a sufficient volume of production to make their operations fully competitive with those of United States companies. Often the required market consisted merely of a few bordering counties in the United States. However, even where trade agreements have seemed to make this possible, customs procedures, amended interpretations, valuations and delays have intervened to prevent it. The widespread support among Canadian manufacturers for a liberal trade policy at the end of the war has in the intervening years been very seriously reduced.[1]

United States agricultural policies, while devised to serve internal interests, have important and disturbing external effects, brought about mainly by two practices. The first is the imposition of import quotas to protect the operation of support prices and prevent foreign supplies from flowing in to take advantage of government purchases. The Canadian farmer from time to time finds markets disturbed by the imposition of quotas on products such as potatoes, oats, barley, etc. In fact, the quotas which are presently imposed are not particularly severe since Canada at the moment has no great supply of coarse grains. They do, however, introduce a very important element of uncertainty into the normal continental trade by which Canadian coarse grains have been exported into the cattle-fattening and dairy regions of the United States. Again, the effect of bigness is important since a comparatively moderate restriction in terms of United States consumption may be of decisive proportions in terms of expected Canadian exports.

The support prices themselves and the devices employed in the

[1] However, the process has been checked somewhat by the President's effective resistance to the bill in Congress reclassifying "hardboard" imports under much higher tariff rates.

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United States to dispose of surpluses also have serious repercussions. It has been increasingly difficult for Canadians to comprehend how a country which prides itself so much on innovation and up-to-dateness in its industry can seriously base a support-price policy on the purchasing power of a bushel of wheat in the period before the First World War, when wheat was sown and harvested by horse-drawn machinery and transported to the rail line in horse-drawn wagons. This system of support prices in the postwar period has caused a very large increase in United States wheat acreage, more than the whole Canadian acreage of wheat. As a result, United States postwar exports of wheat have been nearly five times the exports of the prewar years. In contrast, Canadian postwar exports of wheat have increased less than 40 percent and the Canadian acreage sown in wheat has on the average been no larger than before the war. There are, of course, influences affecting wheat acreage other than the support-price policy; but Canadians find it hard to believe that the production of wheat is not being differentially subsidized by the system and that the United States has not itself created the problem of surpluses which haunts its farmers and the Administration.

They have, of course, no complaint that the farmer in the United States is drawing larger profits than is the farmer in Canada, nor are they concerned with the internal policy of the United States. They necessarily become seriously concerned, however, when the United States uses special devices—giveaway programs, grants of foreign aid with requirements that the money be spent on United States food products, or even straight sales of wheat at depressed prices. They are worried when they find that Canadian exports of wheat have lagged and that the Canadian carry-over this summer is likely to be in the neighborhood of 500,000,000 bushels, a modest amount for the United States but a threateningly large carry-over for Canada. The Canadian wheat farmer is prepared to compete with the United States wheat producer but he feels that the competition is unequal if not unfair when he must compete both with his United States counterpart and the Government of the United States. He has in the past year found this competition particularly costly in terms of sales to Germany and Japan, two of his better customers.

There are a number of other questions, too complex and diverse to discuss in detail here, which influence the Canadian climate of opinion. They concern especially the preservation for Canadian

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use of Canadian sources of energy and the maintenance of the historic pattern of Canadian transportation.

Many Canadians feel that the United States obtained a half interest in the St. Lawrence development (vastly more important to Canada than to the United States) very cheaply. They feel that Canada's declared intention to go ahead alone on the project had the salutary effect of forcing Congress to pass the Wiley Bill. Many point out that for little more than $100,000,000 for the construction of a relatively short canal the United States obtained an equal voice in a transportation system which includes the Welland Canal and will include the new Lachine Canal, both built entirely at Canadian expense. Most Canadians would probably have been happier to carry out the whole project without United States partnership, but it was judged that this scheme would be thwarted by the withholding of United States consent to the joint power project. The St. Lawrence Seaway is going ahead and will be pushed through to satisfactory completion, but there is no question that the United States lost good will in Canada by its hard bargaining.

Regarding the use of the waters of the Yukon rivers and the Columbia, the Canadian Government has indicated the strength of its determination not to allow external use of water power or export of electric energy. Since Canada is a country without centrally located coal deposits, she has historically been sensitive to the importance of power and its use to develop her resources.

A somewhat similar Canadian attitude on the project for a natural gas pipe from the prairie gas fields to Ontario is a reflection of the historic decision which located Canadian transcontinental railways north of Lakes Superior and Huron and assumed for the Canadian nation some of the financial burden of all-Canadian transportation routes.

IV

These are problems for which, no doubt, reasonable and satisfactory solutions will be reached. Some are of small importance in themselves. The attitudes expressed in the discussion of them, however, reveal various trends and apprehensions and highlight certain historic positions which have significance.

Canadians are now conscious that the short-term economic effects of the war have worked themselves out, that the transition period is over. They are aware that their country has within

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it forces of growth which are affected by, but do not spring from, the cold war or defense programs or shifts of policy abroad. After having been immersed in the processes of material advance they are now beginning to redefine and redetermine their directions. They have applauded the action of the Government in appointing a Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects. They think it well to scrutinize carefully the implications of growth and the policies which foster and control it. In the field of trade policy there is bound to be a reëxamination, for the drive for multilateral trade and convertible currencies has had repercussions both favorable and disturbing. The weight of opinion will still support liberal trade policies, but proponents of this view are handicapped by the gap between the principles and practice of trade policy in the United States. With the utmost admiration for the persistence and ingenuity of President Eisenhower and Secretary Benson in finding compromises and blocking extreme action, Canadians are wondering if their liberal trade policy has not become too one-sided to be advantageous to a small country with a big neighbor.

Canadians have been prone to look to the United States for models. Innumerable problems have been encountered and dealt with there before they became acute in Canada. Now there is a growing awareness that, though Canada is and always will be influenced by her huge neighbor, she has a different sort of destiny. She will never equal the United States in mass and density. Her frontier will not reach the Pacific and disappear; it will always stretch across the North—a perpetual frontier to be driven back at intervals in deep thrusts as world needs and technical knowledge develop. This frontier will not be overrun by population but will yield only to scientific knowledge and the great apparatus of modern industry. These prospects will pose different economic problems and different social and political problems. Borrowed solutions will not be adequate.

At the end of the Second World War, Canadians struck out on an economic path which they have followed closely to this day with considerable confidence that they were on the right road. Now they are in the mood to take another view ahead. They do so with the consciousness that although their historic associations still stand they have also their own peculiar destiny.

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TOWARDS A CARIBBEAN FEDERATION

By Sir Alan Burns

FOR at least a century the question of federation in the British West Indies has been seriously discussed, but in spite of the advantages, which have always been obvious to farsighted West Indians, there were many difficulties in the way, some of them geographical and others caused by the insular prejudices of the inhabitants and their differing interests. These human difficulties are now being overcome by common sense and good will even though the handicaps imposed by geography remain.

One of the last and most serious of the stumbling blocks on the road to federation has been the question of migration between the different territories. The people of Trinidad, for example, fear a mass movement to their island from those which are less prosperous and have a denser population. Similar fears exist in mainland British Guiana and British Honduras, which have not yet agreed to join in the proposed Federation. So far as the islands are concerned, however, an agreement on this subject was reached at a Conference held in Trinidad in March 1955, and it is hoped that the remaining stages in the establishment of the Federation will be completed by the end of next year. Mr. Albert Gomes, Minister of Labor, Industry and Commerce in the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, has said that this agreement removed "the last obstacles to federation," and added that "we are all looking forward to being a new Dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations in the near future."

II

The British West Indies (exclusive of the Bahamas, the inhabitants of which, in defiance of geographical fact, deny that they are West Indians) consist of three separate colonies: Jamaica,[1] Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados; and two groups, the Windward and the Leeward Islands. The former group includes Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, while the Leeward Islands consist of Antigua, Montserrat, St. Christopher (St. Kitts) with Nevis and Anguilla, and the British section of the Virgin Islands.[2] There are in addition two mainland colonies,

[1] With its dependencies, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
[2] The United States section of the Virgin Islands is geographically part of this group.

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British Guiana and British Honduras, which have always been closely associated with the West Indies.

Jamaica is some 990 miles from Trinidad and 1,050 miles from Barbados. From Trinidad to the Virgin Islands the distance is about 510 miles. The area of Jamaica is 4,411 square miles and that of Trinidad 1,864 square miles. All the other island colonies together have an area of only 1,531 square miles. The total area is therefore 7,806 square miles or a little less than the area of the state of New Jersey. The area of British Guiana is 83,000 square miles and of British Honduras 8,866 square miles.

The population of the two mainland territories is sparse—474,000 in British Guiana and 72,000 in British Honduras; but in the islands, on the contrary, it is very dense, the total being some 2,811,000, of which 1,490,000 are in Jamaica, 688,000 in Trinidad and 221,000 in Barbados. In Barbados, with an area of 166 square miles, the density of population is about 1,330 to the square mile. In the island of Montserrat, the smallest of the units in favor of federation, the inhabitants number only about 15,000.

In the West Indies as a whole there is an overwhelming majority in the population of people of African blood, the descendants of slaves brought there soon after the beginnings of European colonization. East Indians and Chinese were brought in during the nineteenth century as indentured laborers after the abolition of slavery in the British colonies in 1834. The comparatively small white population is descended mostly from settlers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There are also about 18,000 Amerindian aborigines in British Guiana and 10,000 in British Honduras.

It is only in Trinidad and British Guiana that people of Indian descent form important minorities. In Trinidad the East Indians are 36 percent of the population, while in British Guiana they number 215,000, which is nearly half of the total population. It is among the East Indians in Trinidad that the greatest resistance to federation has been found. They fear that their strong numerical position, with the political advantages which result from it, would be lost if they were included in a federation where the majority of the inhabitants would not be of Asian descent. There was much opposition by Indian members in the legislature of Trinidad when the Federation resolution was debated. Though British Guiana has hitherto refused to join the

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

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proposed Federation, a recent vote of the nominated Legislative Council shows some revival of interest in the prospect and a wish to pursue it further.

Despite the varied racial origins of the inhabitants there is no legal or political discrimination, and even social barriers based upon color are surprisingly few. Feelings of bitterness between groups are based in reality more on class than on color—and class in the West Indies by no means corresponds with color. Color consciousness still exists but it is often greater between those of mixed descent and those of pure African blood than it is between "white" and "black." Colored persons play an ever-increasing part (in some cases the preponderant part) not only in politics but also in the Civil Service and the business and professional life of the colonies.

Although, as stated above, there are Amerindians in the mainland territories, there are practically no indigenous inhabitants left in the islands, less than 200 pure-blooded Caribs surviving in Dominica. The Caribs had exterminated the aboriginal Arawaks in the smaller islands before the arrival of the Spaniards in the West Indies in 1492 and were themselves killed or deported by the British in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the Spaniards had exterminated the Arawaks of Jamaica before that island was conquered by the British in 1655.

The history of the West Indies until the beginning of the nineteenth century is, indeed, one of warfare and bloodshed. The dramatic discovery of the islands by Columbus and his Spanish followers was marred by massacres and abominable cruelties to the indigenous inhabitants. The exploits of French, Dutch and British adventurers, who attacked the Spanish settlements and captured the richly loaded galleons, and the reckless gallantry of the buccaneers, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that many of these men were little better than pirates and that some of them murdered their prisoners in cold blood. The romance of the struggles of the early settlers against nature and savage enemies, and the development of the wealthy "sugar colonies," should be seen against the tragic background of Negro slavery.

III

Columbus first came to the West Indies in 1492 and Spanish rule was quickly established in the larger islands and on the mainland of Central and South America. The smaller islands to the

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east and south of Puerto Rico were not occupied, partly because of the absence of gold and silver and partly because of the warlike nature of the Caribs, who were less easy to subdue than the gentle Arawaks of the Greater Antilles. The Spanish monopoly in the New World was uncompromising, foreigners and foreign trade being excluded by law and where possible by force. The trade with Spain, however, was insufficient for the growing colonial communities and the demand for African slaves was insistent. To meet this demand interlopers from France, the Netherlands and England flocked to Caribbean waters and, in spite of official protests, sold slaves and merchandise to the Spanish colonies. Sir John Hawkins was the first Englishman to take African slaves to the West Indies (in 1563) and he was followed by many others, including Sir Francis Drake.

The Spanish Government did what it could to check this illicit traffic but officials were corrupt or inefficient and in some cases were compelled by a show of force to allow the interlopers to trade with the local inhabitants. Friction gradually increased and in spite of the fact that there was peace in Europe there was "no peace beyond the line" (*i.e.* in the Caribbean). Spaniard and Englishman fought there whenever they met and Drake terrorized the Spanish settlements by his daring raids. When open war broke out between England and Spain in 1585, Drake sailed from England "to impeach the King of Spain in his Indies" as later, in 1587, he was to "singe the King of Spain's beard" at Cadiz. Santo Domingo (the present Ciudad Trujillo) and Cartagena were taken and looted, and much damage was done to Spanish prestige in the Caribbean.

In spite of these and other blows Spanish control of the Caribbean territories was not seriously shaken and no other European nation established colonies in the West Indies until after the beginning of the seventeenth century. It was only in 1624 that Sir Thomas Warner planted the first successful English colony at St. Christopher (St. Kitts). Nevis, Antigua and Montserrat were colonized by British settlers from St. Kitts within a few years and these, with the Virgin Islands which were colonized later, now comprise the Leeward Islands group. Barbados was colonized in 1627 and has the distinction, unique in the West Indies, of never having been captured by a foreign foe.

In 1655 a British expedition which had failed ingloriously in an attack on Santo Domingo passed on to Jamaica and easily

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overcame the weak Spanish resistance in that island. The slaves of the defeated Spaniards, however, took refuge in the interior of Jamaica and they and their descendants, known as the Maroons, were often in arms against the British and caused much trouble in later years.

Apart from one raid on St. Kitts and Nevis in 1629, the Spaniards did not attack the young British colonies. Jamaica in particular owed this immunity largely to the activities of the buccaneers based on that island. These reckless adventurers harried Spanish settlements and captured their ships, keeping the Spaniards mainly on the defensive. At a later date, regular British forces in time of war attacked the Spanish colonies and cities, but yellow fever and other diseases decimated the crews of naval vessels and the young unseasoned troops from England. This fact, coupled with inefficient leadership, was responsible for the repulse of a strong force which attacked Cartagena in 1741; included in this force was a Virginian regiment with which Lawrence Washington served.[3] A more successful expedition was that of 1762 which captured Havana, but even on this occasion the deaths from disease were more numerous than the casualties caused by the fighting.

As Spanish power in the Caribbean gradually declined, a struggle began between France and Great Britain for the control of the sugar-producing islands which at that time were regarded as more valuable than the mainland colonies of North America.[4] In the intermittent wars between the two nations most of the islands changed hands from time to time; but, after the defeat of Napoleon, Great Britain held, in addition to Jamaica and the original colonies of settlement, the islands of Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent (the present Windward Islands) and Tobago (now joined with Trinidad as a single colony). Trinidad was captured from the Spaniards in 1797. British Guiana was ceded by the Netherlands in 1814. British Honduras had long been occupied by British settlers who, disregarding the almost

[3] Lawrence Washington greatly admired Admiral Vernon, the British Naval commander at Cartagena, and named Mount Vernon after him. Lawrence's health was undermined by the hardships of the campaign and in 1751 he visited Barbados in the hope that the change would be beneficial. He was accompanied by his half-brother, George Washington, who contracted smallpox in Barbados. After Lawrence's death in 1752 the Mount Vernon property passed to George Washington.

[4] In the period 1715–17 the imports into Great Britain from Barbados alone were valued at £364,557, as against a value of £382,576 for the imports from *all* the North American mainland colonies. As lately as 1763 it was argued that Martinique and Guadeloupe, captured like Canada from the French, were more valuable than the "frozen wastes" of Canada.

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nominal Spanish sovereignty, cut logwood and mahogany in the forests. In 1798 a Spanish attack on the settlers was decisively defeated; thereafter no attempt was made to enforce Spanish control and, with the collapse of Spanish rule in Central America, the *de facto* occupation by the British led to the establishment of British Honduras as a colony.

In the colonies of settlement and in Jamaica (and later in most of the conquered territories) the white inhabitants were from the beginning allowed a form of self-government in local affairs, the "proprietor" or the Governor being authorized to make laws "with the consent, assent, and approbation of the free inhabitants."[5] The constitutions granted were somewhat similar to those of the New England colonies, being based on the British constitution as it then existed (*i.e.* under Stuart sovereigns). The Governor represented the King; there was a nominated Council in the place of the House of Lords, and there was an elected Assembly with most of the powers of the House of Commons. The slaves, of course, were not represented and the Assemblies were controlled almost entirely, after the first few years, by the planters and the richer merchants. The Governors endeavored to carry out the policy of the British Government, which included the enforcement of the unpopular mercantile laws of the period forbidding trade with foreigners, but were continually thwarted by the intransigent members of the Assemblies, whose principal aims were to keep effective control over their slaves (who greatly outnumbered the white population) and to avoid taxation. The Home Government had frequently to disallow inhuman laws passed by the local legislatures imposing savage penalties on slaves who attempted to escape or rebelled against their masters. The Assemblies for their part repeatedly refused to pass laws to provide for the necessary revenue and often there was a complete deadlock.

IV

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the economic decline of the West Indies began. Other territories had begun to compete in the production of sugar and the position of the planters was threatened by the crusade in Great Britain for the abolition of slavery. In 1807, after a long struggle in which the vested

[5] Letters Patent to the Earl of Carlisle, dated July 2, 1627, granting him proprietary rights over the "Caribees Islands."

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West Indian interests resisted all proposals for reform, the British Parliament enacted legislation which made the slave trade illegal and prohibited the importation of slaves into British colonies. With the end of the Napoleonic wars the campaign for the total abolition of slavery was intensified but again the West Indian interests resisted the change and the local legislatures refused to coöperate. At last in 1833 the British Parliament passed "An Act for the abolition of Slavery throughout the British Colonies" and voted a sum of £20,000,000, a huge amount for those days, to compensate the slave-owners. The slaves were emancipated on August 1, 1834, and after four years as "apprentices" became completely free in 1838.

For a time the planters and merchants, who for so long had controlled the Assemblies, continued to hold their own politically. The freed Negroes were not represented in the legislatures and a handful of the inhabitants continued to legislate largely in their own interests and with little regard for the welfare of their former slaves. In 1843 there was only one colored member of the Barbados House of Assembly, and in St. Vincent in 1854 there were no more than 193 registered voters. In Jamaica in 1863, out of a total population of some 450,000 persons, only 1,482 electors actually voted. Serious disorders among the Negroes in Jamaica in 1865 were the immediate cause of a general reform of the constitutions in all the islands except Barbados, where the ancient constitution was not changed. The elected Assemblies were abolished and the legislature of each colony then consisted of a Legislative Council, the members of which were appointed by the Crown on the nomination of the Governor.

This was the so-called Crown Colony system, which placed the responsibility for the rule of dependent territories squarely on the British Government, acting through governors appointed by the Crown on that Government's advice. As was pointed out in a dispatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1868, the powers of legislation had in the past been

> virtually exercised by Assemblies elected by a very limited number of the colonists and the only control over their legislation was the negative control by the veto of the Crown. . . . The population at large, consisting of uneducated Negroes, neither had nor could have any political powers; they were incapable of contributing to the formation of any intelligent public opinion; and the consequence was that the Assemblies performed their office of legislation under no real or effective responsibility.

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He added that if the British Government was to be responsible for the proper administration of the colonies it must, in the last resort, have the necessary power to pass such legislation as it deemed essential, and this could be secured only in a legislature where a majority of the members could be relied upon to support the Government.

The Crown Colony system has been derided as nothing more than a veiled autocracy, all power resting in the hands of the governor, and the Legislative Council being merely a convenient tool. The members of the Council, not being elected, were held to be unrepresentative of public opinion and only complacent contributors to a façade of democracy. This is scarcely a complete picture of a system which worked effectively during a difficult transitional period. It was no less representative than the old constitutional systems which it replaced, and the nominated members of the Councils were certainly as honest and public-spirited as most of the members of the former Assemblies. The trappings and procedures of democratic legislatures were preserved in these Councils and the present generation of West Indian politicians owes to them its knowledge of parliamentary technique and the decencies of debate.

For the colored inhabitants, who formed a very high proportion of the total population, Crown Colony rule was a great improvement on what had gone before, and a Socialist writer has said that "only with the establishment of Crown Colony government did the Negroes begin to taste the proper fruits of emancipation."[6]

Gradually, as education spread and the colored population proved its competence, the Crown Colony system was adapted to meet the changing conditions. At first a few members elected on a narrow franchise were included in the Legislative Councils, although for a time there was always a majority of official and nominated members. Later, the numbers of officials and nominated members were reduced until in the Councils there were majorities of elected members. Meanwhile the franchise was slowly widened. Today there is universal adult suffrage throughout the British West Indian territories (with the exception of British Guiana, where the constitution has been suspended) and nearly all the members of the legislatures are elected.

In 1944 the "ministerial system" was introduced in Jamaica,

[6] Leonard Barnes, "The Duty of Empire." London: Gollancz, 1935, p. 124.

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each of the elected members of the Executive Council (elected to that Council, which is similar to a Cabinet, by the members of the legislature) being made responsible to the legislature for the work of a group of government departments. The principal Minister, who is the leader of the political party which controls the legislature, has the title of Chief Minister.[7] A similar ministerial system now exists in Barbados[8] and there is a ministerial system in Trinidad where the Ministers have powers similar to those of Barbados and Jamaica, but so far no provision has been made for a Chief Minister. A modified ministerial system is being introduced into the smaller islands, and in British Honduras there is now a "membership system" which, in effect, is a halfway house to it. In British Guiana the same kind of constitution was introduced in 1953 but was suspended within a few months as the party in power after the elections was under the control of a Communist clique which showed no concern for the welfare of the colony and threatened its progress as an orderly state.[9]

In Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad, and to a lesser degree in all the other territories except British Guiana, there is today almost complete self-government in local affairs on a truly democratic basis. While further political advance to the ultimate goal may be possible separately, at any rate for the larger colonies, there can be little doubt that the best road to complete political and economic independence lies through federation. If the British West Indian colonies gained their independence individually they would still be of small account in international affairs but united in a British Caribbean Federation their position would be more assured.

V

The movement towards federation has been slow but its success now seems to be within sight. The British Government has encouraged the movement and has actively helped it, but has wisely left the final decision to the colonists themselves. The modern movement may be said to have begun with the Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Col-

[7] The Chief Minister from 1944 to 1954 was Mr. W. A. Bustamente. His party was defeated in the recent elections and he has been succeeded as Chief Minister by Mr. N. W. Manley.

[8] The principal Minister in Barbados, Mr. Grantley H. Adams, has the title of Premier.

[9] The leaders of this clique were Dr. and Mrs. Jagan. He is of Indian descent and was born in British Guiana. She was born in Chicago and is of Czechoslovak descent.

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onies held at Montego Bay, Jamaica, in 1947. This Conference set up a committee to devise a federal scheme which was published in 1950. The scheme was discussed in the various colonial legislatures and accepted in principle by all except those of British Guiana, British Honduras and the Virgin Islands; it is to be hoped that these territories will later decide to join. A further Conference was held in London in 1953 at which the original federal scheme was slightly amended and agreement was reached on points of detail. The last remaining question of importance—that of free migration between the territories, already referred to—was settled by a conference in Trinidad in March 1955.

While other territories may subsequently join, the original Member Units of "The British Caribbean Federation" will be Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis and Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. The Senate of the Federation will consist of 19 members appointed by the Governor-General, one for Montserrat and two each for the other nine units. The House of Representatives will consist of 45 elected members, 17 to represent Jamaica, ten for Trinidad, five for Barbados, one for Montserrat, and two for each of the other six units. Except in the case of defense and other reserved matters, the Governor-General will be required to act on the advice of a Council of State which will consist of the Prime Minister of the Federation, three officials appointed by the Governor-General, seven members of the legislature nominated by the Prime Minister, and three members of the Senate appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council.

The British Government has promised financial assistance to the Federation during its early years. A contribution will be made towards the cost of establishing a federal headquarters (the site of which has not yet been fixed), and during the first ten years grants will be made to cover the annual deficits of any unit which may be unable to pay its way from its own revenues or reserves. Grants will continue to be made to the Federation for development and welfare projects as formerly to the individual colonies. The British Government will be responsible for the defense of the Federation and for its external relations, but otherwise the Federation will be self-governing for nearly all practical purposes. The subjects with which the Federal legislature alone can deal will be set out in an "Exclusive List" while both the Federal legislature and the legislatures of the units concerned will be

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empowered to legislate on matters set out in a "Concurrent List." Power to make laws of local application on matters not included in either list will rest with the respective unit legislatures.

The British West Indian territories are among the oldest possessions of the Crown, their peoples are English speaking, traditionally loyal, and mainly Christian, though the large populations of Indian origin in Trinidad and British Guiana are mostly Hindus. The regional organization under the Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies, set up in 1940, has brought the colonies together by the fostering of common schemes, and there are other intercolonial organizations, in particular the Regional Economic Committee, which have had the same result. Students from all the colonies attend the University College of the West Indies in Jamaica. There is a West Indian Trade Commissioner in London and a West Indian Court of Appeal. Last, but not least, a West Indian consciousness has been built up by a common devotion to the very English game of cricket, with West Indian teams playing "Test Matches" against English and Australian sides.

Literacy, if far from universal, is widespread. British law is long established and generally respected. Representative institutions are of very long standing. It has been the declared aim of British policy to quicken the progress of all colonial peoples towards the goal of self-government. Mr. Adlai Stevenson has reminded us that British imperialism has been accompanied by the British democratic tradition and has, as one of its many achievements, the successful preparation of colonial peoples for democratic self-government.[10] Of no area is this more true than of the West Indies.

Against these advantages, which offer much hope for the success of federation, must be set serious handicaps arising mainly from the nature of West Indian economies, the serious overpopulation of the islands, their scattered geography and their small size. The economies of all the islands are mainly agricultural and depend on export crops of which sugar is the chief. Oil in Trinidad and bauxite in Jamaica are the only minerals of commercial significance in the islands. A growing and important industry is tourism, so far mainly confined to Jamaica and Barbados but with possibilities elsewhere. Over everything, however, hangs the threatening cloud of an ever-expanding population.

There is nevertheless some ground for reasonable optimism.

[10] "Call to Greatness." New York: Harper, 1954, p. 21.

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Socially, the various communities have achieved a modus vivendi which may bear fruit in a happy multi-racial society. Politically, the territories have already made good progress and are still advancing on the road to self-government. Economically, United Kingdom policy is directed towards helping the region to develop its economic potentialities to the full. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, which at present extends until 1962, guarantees the producers of the most important crop a reasonably remunerative price up to a certain level of production. The future of other West Indian industries, such as citrus and bananas, is less certain owing to increased competition in overseas markets (one of the most important of which is the United Kingdom) from countries where the industries for various reasons are in a favorable position as compared with those of the West Indies. The British Government has undertaken to safeguard these industries and to introduce measures to that end during the current year. In this connection the waiver which was granted by the members of GATT at their last session in Geneva can be of direct help to West Indian exporters to United Kingdom markets, provided that other member governments are ready to support particular measures proposed by the British Government.

The future, however, is ultimately in the hands of the West Indians themselves. A leading West Indian politician has said: "Federation by itself will not bring prosperity, but federation will enlarge the possibilities of winning that prosperity which we West Indians alone can, and certainly must, create for ourselves." In this enterprise they will have the good wishes of the world.

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OF SUMMITS

By Lindsay Rogers

THE MEMOIRS OF PHILIP DE COMMINES, LORD OF ARGENTON. Edited, with Life and Notes, by Andrew R. Scoble. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1856.

IN THE sciences and arts, paternity is sometimes certain and sometimes a matter of dispute. Every schoolboy is told that Herodotus and Thucydides were "the fathers of history." These Greek historians are still read. New translations have appeared recently and at slight expense the schoolboy will be able to see what General George C. Marshall meant when in an address at Princeton while he was Secretary of State he asked "whether a man can think with full wisdom and deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues of today, if he has not reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens."

What historian following Thucydides compels mid-twentieth century interest? Polybius, perhaps, but only by proxy because he greatly influenced Toynbee who intrigues or annoys his readers. Caesar and Livy are still read, but principally so that a steadily dwindling number of schoolboys can attempt to learn the language in which they wrote. During the middle ages there were chroniclers, but before Philip de Commines was there anyone who deserves to draw even a fleeting attention from a world recently interested in meetings "at the summit," mildly encouraged by the manifestations of friendship between heads of states, and still deeply anxious about the future of "the German question?" Those who first gave Commines his due were not concerned with *facilis ascensus Averni.*

Henry Hallam described Commines as the first modern writer who in any degree "displayed sagacity in reasoning on the characters of men and the consequences of their actions." Even though England had "produced some commendable historians," John Dryden thought that "above all men in this kind of writing, may be accounted the plain, sincere, unaffected, and most instructive Philip de Commines." Clarendon's "History of the Rebellion" was not to be published until after Dryden's death. Clarendon

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was a greater historian than Commines, and it should not be forgotten that the profits from his later editions helped to pay for the Clarendon Press building at Oxford.

"The father of modern history" was born in Flanders, probably in 1447. His father was a knight in the service of Philip V, Duke of Burgundy ("Philip the Good"), who became the boy's godfather and had him brought up in the household of his own son, later to be called "Charles the Bold." In 1468 Commines became chamberlain and councillor to Charles. A few months later Louis XI paid a visit to Charles, who disregarded the safe conduct he had given and put the King into custody that was menacing rather than protective. Commines then had his first tryout in statecraft. He was instrumental in negotiating the King's release and perhaps in saving his life. Four years later Louis bid so high for his services that Commines left Burgundy to serve the court of France. There he acquired honors, properties, pensions and a wife who was wealthy as well as noble. Until the death of Louis in 1483, Commines was his chamberlain, councillor and envoy.

From this position near the summit he could observe the conflict of nations, the schemes of sovereigns and the intrigues of courtiers. His mind was subtle and perspicacious and his insight into motives was keen. None of his readers will conclude that Louis XI did not deserve his nickname, "the spider." Admiration that was too unqualified and apologies that did not go far enough show that Commines was a child of the century, indifferent to matters of right and wrong. So perhaps Sir James Stephens did not exaggerate when he wrote that Commines approached that "judicial serenity which we ascribe to a member of the Amphictyonic Council."

Charles VIII and Louis XII who succeeded Louis XI made little use of Commines and for a time he was banished to one of his estates and put under bond for good behavior. He had to spend much time in defending his rights to properties that had been unlawfully taken from their owners and given to him, but by 1491 he had completed his account of the reign of Louis XI. The second part of his memoirs—on Charles VIII's Italian expedition and the treaty of Vercelli (where he represented the King) —he completed in 1498. Until his death in 1511 he took little part in public affairs. His memoirs appeared 14 years later. As Hallam was to say, they marked "an epoch in historical literature."

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Commines was no admirer of meetings at the summit and he documented his distaste by accounts of several he attended and of one he had heard about in detail from Louis and others who were present—the interview with Henry IV, King of Castille, which had taken place ten years before Commines left the service of the Duke of Burgundy. "It is the highest act of imprudence," wrote Commines, "for two great princes, provided there is any equality in their power, to admit of an interview, unless it be in their youth, when their minds are wholly engaged and taken up with entertainments of mirth and pleasure." When the concern was with affairs of state meetings were hazardous. "Though their persons should be in no danger (which is almost impossible), yet their heartburnings and animosities will certainly augment. It were better, therefore, that they accommodated their differences by the mediation of wise and faithful ministers." The details, as Commines gives them, justify the judgment.

Louis XI and Henry IV, he wrote, "had never had any quarrels, neither was there the least difference between them; they saw one another not above once or twice, upon the bank of a river" —the Bidassoa, which separates the two kingdoms and debouches between Hendaye and Fuenterrabia. There were language difficulties; the attending courtiers quarreled with each other, and the regal haberdashery caused derision. "The King of Castille's person was homely, and his dress did not please the French who laughed at and derided both." It was Louis's custom to wear old clothes and to circulate among his people as one of them. He did not dress up for the occasion, and the Castillians laughed heartily, "supposing it his stinginess." The parting was marked by "scorn and contempt on both sides."

Commines was present at a much more important meeting between Louis and Edward IV of England, in 1475. The summit chosen was a bridge that crossed the Somme at Picquigny, near Amiens. Ambassadors had fixed the amounts that Edward and his retinue would be paid for returning to their country, and now he and Louis were to meet and swear that they would carry out the terms of the agreement. A buffet was thought important, but not for the sovereigns themselves. Louis sent the English 300 cartloads of wine, and the taverns of Amiens kept open house for three days during which, Commines dryly notes, "not a drop of water was drunk." Several thousand soldiers staggered and slept in the streets and there was much disorder.

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To separate the monarchs during their interview carpenters constructed a "strong wooden lattice," with openings only wide enough to let an arm go through. According to Commines, Louis insisted on this kind of a barrier because he recalled what had happened when his father (Charles VII) met John, Duke of Burgundy, on a bridge in 1419. There was a barrier then but it had a wicket. John unbolted it, passed through, "and was immediately slain, himself and all those who attended him."

On Edward's side of the river there was an English army. The King of France had with him 800 men at arms, but at the lattice barrier, the opposing retinues lessened to twelve on each side. Louis XI took no chances, but Edward did, because when he came to the bridge he had to pass through a causeway and was an easy mark for bow-men. This, Commines says, "might have produced very dangerous consequences to the English if our intentions had not been honorable," and adds: "the English do not manage their treaties and capitulations with so much cunning and policy as the French do, let people say what they will, but proceed more ingenuously, and with greater straight forwardness in their affairs." There were embraces through the holes of the gate; there were oaths to preserve the treaty; Louis asked Edward to visit Paris "where he could divert himself with the ladies." Before it was certain that the invitation would be declined, Louis regretted having given it. Some of the ladies, Louis told Commines, "may appear to him so charming, as may give him a desire of making us a second visit. His predecessors have been too often in Paris and Normandy already; and I do not care for his company so near, though on the other side of the water, I shall gladly esteem him my friend and brother."

At Geneva invitations were extended and accepted, but if and when statesmen pay visits today they do not take armed forces with them.

But the "Memoirs" of Philip de Commines have another relevance to our present discontents. Had they not been published, we might not now face a question to which even a genuine *détente* between the Soviet Union and the Western World and a decision by the Soviet Union to conduct its public affairs in a goldfish bowl, as the Western democracies do, would not give an answer: How much has a fifth Power learned from two world conflicts that were almost won and then lost? That Power, only a decade ago in the dregs of misery that she brought on herself, now complains

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that Geneva accomplished nothing so far as she is concerned. The question is: Will Germany again strive for *Weltmacht?*

To *Poor Richard's Almanac* Benjamin Franklin prefixed the much-quoted maxim: "For want of a nail the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe the horse was lost; for want of a horse the rider was lost; for want of a rider a battle was lost." Well, the battle *was* lost. The chain of possible cause and effect that I suggest (substituting "might" for "was") is this: for want of Philip de Commines's "Memoirs," Sir Walter Scott might not have written "Quentin Durward;" for want of "Quentin Durward," Leopold von Ranke might not have decided to become the kind of historian that he did—Carlyle's "Professor Dry-as-Dust;" for want of Ranke, the most influential historian of his age—and it was a long one, for Ranke lived and worked until 1886—other historians might not have thought that the Kingdom of Prussia could do no wrong; and for want of these historians the German people might not have been so willing for William II and Hitler to lead them to battle. As Trevelyan has said, historians who disseminate the wrong history can help to plunge the world into war.

The "Memoirs" appeared in English as early as 1596 and there were later translations. John Dryden wrote of Commines as "unaffected," but Sir Walter Scott was affected: the "Memoirs," a French geographical index, a map of Lorraine, and eight-year-old memories of a visit across the Channel, enabled him to produce his first romance with the scene laid outside Britain, "Quentin Durward." The historical characters included Louis XI, Charles the Bold and Commines himself.

Ranke read "Quentin Durward" and was shocked. In the words of Lord Acton who had been his student: "He decided effectually to repress the poet, the patriot, the religious or political partisan, to sustain no cause, to banish himself from his books, and to write nothing that would gratify his own feelings or disclose his private convictions." Or as Ranke himself said: "I found by comparison that the truth was more interesting and beautiful than the romance. I turned away from it and resolved to avoid all invention and imagination in my works and to stick to facts." His aim would be to learn how it actually happened, *Wie es eigentlich gewesen ist.*

He used this phrase in the first book he published and "scientific" historians have quoted it *ad nauseum.* The first book appeared in 1824, when Ranke was not yet thirty and was serving as a master in a school. The Prussian Minister of Education saw

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the book and promised Ranke a post in Berlin; within three months he had a supernumerary professorship—so prompt was the Prussian Government in rewarding historians who did not have dangerous political opinions. One would have thought that Ranke might have wondered concerning the reasons for his spectacular preferment. From the standpoint of the state, the choice was wise; nothing in any one of Ranke's later forty-odd volumes made any Prussian Minister of Education uneasy.

Ranke's belief in his "objectivity" was serenely complacent. An eminent theologian who, like him, had written on the Reformation, once met the German historian in Berlin and hailed him as a colleague. "No!" was the reply. "There is a great difference between us. You are above all a Christian, and I am above all a historian. There is a gulf between us." But Ranke was a Christian as well. He wrote: "God lives and is observable in the whole of history. Every deed bears witness of Him, every moment proclaims His name; but especially do we find it in the connecting line that runs through history." Presumably nothing that Prussia did could incur God's disfavor. Hence in the case of events that would require another historian to speak of turpitude and crime, Ranke wrote of "transactions and occurrences."

Views of whether certain occurrences are venial or vile will vary with the viewer. But another Rankean contribution to objective history was an insistence that the date of the "occurrence" made no difference. "*Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott,*" he proclaimed: all centuries are equal in the sight of God. The theologians can dispute whether they should agree, but what a philosophy for a historian! Henry VIII's Lord Chancellor and Solicitor General themselves turned the screws of the Tower rack in the hope of forcing the protestant Ann Askewe to make some confessions. She "would not convert for all the pain," and a few weeks later the legal luminaries went to Smithfield to watch her body being burned. Should we be no more moved to horror if we read that two of the law officers of Queen Elizabeth II were to participate in a comparable "transaction?"

Some advocates of colorless history make great play with the argument that the historian should not assume the role of "a hanging judge." Of course not, and the analogy is faulty. A bishop once said to a judge: "I can say 'you be damned' while you can only say 'you be hanged.'" "Yes," replied the judge, "but when I say you be hanged you are hanged." Not always, because

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there may be reversals on appeal or clemency. The historian is not a hanger but a damner, for his readers are free to reject or modify his verdict, and the next year they may read a different verdict handed down by another historian.

Geneva proved Commines a bad prophet in one respect. The heads of states did not separate disliking each other more than they did before they met. Indeed, Geneva displayed more sweetness and bonhomie than any conference since 1520 when Henry VIII and Francis I met on "the field of the cloth of gold." Those two monarchs were so boisterously companionable that they began a wrestling contest which the ladies terminated before it became unfriendly. "It's time for supper," they called. The buffets at Geneva enabled President Eisenhower to say that "there is evidence of a new friendliness in the world." Opinions will differ on whether the men in the Kremlin, when, until so recently, they hurled insults, were putting on an act or whether the change of manners is itself an act. Such uncertainties do not exist in respect of Western statesmen. They live like goldfish and one can accurately estimate whether they are being themselves or pretending.

But Commines was right when he said that the "mediation of wise and faithful ministers" rather than summit meetings must be the way to reconcile differences between states. Every substantive issue of the cold war remains as it was before Geneva. The Russians, by their smiles, sought to conceal their refusal to move from their positions on European security, disarmament and German unification. As the French put it, there is a *détente* but no *entente.*

But even if the Western Powers were willing to say that there is no hurry about German unification, Germany would not agree. In Murren the brooding presence of Western Germany, in the person of her Chancellor, was intended to make a greater impression on the Big Four than if he had remained in Bonn. "Even if you don't like the hors d'oeuvres you wait for the main course," was his comment on Geneva. A main dish will be cooked for him in the Kremlin when he visits the Soviet Union. Dr. Adenauer is not immortal. Will his policy, even his party, survive him? Will we learn that the German mind has not exorcised the spell cast by Ranke? It was a German historian, Hegel, who thought that the only lesson of history is that people and governments learn nothing from it. And of Hegel himself, it was said that he mistook the Kingdom of Prussia for the Kingdom of Heaven.

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HOW COMMUNIST POWER IS ORGANIZED IN CHINA

By Chao Kuo-chün

THE power structure in mainland China may be likened, in a simplified manner, to the form of a pyramid. At the top is the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) and its inner core, the Central Secretariat. At the second level are men in key posts in the central government, regional Party leaders, top military commanders and political commissars of the field armies. The third layer includes Party secretaries in the provinces, top personnel of the major mass organizations, and second echelon army commanders. The fourth consists of professional people, managerial personnel and technicians. Next to the bottom we find local government and Party officials, and other junior cadres. The base of this pyramid rests on what the Communists call the masses. These may be subdivided into organized groups of soldiers, youth leaguers, labor union men, members of women's federations, members of coöperatives, and so on; and at the very bottom are the unorganized individuals whose number is ever decreasing.

However, the exercise of power is never static, least of all in a Communist state, and the actual planes of power do not necessarily correspond to the simplified version. And personalities play a great part; there are always men coming up and men going down. The first and most important center of power is, of course, the Politburo of the Communist Party and its Central Secretariat. Available information indicates that there are at present 13 members of the Politburo. They are: Mao Tse-tung (Chairman), Liu Shao-ch'i (Vice-Chairman), Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yün, K'ang Sheng, P'eng Chen, Tung Pi-wu, Lin Po-ch'ü, Chang Wen-t'ien, P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The first Big Five constitute the omnipotent Central Secretariat, with Mao automatically the chairman. Kao Kang, once an important member, was dropped in 1954 from the Politburo and the Central Committee for "conspiratorial activities" and was reported to have committed suicide.

The second major places of power are found in a number of key Party and national government posts. In addition to those positions held by the Politburo members, such as the Chairmanship of the People's Republic, Premier of the State Council, etc., the others probably include the following: (1) Secretary-General of the Central Secretariat, C.C.P. This significant post is now held by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who was elected to the Politburo in March 1955. Concurrently serving as the fifth Vice-Premier of the State Council, a Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Council and a delegate to the All-China People's Congress, Teng is in a position to coördinate the work of the Party, the government and the military forces. (2) Deputy chief of the organizational bureau of the Central Committee. This is the traditional avenue through which Party men (like Stalin and Liu Shao-ch'i) rose to power. (3) Chairman of the United Front Workers Department of the Central Committee. Li Wei-han has been in charge of this vital organ ever since the late

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thirties. (4) Ten Vice-Premiers in the State Council. (5) Procurator-General, Central People's Government. (6) Chairman of the State Planning Commission. (7) Chairman of the National Construction Commission. (8) Some key ministries in the Central People's Government like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Heavy Industry, Ministry of Public Security, and others, generally headed by members of the Central Committee. (9) Other high government posts which carry considerable prestige and authority such as the Vice-Chairmanships of the All-China People's Congress.[1]

A third group of centers of power is formed by the regional Party secretaries, top army commanders, and their political commissars. Often one man serves concurrently in several of these offices. Since the recall to Peking in 1953 of all the commanding generals of the four field armies, the relative weight of field army commanders has perhaps decreased. The top political commissars of these field forces were also transferred to central government assignments. However, Party bosses in various regions, army commanders and political commissars still hold considerable power and can be coming men.

As the top military figures are recalled from the field to Peking, the commanding posts in the People's Liberation Army become even more important. These include the Chief of General Staff, the Training Bureau, the Political Department, the Supervisory Bureau, the Supplies Department and the Finance Bureau. The National Defense Council, legally the supreme military organ of the nation, has become so large that membership in it is, for practical purposes, a prestige office. Among its 15 Vice-Chairmen are four ex-Kuomintang generals, and among its 81 members are 26 former Kuomintang officers.

Regional and local power generally lies with the Party secretaries of the areas concerned. Certain key districts like Peking, Mukden, Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton, Tientsin, Anshan, Dairen, Port Arthur and Chungking are particularly the places to look for middle-echelon Party men marked for promotion and national rôles.

The fourth key place of power lies in the hierarchies of the major mass organizations which serve as primary instruments for carrying out government and Party programs. Under this category are the labor unions, the youth organizations and the women's federations.[2]

The above centers of power are, of course, closely coördinated. Almost all the occupants of key positions are members of the Central Committee, for example. Yet, membership in the Central Committee is not in itself a sign of possession of power. Important as the Committee is, its 43 regular and 27 alternate members were elected ten years ago (June 1945). At that time the Communists controlled only a fraction of the territory and population of China; a lot of water has passed under the bridge since then. A few regular members of the Central Committee have faded from the political limelight, a few others seem never to have played prominent rôles. On the other hand, a

[1] For a discussion of the structure and personnel of the Central People's Government, see the author's "National Constitution of Mainland China," *Far Eastern Survey*, October 1954.

[2] For a discussion of the structure, leadership, programs and problems of the major mass organizations in China, see the author's "Mass Organizations in Mainland China," *The American Political Science Review*, September 1954.

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score or more of Party men like Li Wei-han, Chia T'o-fu, Lai Jo-yü, Hu Yao-pang, Liao Lu-yen and Tao Chu have come into positions of real power, and most, if not all of them, will probably be elevated to Central Committee membership at the next Party Congress. The infrequency of meetings of the Committee also diminishes its effectiveness as an instrument for the actual exercise of power. The Party Constitution stipulates that a plenary session is to be convened every six months, but only four meetings are known to have been held since June 1945—an average of one every 30 months.

The Politburo, together with a few individuals in key positions, decides major issues and controls policies, and only members of the Politburo could tell the full story of the techniques which are used to govern mainland China. A few known facts permit certain guesses, however. As has been noted above, in the case of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, various organs of the government as well as the major mass organizations are coördinated through a maze of interlocking directorships. Liao Ch'eng-chih, to give another example, is a member of the Central Committee, C.C.P., Chairman of the Federation of Democratic Youth, Vice-Chairman of the Youth League, a member of the Standing Committee of the All-China People's Congress, First Deputy Chairman of the Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs, Vice-Chairman of the National Committee for the Welfare of Children, a member of the Standing Committee on World Peace, and a member of the Executive Committee of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Officials of less exalted standing are also busy, though in 1953 there was an "anti-five-too-many movement," which, translated, meant that the Party warned that there were too many tasks, meetings, documents, forms, organizations and concurrent posts. Multiple directorships among the lower ranks in the government and mass organizations have since been reduced.

Policy decisions are made at Party caucuses at various levels and carried out by Party personnel in the government, army and mass organizations, who receive and implement Party directives. For example, the National Constitution which was legally adopted by the All-China People's Congress in September 1954 was drafted by the Central Committee of the C.C.P.

The Communists have also shown great dexterity in the use of non-Party political leaders, professional people and intellectuals in general. Leaders of the coalition parties, and other non-Communists of some reputation, are offered high but non-vital government posts. Most of the leaders in the "democratic parties" are aged men, or the widows of past national figures. They are respected by the Chinese people and hence confer prestige on the new régime, and they are not persons of a type likely to challenge the power of the Party. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that all activities of these non-Communist office holders are known to the Party. Many of them no doubt sincerely support the programs of Peking, as they have always been leftists and in opposition to the Kuomintang régime.

"Organization" is, of course, the key word in any description of methods of Communist rule. The backbone of the power of the Party and the government are the professional and devoted organizers who also serve as the reserve army for higher posts. One of the organizational techniques is to expand the central organs of various government and mass organizations, as a

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means of training more leaders. Thus the number of vice-premiers was increased from four to five in 1953, and to ten in 1954. The new hierarchies of major mass organizations set up in the summer of 1953 showed a similar trend.

Another tactic is the setting up of front groups. They serve as a double political weapon: to absorb and indoctrinate those persons who are able or ambitious but not quite ready to accept unreservedly the Party ideology; and to present to the public and the outside world a show of unity and popular support. The People's Congresses and various associations of professional people exemplify this approach. Still another technique employed by the Party in the power game is to remove persons from key centers of strength by kicking them upstairs—with all ceremony, of course.

Finally, the Party endeavors to enhance its power through control and indoctrination at the grass roots. Individuals are enrolled in a great variety of groups. Every kind of mass media, traditional and improvised, is used to carry on propaganda. No aspect of life is left outside Communist teaching. For example, a document issued by the New Democratic Youth League states that:

> The work style and group life within the League must not rely on abstract political talk, nor the preaching of dry dogma. The League should use Marxism-Leninism to analyze correctly and solve the problems that are closely related to the interests of the youth such as the following: the problems of wages, health, job, sports and recreations, learning scientific knowledge, raising the cultural standard, tuition fees, student loans, examination system, love and social activities, family affairs, methodology in learning, books and texts, and the suitable distribution of time for work and for study. . . . All the meetings convened by the League for Youth must be lively and concrete. . . .

Directives frequently quote cases to explain how some model groups successfully accomplish their mission by using practical approaches to programs and by consulting the local people. There is a constant appeal to cherished values such as security, national honor, prosperity, peace and personal prestige.

Since Mao Tse-tung assumed formal leadership of the Party at the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, there seems to have been no serious challenge to his authority. The half-dozen men who were veteran Politburo members when Mao was only a regional Party leader in his native province of Hunan are today either his faithful lieutenants or powerless and inactive. Since 1935, there have been two expulsions from the Politburo—that of Chang Kuo-t'ao in 1938, and of Kao Kang in 1954—but they were followed by no large-scale desertions or mass purges of Party leaders of importance except in the case of Jao Shu-shih, former Central Committee member. Mao maintains close ties with the top military commanders; and he takes pains to see that the close-knit and highly centralized Party leadership does not isolate itself from the masses. The 69 members of the Central Committee have a relatively representative social background. According to one analysis made in 1953, 37 percent are from middle class families, 23 percent from poor peasant or worker stock, and 40 percent of upper class origin—officials, landlords, businessmen, professional people, army officers, etc. It is significant to note that

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from two-thirds to three-quarters of the members were of rural origin, whereas the ratio was reversed for the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.[3] According to Communist sources, some 50,000 persons graduated in 1953 from 60 training schools of the trade unions, and 15,000 persons were sent by the basic trade-union branches to the Party or government organs. Between April 1949 and June 1953, more than 1,000,000 Youth Leaguers entered the Party and government; among these, 40,000 served in posts above the ch'ü (district) level.[4]

What is the possibility of schism in the power structure of mainland China? A number of American analysts of contemporary Chinese problems, while agreeing that there is a high degree of cohesion in the Party under Mao Tse-tung, point out that the succession to a monolithic dictatorship is unlikely to be peaceful. They therefore maintain that cleavage will occur after the exit of Mao, particularly on the question of succession. But no challenger is yet in sight. At the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held at Yenan in 1945, Liu Shao-ch'i was officially made second in command to Mao. Chu Teh was made the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China in September 1954, but he is now 69 years old, and his position is probably mainly an honorary one. Liu, who might otherwise have been the logical candidate for that post, fills the important job of Chairman of the Standing Committee of the All-China People's Congress. Presumably, if Liu is slated to succeed to the chairmanship when Mao dies, Chu will resign and let Liu be elected by the People's Congress. Chou En-lai, now 57, is about the same age as Liu, but he has always been content to play a secondary though indispensable rôle to the number-one man in the Party. The head of the Party is expected to combine the rôles of theoretician, political leader and military strategist; next to Mao, Liu is believed to possess these qualities most plainly. At the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1954 there was an interesting mention of "collective leadership," but what collective leadership actually means in a Communist country we do not yet know.

Nor, of course, can anyone tell what ambitious man may be waiting in the wings for his entrance cue to the power drama. The record of the Chinese Communist régime seems to suggest that he is unlikely to be a military man. The Chinese Red Army had long been under the complete control of the Party when the Peking Government was established. The People's Liberation Army was founded and brought up on the political as well as the strategical concepts of Mao Tse-tung. Even powerful and popular military leaders like Lin Piao and Ch'en I invariably bow to the wishes of Party directives. And, as noted earlier, the power of the top army men declined when the field commanders were recalled from their regional headquarters to Peking in 1953. Among the 13 Politburo members, there are only three generals and two of them, P'eng Te-huai and Lin Piao, are not known to be on the Central Secretariat. In any case, almost all the key army personnel belong to the close-knit old Yenan group. No antagonism has been detected between the mili-

[3] Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Oligarchy and Mobility in Political Parties," Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1953.

[4] *Ta-kung pao*, Tientsin, May 1, 1954, p. 2; and Hu Yao-pang, "Call to China's Youth to Build Socialism," New China News Agency, Peking, May 4, 1954.

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tary and the Party functionaries; they have gone through much together during the past 30 years, with little if any factional dissension.

Some observers have suggested that certain non-Communist parties or groups on the Chinese mainland may grow disillusioned and develop into opposition forces. Even if such should be the case, these groups have neither the organization nor the mass base to compete effectively for political power. In 1952 the coalition parties agreed not to campaign for membership among the industrial workers and peasants; they seem thus to have lost any possibility of expanding a mass base. The so-called "third parties" and anti-Communist groups outside mainland China are even more deficient in popularity and do not seem to be a practical alternative to the Peking Government.

Is there a likelihood that the top leaders of the Party may split into hostile factions over differences in basic policies, such as the speed of industrialization and certain agricultural programs? One cannot know what reservations may exist in the minds of members of a monolithic government, but at any rate there is no evidence that leading figures in the Party hierarchy hold divergent stands on basic policies. The Chinese Communists are well disciplined.

There is a possibility of internal conflict, over a period of years, in the potential rivalry between a newly-developed bureaucratic-technician class and the older type of Party bosses. Tremendous emphasis is now laid by Peking on the expansion of technical and managerial personnel. For instance, about half of the 230,000 students at the college level in 1954 were in the field of engineering. Already a number of persons have risen to national prominence on the strength of their professional or technical abilities. When this group becomes sufficiently numerous and strong, it may challenge decisions of the Party hierarchy on economic or technical grounds. Some older Communists who lack technical education may also feel resentful toward these new men because of their privileges and quick promotions.

What of the possibility of internal conflict arising as a result of external causes? If Peking were to join an all-out international war and lose, or if it were to resort to military expansion and suffer a severe setback, then active opposition might arise both within and without the Party. The establishment of a "Free Thai" Government in Yunan suggests that a policy of adventure holds some attractions for the régime. And the situation in the Formosa Strait could still be explosive. However, developments in mainland China seem rather to indicate that Peking is likely to devote its main attention to internal construction; but this of course does not contradict a desire to expand its influence in Asia, politically, economically and culturally.

If the Chinese Communist leadership should prove itself to be working in the interests of Soviet Russia at the expense of China's own national welfare, then either a popular resistance movement would develop or some leaders within the Party would revolt. Both the Party and Moscow seem to be aware of this. The Soviet Union's return of Port Arthur and its relinquishment of Russian mineral rights in Sinkiang in November 1954 indicate the strength of Chinese nationalism. The Party leaders will hardly be so blind as to commit political suicide by going against the nationalist force which contributed so much to the Party's rise to power and has won popularity for the Peking Government among many overseas Chinese.

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THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1953. By RICHARD P. STEBBINS, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF GRANT S. MCCLELLAN. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1955, 512 p. $5.00.

The latest volume of this important annual survey offers a synoptic view of United States foreign relations in the first year of the Eisenhower Administration, with emphasis on the new perspectives opened by the death of Stalin, the ending of the Korean War and the Soviet development of a thermonuclear weapon.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1952. By PETER CALVOCORESSI. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1955, 473 p. $7.20.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1952. SELECTED AND EDITED BY DENISE FOLLIOT. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1955, 529 p. $8.80.

The fourth postwar volume in this valuable series, with its accompanying volume of documents.

THE DIGNITY OF MAN. By RUSSELL W. DAVENPORT. New York: Harper, 1955, 338 p. $4.00.

In this uncompleted work, which was edited and published after his death in 1954, Mr. Davenport works to meet Marxism's intellectual challenge to our times. Aware of its power and appeal as he is appalled by its effects, he fights hard, if not always clearly and coherently, for a countermovement of the spirit capable of overcoming the "blue haze of fear."

THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN FOREIGN POLICY. By FRANK TANNENBAUM. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955, 178 p. $3.50.

A vigorous polemic against Realpolitik and balance of power thinking, and advocacy of an international order analogous to the federal system of the United States.

TOWARD INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING. By YASAKA TAKAGI. Tokyo: Kenkyusha, 1954, 180 p. Yen 250. (New York: East and West Shop, $1.50.)

Essays on international and Japanese topics, written over several decades by a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo and the first holder of the American Chair at that university.

BILLIONS, BLUNDERS AND BALONEY. By EUGENE W. CASTLE. New York: Devin-Adair, 1955, 278 p. $3.50.

As the title would suggest, the author is less than enthusiastic about the operation of American information and propaganda agencies such as F.O.A. and U.S.I.A., both of which he feels should be eliminated.

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LES DÉLIBÉRATIONS DU CONSEIL DES QUATRE (24 MARS–28 JUIN 1919). By Paul Mantoux. Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1955, 2 v. Fr. 3200.

Notes on the sessions of the Council of Four at the Versailles Conference, taken by M. Mantoux in his capacity as interpreter. An important source in supplementing the previously published record prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey.

PERSONALITIES AND POWERS. By Sir Lewis Namier. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 157 p. $3.00.

While half the pieces in this latest collection of essays, lectures and reviews concern British history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Sir Lewis contrives to keep an eye—and a very sharp one it is—on twentieth century diplomacy.

ASIA AND AFRICA IN THE MODERN WORLD. Edited by S. L. Poplai. Bombay: Asia Publishing House (for the Asian Relations Organization), 1955, 218 p. Rs. 5. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, $1.25.)

A handbook of information on the independent countries of Asia and Africa, prepared by the Asian Relations Organization.

HISTORY OF THE THREE INTERNATIONALS. By William Z. Foster. New York: International Publishers, 1955, 580 p. $6.00.

A capsule history of international Communism from its nineteenth century antecedents to the present, by the chairman of the Communist Party in the United States. Tito's villainy will presumably be removed from a later printing.

ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES. By Lieut.-Col. F. O. Miksche. New York: Praeger, 1955, 222 p. $5.00.

Largely a study of the effect of tactical atomic weapons on the tactics and organization of armies. In the author's view the Western Powers are basing their strategy on bombs that are too big and on armies that are too small.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDED MISSILE. By Kenneth W. Gatland. New York: Philosophical Library (for *Flight*), 1954, 292 p. $4.75.

A collection and discussion of the available information on the growing family of guided missiles.

IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Krystyna Marek. Geneva: Droz, 1954, 613 p. Swiss Fr. 41.60.

An extensive juridical monograph, in which the experiences of Italy, Austria, Jugoslavia, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Austria, the Baltic States and Poland are examined as test cases.

A HALF CENTURY OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. By Frederic R. Coudert. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 352 p. $4.00.

A selection of speeches and articles by a leading American international lawyer.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. New York: Holt, 1955, 414 p. $6.00.

A report of a study group sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association. After undertaking a diagnosis of some of the leading international economic problems, with special emphasis on the underdeveloped countries, it then presents its prescriptions for U.S. foreign economic policy.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PATTERNS. Edited by Harold F. Williamson and John A. Buttrick. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954, 576 p. $9.00.

A number of economists and social scientists examine the various factors contributing to economic development. The chapters include case studies of Japan, India and Mexico.

THE MARSHALL PLAN AND ITS MEANING. By Harry Bayard Price. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955, 424 p. $5.00.

A substantial history and evaluation of the Marshall Plan and associated programs in Asia, published under the auspices of the Governmental Affairs Institute in Washington.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TROPICAL AND SUB-TROPICAL COUNTRIES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO AFRICA. Edited by A. Leslie Banks. London: Arnold, 1954, 217 p. 18/. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955, $3.75.)

The report of a seminar held at Cambridge and using Africa as a typical area for a consideration of the problem.

THE AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE WORLD. By William Van Royen. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954, 258 p. $13.35.

A useful reference work, with maps, diagrams and text.

TARIFFS: THE CASE FOR PROTECTION. By Lewis E. Lloyd. New York: Devin-Adair, 1955, 207 p. $3.50.

An argument for maintaining our present tariff rates, stressing tariff equalization, enforcing anti-dumping laws, and urging currency convertibility.

ENQUÊTE SUR L'IMPOSITION DES REVENUS INDUSTRIELS COMMERCIAUX ET PROFESSIONNELS. Edited by Emanuele Morselli. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1954, 519 p. Fr. 3200.

A survey of the imposition of taxes on business and professional income in some 20 countries of Europe and North and South America.

FEDERALISM, FINANCE AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION. By A. H. Birch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 314 p. $5.60.

A comparative study of federal finance, especially with respect to social legislation, in Canada, Australia and the United States.

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: ECONOMIST AND POLICY MAKER. By Seymour E. Harris. New York: Scribner, 1955, 234 p. $3.00.

A sketch for the general reader of the late Lord Keynes' rôle and contribution as an economic analyst and practitioner.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS. By Donald R. Taft and Richard Robbins. New York: Ronald, 1955, 670 p. $7.00.

A textbook presenting both the theories of migration and the migratory movements since the First World War.

CULTURE AND HUMAN FERTILITY. By Frank Lorimer and Others. Paris: UNESCO, 1954, 514 p. Fr. 1250. (New York: Columbia University Press, $4.50.)

A study by several specialists of the relation of social and cultural conditions to fertility in nonindustrial and transitional societies.

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THE PREVALENCE OF PEOPLE. By Marston Bates. New York: Scribner, 1955, 283 p. $3.95.

A thoughtful and very informative study of the relationship between public health measures and the world's population problem.

STANDING ROOM ONLY. By Karl Sax. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955, 206 p. $3.00.

A vigorously Malthusian view of the world's population problem, placing most stress on the need to control the birth rate.

AMERICAN LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOVEMENT, 1940 TO 1953. By John P. Windmuller. Ithaca: Institute of International Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1954, 243 p. $3.00.

A study of American labor's growing interest and influence in foreign affairs. Particular attention is paid to the issues surrounding the W.F.T.U. and the formation of the I.C.F.T.U.

THE STORY OF FAO. By Gove Hambidge. New York: Van Nostrand, 1955, 303 p. $6.50.

An account of the history and achievements of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, by its North American Regional Representative.

AMERICA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL WELFARE. By Alva Myrdal, Arthur J. Altmeyer and Dean Rusk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 109 p. $2.00.

The Florina Lasker Lectures, delivered in 1953: "A Scientific Approach to International Welfare," by Mr. Myrdal; "Training for International Responsibilities," by Mr. Altmeyer; and "Peace, Freedom, and Social Welfare," by Mr. Rusk.

THE COLOUR PROBLEM. By Anthony H. Richmond. Baltimore: Penguin, 1955, 370 p. 85 cents.

A study of racial prejudice with special reference to the color bar in British and Commonwealth territories in Africa and the West Indies.

AN ESSAY ON RACIAL TENSION. By Philip Mason. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954, 149 p. $1.50.

A concise and illuminating study, of which half is devoted to an excellent examination of racial tension in South Africa.

NATIONALISM: MYTH AND REALITY. By Boyd C. Shafer. New York: Harcourt, 1955, 319 p. $5.00.

In this addition to the literature on the subject the author stresses the contingent nature of nationalism. In his view it is not innate but is a particular product of modern culture and may well vanish with changing conditions.

The Second World War

ROYAL AIR FORCE 1939–1945. By Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders. London: H.M.S.O., 1953–54, 3 v. 40/6. (New York: British Information Services, $7.29.)

An officially commissioned history of R.A.F. operations in the Second World War, based on full access to Air Ministry documents.

WITEBSK. By Otto Heidkämper. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1954, 189 p. DM. 8.80.
TSCHERKASSY. By Nikolaus von Vormann. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1954, 132 p. DM. 8.80.

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DER ENDKAMPF AUF DEM BALKAN. By Erich Schmidt-Richberg. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1955, 163 p. DM. 10.50.

Three volumes in the unofficial history of the German Army in the Second World War: "Die Wehrmacht im Kampf."

MARINE IMPÉRIALE. By Captain Andrieu d'Albas. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1954, 244 p. Fr. 890.

A short history of the Japanese fleet in World War II.

The United States

FOREIGN POLICY AND PARTY POLITICS: PEARL HARBOR TO KOREA. By H. Bradford Westerfield. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955, 448 p. $6.00.

In this substantial examination of the possible ways—partisan, bipartisan and extrapartisan—to achieve democratic control of foreign policy in the United States, the author analyzes Congressional voting, the party organizations and the recent history of the rôle of parties in our foreign relations.

THE PARCHMENT PEACE. By John Chalmers Vinson. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955, 259 p. $4.50.

A study of the rôle of the Senate in forming American foreign policy in the immediate post-Wilson era, especially in relation to the Washington Conference.

GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION. By Alan Barth. New York: Viking, 1955, 231 p. $3.00.

A critique, by an editorial writer on the Washington *Post and Times-Herald*, of recent Congressional inquiries, their methods of procedure, and the extension of their investigations into inappropriate areas of the national life.

U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE: A STUDY AND APPRAISAL. By Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith. New York: Duell, and Boston: Little, Brown, 1955, 256 p. $3.50.

A short history of the development of American military doctrines since the Revolution, with some pertinent concluding observations on military policy and doctrines for the future.

IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Frank L. Auerbach. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955, 372 p. $8.00.

A textbook analyzing the principal provisions of the immigration laws, the regulations issued under them, and the prevailing administrative practices.

PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Jacobus tenBroek and Others. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954, 408 p. $5.00.

A study of the origins, political characteristics and legal consequences of the wartime evacuation of Japanese-Americans from the Pacific Coast, an act which the authors see as a "great and evil blotch upon our national history."

SPANISH-NAME PEOPLE IN THE SOUTHWEST AND WEST. By Robert H. Talbert. Fort Worth: Leo Potishman Foundation, Texas Christian University, 1955, 90 p. $2.00.

An analysis of data in the 1950 United States Census relating to persons of Spanish surname in southwestern states.

NATIONAL POLICIES FOR EDUCATION, HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES. Edited by James E. Russell. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 551 p. $7.50.

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A report on the fourth conference of the series held to celebrate Columbia University's Bicentennial.

AMERICAN INCOME AND ITS USE. By Elizabeth E. Hoyt and Others. New York: Harper, 1954, 362 p. $4.00.

This volume in a series under the sponsorship of the Federal Council of Churches examines the rapid rise of American income in recent decades and our successes and failures in relating this material advance to ethical aims.

ADDRESSES UPON THE AMERICAN ROAD, 1950–1955. By Herbert Hoover. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, 365 p. $4.00.

The latest collection of the former President's public papers—speeches, press statements, articles, etc.

MEET MISTER EISENHOWER. By Merriman Smith. New York: Harper, 1955, 308 p. $3.50.

A sketch of the President in action, by the United Press White House correspondent.

MANPOWER IN THE UNITED STATES: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES. New York: Harper, 1954, 225 p. $3.00.

Some 16 essays by various authors dealing with the American labor force and the mobilization of manpower. Edited by William Haber, Frederick H. Harbison, Lawrence R. Klein and Gladys L. Palmer.

THE PACIFIC COAST MARITIME SHIPPING INDUSTRY, 1930–1948. VOLUME II: AN ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE. By Wytze Gorter and George H. Hildebrand. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954, 371 p. $5.00.

The second volume of this scholarly work—Volume I was published in 1952—analyzes the reasons for the instability and decline of the West Coast shipping industry in recent decades.

Western Europe

HOW CAN EUROPE SURVIVE. By Hans F. Sennholz. New York: Van Nostrand, 1955, 336 p. $4.00.

A survey of the various proposals and organizations for European political unification and economic coöperation. The author, while favoring unification, is sharply opposed to interventionist and "welfare" policies. In his view "only the system of individual liberty and the unhampered world economy can provide the enormous advantages of the international division of labor and provide the milieu for nations to live in peace."

LA DÉMOCRATIE INDUSTRIELLE. By André Philip. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955, 308 p. Fr. 980.

This work is concerned with the problem of interesting the laborer in his work as part of the task of advancing European economic coöperation and integration. Special sections deal with recent French and Jugoslav experiences.

LES GRANDES PUISSANCES. By Jean Chardonnet. Paris: Dalloz, 1953, 589 p. Fr. 1800.

This first volume in a series surveying the economies of the Great Powers deals with the European nations, including Great Britain and the Soviet satellites. It is limited to the period since 1945.

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RECHTSFRAGEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN EINIGUNG. By Rudolf L. Bindschedler. Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1954, 424 p. Swiss Fr. 53.

A monograph on the juridical problems involved in the recent moves toward European unity and unification.

THE EUROPEAN INHERITANCE. Edited by Sir Ernest Barker and Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 3 v. $16.80.

A multi-national general history of Europe, designed to overcome the limited perspectives of national histories. The last section, dealing with the period since 1914, was written by Edmond Vermeil.

FRANCE. By Patrick Edward Charvet. New York: Praeger, 1955, 254 p. $4.50.

A general survey of contemporary France, weak on the economic side but good for its understanding of French society and the intellectual climate of French politics.

FRANCE AGAINST HERSELF. By Herbert Luethy. New York: Praeger, 1955, 476 p. $6.50.

A Swiss political commentator looks searchingly at recent French history and thought to try to determine what makes France tick, and why it ticks at its own rate —a theme suggested in the original Swiss title, "Frankreichs Uhren Gehen Anders" (Zurich: Europa, 1954, 366 p. Swiss Fr. 15.80).

VICHY: POLITICAL DILEMMA. By Paul Farmer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 376 p. $5.50.

An able history of the Vichy régime, which "seemed to have the destiny of thwarting the hopes of everyone who had to do with it." Of particular interest is the author's view of the relation of the Vichy interlude to its background in the Third Republic.

FRANCE: THE TRAGIC YEARS 1939–1947. By Sisley Huddleston. New York: Devin-Adair, 1955, 360 p. $5.00.

A quite personal interpretation of the Vichy era, by a correspondent who died in 1952. Stoutly for Pétain; vigorously anti-de Gaulle.

LES IDÉES POLITIQUES ET SOCIALES DE LA RÉSISTANCE. Edited by Henri Michel and Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1954, 410 p. Fr. 1200.

A collection of clandestine documents by the various groups of the French Resistance movement in the years 1940–1944: articles, broadsides, programs, etc. The editors have provided an extended introduction and notes on the texts.

SO FULL A GLORY: A BIOGRAPHY OF MARSHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY. By Major-General Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones. London: Weidenfeld, 1954, 288 p. 21/.

A popular, appreciative biography of the late French commander.

INDUSTRIALIZATION–EMIGRATION. By Willem Steigenga. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, 69 p. Guilders 4.25.

A study of demographic developments in the Netherlands.

THE CHALLENGE OF SCANDINAVIA. By William L. Shirer. Boston: Little, Brown, 1955, 437 p. $5.00.

The author of "Berlin Diary" reports on Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, giving particular attention to economic and public welfare activities.

SWITZERLAND IN PERSPECTIVE. By George Soloveytchik. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 306 p. $3.40.

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A lively if somewhat ill-organized survey of Swiss life, politics, economic affairs and foreign relations. The author's view is nicely summarized in the observation: "In public life the average citizen of Switzerland is certainly *homo politicus* and *homo economicus;* but when it comes to his domestic affairs, he is *homo infelix* and *homo insipiens.*"

GEDANKEN ÜBER DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE LANDESVERTEIDIGUNG IM ZEICHEN NEUZEITLICHER WAFFENTECHNIK. By Nicolas Jaquet. Basel: Helbing, 1955, 135 p. Swiss Fr. 3.65.

A reëxamination of Swiss defensive and strategic requirements in the age of atomic weapons.

LA NEUTRALITÉ DE LA SUISSE. By Jacques M. Vergotti. Lausanne: Imprimerie La Concorde, 1954, 172 p.

A dissertation dealing with the international aspects of Swiss neutrality in the present century.

DER DEUTSCHE SOLDAT IN DER ARMEE VON MORGEN: WEHRVERFASSUNG, WEHRSYSTEM, INNERES GEFÜGE. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1954, 503 p. DM. 18.

A symposium of articles and studies dealing with the problem of avoiding a return of the tensions between a German army and German society. Particular attention is devoted to the relations between civil and military authorities and to the internal structure of a German military establishment. A wide-ranging discussion.

ADMINISTRATION ET POLITIQUE EN ALLEMAGNE OCCIDENTALE. Edited by Alfred Grosser. Paris: Colin, 1954, 246 p. Fr. 700.

Essays on "Land" and municipal administration in selected areas of West Germany.

TWO POSTWAR RECOVERIES OF THE GERMAN ECONOMY. By Horst Mendershausen. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1955, 130 p. Guilders 12.

An able study of the similarities and differences in Germany's economic reconstruction after the two world wars.

NAZISMEN I TYSKLAND. By Arild Haaland. Bergen: Grieg (for Chr. Michelsens Institute), 1955, 685 p.

On the basis of eight years of study of a great mass of literature, the author discusses the individual, social and ideological factors which went into Nazism in Germany. By comparisons with other countries he eliminates single causes and stresses the peculiar combination of factors in Germany. Particular emphasis is given to psychological factors.

FRAGEBOGEN [THE QUESTIONNAIRE]. By Ernst von Salomon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 525 p. $6.00.

A much discussed political autobiography in the form of answers to the questionnaire which the Allied Military Government required all Nazi suspects to fill out. Entirely frank and often witty about his *Freicorps* past, his drifting in and out of Nationalist movements, the author's views remain peculiarly repellent, but, it is to be hoped, not symptomatic.

THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE FREE: THE GERMANS 1933–45. By Milton Mayer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, 345 p. $4.75.

An informal but in places penetrating and sensitive view of the Third Reich as

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seen and experienced by ten former Nazis whom the author came to know and like during a recent stay in Germany.

NUREMBERG: GERMAN VIEWS OF THE WAR TRIALS. Edited by Wilbourn E. Benton and Georg Grimm. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1955, 232 p. $4.00.

A collection of 12 articles by German lawyers and professors analyzing and criticizing the Nuremberg trials.

FAILURE OF A REVOLUTION: GERMANY IN 1918–1919. By Rudolf Coper. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955, 293 p. $5.00.

A concise retelling of the German Revolution of 1918–1919; very critical of the rôles of Ebert and Scheidemann, though most of the participants seem to have floundered badly.

THE HOLSTEIN PAPERS, VOLUME I: MEMOIRS AND POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS. Edited by Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955, 215 p. $5.00.

The papers of Baron von Holstein were captured by the Allies in the Second World War. This first volume of the English translation includes his memoirs, written in 1883, in 1898 and in 1906–1909. Volumes of diaries and letters are in preparation.

KRUPPS. By Gert von Klass. London: Sidgwick, 1954, 437 p. 25/.

A sympathetic history of the Krupp dynasty and their industrial empire.

TRAGÉDIE DE LA DÉPORTATION, 1940–1945: TÉMOIGNAGES DE SURVIVANTS DES CAMPS DE CONCENTRATION ALLEMANDS. Edited by Olga Wormser and Henri Michel. Paris: Hachette, 1954, 511 p. Fr. 1000.

Further scenes, episodes and tragedies of German concentration camp life.

WHO'S WHO IN AUSTRIA. Edited by Stephen Taylor. New York: Intercontinental Book, 1955, 703 p. $12.00.

The first edition of this reference book for Austria.

DIECI ANNI DOPO, 1945–1955. By Leo Valiani and Others. Bari: Laterza, 1955, 598 p. L. 3000.

A useful review, by seven authors, of political, constitutional, legal, economic, labor and cultural developments in Italy over the decade since liberation.

STORIA DELLA RESISTENZA ITALIANA. By Roberto Battaglia. Turin: Einaudi, 1953, 623 p. L. 2500.

An extensive and substantial history of the achievements of the Italian Resistance from September 1943 to the end of the War. The author participated in the group "Giustizia e Libertà."

SÜDTIROL. By Mathilde de Block. Groningen: Wolters, 1954, 230 p.

A Dutch dissertation, written in German, on the history of the South Tyrol in diplomatic relations.

COMMUNISM AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. By David T. Cattell. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955, 290 p. $3.75.

A dissertation on the rôle of the Communists and of Communism in the Spanish civil conflict. In general the author finds that at this juncture the Communists' aims, if not their means, were relatively limited and largely determined by defensive considerations.

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Eastern Europe

NINE SOVIET PORTRAITS. By Raymond A. Bauer. Cambridge: Technology Press, and New York: Wiley, 1955, 190 p. $3.95.

A useful reconstruction in semi-fictional form of the life, outlook and problems of nine "typical" Soviet citizens, ranging from a woman collective farmer to a secret police agent.

SOVIET MILITARY LAW AND ADMINISTRATION. By Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 208 p. $4.00.

An analysis, the first of its kind, of the administrative and legal structure of the Soviet military establishment.

SOVIET POWER AND POLICY. By George B. De Huszar and Associates. New York: Crowell, 1955, 598 p. $8.75.

Chapters by 14 authors, providing a relatively comprehensive but uneven handbook on the components of Soviet power and on Soviet expansion in Eurasia.

SOVIET TAXATION. By Franklyn D. Holzman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 376 p. $6.50.

An able and systematic investigation of the Soviet taxation system, its theory and history. The book includes a significant analysis of the burden of taxation.

LE NIVEAU DE VIE EN U.R.S.S. By Jean Romeuf. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1954, 138 p. Fr. 540.

An inquiry into Soviet standards of living, wages, purchasing power and prices.

ATTACHÉ NAVAL À MOSCOU. By Rear Admiral Peltier. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1954, 312 p. Fr. 630.

Run-of-the-mill "témoignage" of a French naval person.

MY NINE LIVES IN THE RED ARMY. By Mikhail Soloviev. New York: McKay, 1955, 308 p. $3.75.

Episodes and recollections of the 1930's and early 1940's, largely dealing with life in the Red Army, by a former Soviet military correspondent and writer.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917. By N. N. Sukhanov. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 691 p. $10.00.

A good, abridged translation of one of the most important eyewitness accounts of the Russian revolutions of 1917, "Zapiski o Revolutsii," originally printed in Russian in Germany in 1922 and 1923.

NINETEEN-SEVENTEEN: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION BETRAYED. By Voline. New York: Libertarian Book Club, 1954, 269 p. $3.50.

An interpretation of where and how the Russian Revolution of 1917 went wrong, by a Russian anarchist who died in 1945.

THE WAIF. By Nicholas Voinov. New York: Pantheon, 1955, 291 p. $3.95.

A grim autobiographical account of a child who was orphaned by the purge of his father in 1929 and joined the ranks of roving urchins and juvenile delinquents.

BOROT'BISM. By Iwan Majstrenko. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954, 325 p. $4.50.

A history of the Borot'bisty, Ukrainian left-wing Socialists who coöperated with the Bolsheviks in the early years of the Revolution.

THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY IN FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. New York: United Committee of the Ukrainian-American Organizations, 1954, 223 p. $3.50.

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A miscellany of addresses, articles, short stories and plays dealing with the background and activities of Ukrainska Povstancha Armia (UPA).

CHURCH AND STATE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. Edited by Vladimir Gsovski. New York: Praeger (for the Mid-European Studies Center), 1955, 311 p. $5.00.

A handbook on church-state relations under the Communist régimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. The authors are exiles from these countries.

THE SOVIET SEIZURE OF SUBCARPATHIAN RUTHENIA. By F. Nemec and V. Moudry. Toronto: Anderson, 1955, 375 p. $4.75.

Authoritative and well documented. One of the authors (Mr. Nemec) was the Beneš Government's plenipotentiary for "liberated areas." The efforts to restore Czechoslovak sovereignty in Subcarpathian Ruthenia were frustrated by the skill and superior power of Soviet forces.

INDUSTRIEKOMBINAT OBERSCHLESIEN. By Peter-Heinz Seraphim. Cologne: Müller, 1953, 101 p. DM. 8.60.

A study of the Upper Silesian industrial area under Soviet control.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE POSTWAR ECONOMY OF POLAND. By W. J. Stankiewicz and J. M. Montias. New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1955, 125 p. $1.00.

A brief and introductory study of institutional developments in the Polish economy up to mid-1954.

PEASANTS, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN YUGOSLAVIA. By Jozo Tomasevich. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, 743 p. $7.50.

An extensive description and analysis of the peasantry and agriculture in Jugoslavia during the inter-war period, introduced by a section dealing with political and socio-economic developments prior to 1914. The position of the agricultural population was, as the author puts it, "unenviable." No comparisons with the postwar situation.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN BRITAIN. Edited by D. V. Glass. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1955, 412 p. $5.00.

An extensive collection of studies, in which many scholars and specialists have participated, dealing with the intricate and subtle problem of social mobility: the extent of movement in social status or social position by individuals of diverse social origins.

THE MIDDLE CLASS VOTE. By John Bonham. London: Faber, 1954, 210 p. 21/.

An analysis of the voting record in the British general elections of 1945, 1950 and 1951 of the roughly 10,000,000 people the author classifies as being of the political middle class.

POWER AND INFLUENCE. By Lord Beveridge. New York: Beechhurst Press, 1955, 447 p. $5.00.

A graceful but candid autobiography revealing Lord Beveridge's many and varied activities prior to the famous Report, which stands as an appropriate capstone to his career.

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THE PHANTOM CARAVAN. By Sir Owen O'Malley. London: Murray, 1954, 262 p. 21/.

Pleasantly written memoirs of a life in the British Foreign Service—travels through Russia, China, Indo-China, Mexico, Spain, Hungary and Portugal—and comments on the operation of the Foreign Office.

THE MISSING MACLEANS. By Geoffrey Hoare. New York: Viking, 1955, 247 p. $3.75.

On the disappearance of the two British Foreign Office officials, Burgess and Maclean, and of the latter's wife. Many interesting clues; no certain answers.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH. By D. C. Somervell and Heather Harvey. London: Christophers, 1954, 444 p. 15/.

A general regional survey, an extensive revision of Somervell's earlier "The British Empire."

THE MULTI-RACIAL COMMONWEALTH. By Nicholas Mansergh. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955, 175 p. $4.00.

A report on issues of intra-Commonwealth interest discussed at the Fifth Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Lahore in March 1954.

THE BRITISH ISLES: A GEOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC SURVEY. By L. Dudley Stamp and Stanley H. Beaver. New York: Longmans, 1954, 780 p. $9.50.

A revised and considerably rewritten edition of a standard work of reference.

NEW ZEALAND. Edited by J. L. Robson. London: Stevens, 1954, 384 p. 30/.

The fourth volume in an important, though specialized, series of studies on the development of the laws and constitutions of the British Commonwealth members.

WAR ECONOMY, 1939–1942. By S. J. Butlin. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1955, 516 p. 25/.

This volume in the civil series of the history of Australia in the war of 1939–1945 covers developments in the Australian war economy through the Japanese attack.

ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION. By A. W. Currie. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954, 727 p. $10.00.

A substantial and, it would appear, definitive study of the major problem of the Canadian economy, a problem rooted in the physical geography of the Dominion.

The Middle East

SA'UDI ARABIA. By H. St. John Philby. New York: Praeger, 1955, 393 p. $6.50.

A recognized authority on the Arabian peninsula here narrates the achievements of the dynasty of Ibn Sa'ud over the last 200 years.

ISRAEL'S EMERGING CONSTITUTION, 1948–51. By Emanuel Rackman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 196 p. $3.00.

A study of the various constitutional projects, endeavors and controversies during the years of Israel's establishment.

BAHREIN ISLANDS. By Fereydoun Adamiyat. New York: Praeger, 1955, 268 p. $5.00.

An examination by an Iranian scholar of the conflicting British and Russian claims to the Bahrein Islands.

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South and Southeast Asia

AN AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA. By W. W. Rostow with Richard W. Hatch. Cambridge: Technology Press, and New York: Wiley, 1955, 59 p. $1.00.

This sequel to the author's "The Prospects for Communist China" (noted here July 1955) is concerned with defining U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and indicating certain recommended lines of action, especially in the area of economic development.

PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN ASIA. By Edward S. Mason. Claremont (Cal.): Claremont College, 1955, 83 p. $2.75.

In these lectures Dr. Mason very concisely and skillfully examines the justification for U.S. aid to Southern Asia—primarily as a security interest—and the prospects for economic advance—which he considers only moderate. Contains a useful section on Pakistan, where the author served as an economic adviser.

THE WESTERN-EDUCATED MAN IN INDIA. By John and Ruth Hill Useem. New York: Dryden, 1955, 237 p. $3.00.

The results of a field investigation of the consequences of a Western education in terms of social rôle and influence; with a view to possible improvements in organizing the exchange of persons between countries.

MINORITY PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1955, 295 p. $4.00.

A rather unevenly organized and written book, but with some useful information on the Indians in Southeast Asia and on the conflicts between various Buddhist groups.

ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THAILAND SINCE 1850. By James C. Ingram. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1955, 254 p. $5.00.

A scholarly effort to trace, against a paucity of data, the principal economic changes which have occurred in Thailand over the last century.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Rupert Emerson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1955, 197 p. $3.50.

A brief examination by a professor of government at Harvard of the development and functioning of representative government in Indonesia, Burma and Malaya. Chapters on the Philippines and on local self-government have been prepared by Willard H. Elsbree and Virginia Thompson.

REPORT FROM MALAYA. By Vernon Bartlett. New York: Criterion Books, 1955, 128 p. $2.75.

An able political report on Malaya and the struggle against the Communist terrorists, based largely on observations made in 1953.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

SOWJET-FERNOST. By Erich Thiel. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1953, 329 p. DM. 19.80.

A solid study of the physical and economic geography of the far eastern regions of the U.S.S.R., from Irkutsk to the Bering Strait.

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CHINA UNDER COMMUNISM: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS. By Richard L. Walker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955, 403 p. $4.50.

An excellent and comprehensive survey of developments in Communist China since the establishment of the Peking régime in October 1949. The author concludes that the Communists, despite some impressive achievements, have been corrupted by their absolute power. Ruthless, aggressive and warlike, they have already gone far toward transforming China's ancient and humane civilization into a slave society. Mr. Walker sees little prospect for change in Communist China's basic international orientation of alliance with the U.S.S.R. and implacable hostility to the United States.

SOVIET POLICIES IN CHINA, 1917–1924. By Allen S. Whiting. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 350 p. $5.50.

An able and scholarly monograph, one of the studies of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, directed to the question: "How did Soviet policy in China evolve, and what were the implications of that evolution for Soviet Russia's position in the Far East?"

THE RISE OF CHINESE MILITARY POWER, 1895–1912. By Ralph L. Powell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, 383 p. $6.00.

A study of the growth of semi-personal armies and warlordism together with the modernization of Chinese land forces during the years between the Sino-Japanese war and the abdication of the Emperor in 1912.

STILL THE RICE GROWS GREEN. By John C. Caldwell. Chicago: Regnery, 1955, 312 p. $3.75.

A personal but informative report on the Chinese coastal islands, Formosa and Korea, and on the prospects, which the author believes are real, for undoing the Communist victory on the mainland.

JAPANESE AND AMERICANS: A CENTURY OF CULTURAL RELATIONS. By Robert S. Schwantes. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1955, 380 p. $4.00.

In this well-informed study Mr. Schwantes proceeds from the American and the Japanese image of the other nation to a consideration of economic, ideological, educational, literary and artistic influences and cross-currents over the last century. Approaching the subject as a historian, the author gives much emphasis to present-day Japanese-American cultural relations and to their prospects for the future.

WITHOUT THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: A STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES OF YOUTH IN POST-WAR JAPAN. By Jean Stoetzel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 334 p. $4.00.

A sociological study, organized by UNESCO, of the attitudes of Japanese youth, making extensive use of questionnaires, projective tests and the like.

HIROSHIMA DIARY. By Michihiko Hachiya. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955, 238 p. $3.50.

The journal of a Japanese physician covering the harrowing days after the explosion of the atomic bomb.

Africa

LES PARTIS POLITIQUES MAROCAINS. By Robert Rézette. Paris: Colin, 1955, 403 p. Fr. 1300.

An important, scholarly and detailed examination of Moroccan political parties: their history, structure and leadership. Includes Tangier and the Spanish Zone.

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EGYPT'S LIBERATION. By Gamal Abdul Nasser. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955, 119 p. $2.00.

Premier Nasser's "impressions of the philosophy of the revolution of July 23, 1952."

THE SUDAN. By Sir Harold MacMichael. New York: Praeger, 1955, 255 p. $4.50.

A concise survey by a onetime public servant in the Sudan. Very snappish about the Egyptian rôle.

MUST WE LOSE AFRICA? By Colin Legum. London: W. H. Allen, 1954, 264 p. 16/.

This book has two distinct parts: The first concerns the crisis surrounding the banishment of the Kabaka of Buganda in 1953; the second, the general problem of European-African relations, especially in British Africa.

RÉACTIONS DAHOMÉENNES. By R. Grivot. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1954, 180 p. Fr. 400.

A brief study, by a colonial official, of the native reaction to the French social, economic and cultural impact on Dahomey.

Latin America and the West Indies

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA: ITS RISE AND DECLINE. By Arthur P. Whitaker. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954, 194 p. $3.00.

Eight essays on the history of the idea that the peoples of the Western Hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another and that this sets them apart from the rest of the world—an idea which the author sees as being on the decline in the last few decades.

ROOSEVELT Y LA BUENA VECINDAD. By Francisco Cuevas Cancino. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1954, 551 p. Pesos 25.

An extensive study and appreciation of the late President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.

TOWARD OUR COMMON AMERICAN DESTINY. By John M. Cabot. Medford: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1955, 214 p. $3.50.

A volume of speeches and interviews on Latin American problems by Ambassador Cabot, while Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1953–54.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH WEST INDIES. By Sir Alan Burns. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954, 821 p. 70/. (New York: Macmillan, $12.00.)

A comprehensive general history, of which, however, only a few pages are devoted to the present century.

HAÏTI ET SON PEUPLE. By Dantès Bellegarde. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1953, 121 p. Fr. 250.

A brief sketch.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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Pyidawtha; the new Burma. A report from the Government to the people of the Union of Burma on our long-term programme for economic and social development. Rangoon, Economic and Social Board, Government of the Union of Burma, 1954. 128 p. 7s. 6d.

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